Fed and Lehman Brothers: Setting the Record Straight on a Financial Disaster, The Fed and Lehman Brothers: Setting the Record Straight on a Financial Disaster [Kõva köide]

(The Johns Hopkins University)
  • Formaat: Hardback, 294 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 236x159x17 mm, kaal: 610 g, Worked examples or Exercises; 6 Line drawings, black and white
  • Sari: Studies in Macroeconomic History
  • Ilmumisaeg: 07-Jun-2018
  • Kirjastus: Cambridge University Press
  • ISBN-10: 1108420966
  • ISBN-13: 9781108420969
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  • Formaat: Hardback, 294 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 236x159x17 mm, kaal: 610 g, Worked examples or Exercises; 6 Line drawings, black and white
  • Sari: Studies in Macroeconomic History
  • Ilmumisaeg: 07-Jun-2018
  • Kirjastus: Cambridge University Press
  • ISBN-10: 1108420966
  • ISBN-13: 9781108420969
Teised raamatud teemal:
The bankruptcy of the investment bank Lehman Brothers was the pivotal event of the 2008 financial crisis and the Great Recession that followed. Ever since the bankruptcy, there has been heated debate about why the Federal Reserve did not rescue Lehman in the same way it rescued other financial institutions, such as Bear Stearns and AIG. The Fed's leaders from that time, especially former Chairman Ben Bernanke, have strongly asserted that they lacked the legal authority to save Lehman because it did not have adequate collateral for the loan it needed to survive. Based on a meticulous four-year study of the Lehman case, The Fed and Lehman Brothers debunks the official narrative of the crisis. It shows that in reality, the Fed could have rescued Lehman but officials chose not to because of political pressures and because they underestimated the damage that the bankruptcy would do to the economy. The compelling story of the Lehman collapse will interest anyone who cares about what caused the financial crisis, whether the leaders of the Federal Reserve have given accurate accounts of their actions, and how the Fed can prevent future financial disasters.

Arvustused

'What caused the financial crisis of 2008? Are policymakers ready to handle the next one? These are key questions for anyone interested in economic history and policy. In the past decade, a conventional wisdom has developed about the answers. Yet a new book questions that orthodoxy, offering a more disturbing perspective on the past and a less sanguine prognosis for the future.' The New York Times 'Ten years after the Lehman Brothers collapse, one might think that it's time to end the debate over its causes. Laurence M. Ball, an economics professor at The Johns Hopkins, doesn't agree. He makes a persuasive case that a key lesson remains overlooked: that the Lehman failure and the market crash that followed didn't have to happen and that the political response, the 2010 Dodd-Frank banking law, has made future financial crises more likely, not less ... Mr Ball's argument that Dodd-Frank contains the seeds of further politically motivated fiascoes is persuasive - and worrisome.' Wall Street Journal 'Laurence M. Ball has produced a brilliant and riveting study of the most important moment of modern financial history: the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. In a remarkably detailed and careful analysis Ball argues that decisions were driven by politics rather than sound policy. In short, this is a must-read masterpiece of financial and historical analysis.' Jeffrey Sachs, Columbia University, New York 'Government failure to rescue Lehman Brothers investment bank, and its bankruptcy in September 2008, precipitated a monumental financial crisis. Laurence M. Ball combs through a mass of documents, and presents a new and quite disturbing perspective on the events. Some may disagree with his take, but it is a milestone in the historical analysis of the crisis.' Andrei Shleifer, Harvard University, Massachusetts 'A monumental piece of scholarship that is essential for understanding the financial crisis of 2008 - and the Great Recession that followed. Meticulous, gripping, and compelling.' David Romer, Herman Royer Professor of Political Economy, University of California, Berkeley 'With unprecedented and exciting investigative research, Laurence M. Ball convincingly puts forth an important new view of the financial crisis, uncovering fundamental inconsistencies in the government's often-told story of its role in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and the panic of 2008. He shows that the Fed could have legally prevented the bankruptcy, but didn't do so either because of political concerns or a botched implementation of its game plan.' John B. Taylor, Mary and Robert Raymond Professor of Economics, Stanford University 'The official narrative of any crisis is not always the most accurate. Professor Laurence M. Ball's authoritative account of Lehman's demise debunks the Fed's narrative of the calamity and raises uncomfortable questions about the Fed's inconsistent use of its discretionary authority. This captivating book should be required reading for anyone with a stake in preventing the next financial collapse.' Athanasios Orphanides, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 'Ball supports his hypothesis with ample documentation. Whether readers come away convinced that the Fed made a grievous error in not being the lender of last resort to Lehman will probably depend on their view of the Fed. And even if future Fed leaders 'take the Lehman lesson to heart', they may be hamstrung in their actions.' Brenda Jubin, Talk Markets (www.talkmarkets.com) 'Laurence Ball's new book The Fed and Lehman Brothers is an excellent book on the 2008 Financial Crisis ... This is a valuable lesson I have learned from Professor Ball's explanation of how the Fed could have saved Lehman. Merely by broadening the types of collateral accepted for cash funding from the Fed and maintaining the functioning of the repo market, the Fed can ensure solvent financial institutions being able to withstand the turbulence of financial crisis.' Seeking Alpha (www.seekingalpha.com) 'The bank that precipitated the [ financial] crisis was Lehman Brothers. In The Fed and Lehman Brothers, [ Laurence M. Ball], a senior American economics professor, has written an entire book on this episode, based on a careful archival reconstruction of events. His findings are fascinating and significant, and so is his villain: not Lehman Brothers but the Federal Reserve.' Paul Collier, The Times Literary Supplement 'What caused the financial crisis of 2008? Are policymakers ready to handle the next one? These are key questions for anyone interested in economic history and policy. In the past decade, a conventional wisdom has developed about the answers. Yet a new book questions that orthodoxy, offering a more disturbing perspective on the past and a less sanguine prognosis for the future.' The New York Times 'Ten years after the Lehman Brothers collapse, one might think that it's time to end the debate over its causes. Laurence M. Ball, an economics professor at The Johns Hopkins, doesn't agree. He makes a persuasive case that a key lesson remains overlooked: that the Lehman failure and the market crash that followed didn't have to happen and that the political response, the 2010 Dodd-Frank banking law, has made future financial crises more likely, not less ... Mr Ball's argument that Dodd-Frank contains the seeds of further politically motivated fiascoes is persuasive - and worrisome.' Wall Street Journal 'Laurence M. Ball has produced a brilliant and riveting study of the most important moment of modern financial history: the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. In a remarkably detailed and careful analysis Ball argues that decisions were driven by politics rather than sound policy. In short, this is a must-read masterpiece of financial and historical analysis.' Jeffrey Sachs, Columbia University, New York 'Government failure to rescue Lehman Brothers investment bank, and its bankruptcy in September 2008, precipitated a monumental financial crisis. Laurence M. Ball combs through a mass of documents, and presents a new and quite disturbing perspective on the events. Some may disagree with his take, but it is a milestone in the historical analysis of the crisis.' Andrei Shleifer, Harvard University, Massachusetts 'A monumental piece of scholarship that is essential for understanding the financial crisis of 2008 - and the Great Recession that followed. Meticulous, gripping, and compelling.' David Romer, Herman Royer Professor of Political Economy, University of California, Berkeley 'With unprecedented and exciting investigative research, Laurence M. Ball convincingly puts forth an important new view of the financial crisis, uncovering fundamental inconsistencies in the government's often-told story of its role in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and the panic of 2008. He shows that the Fed could have legally prevented the bankruptcy, but didn't do so either because of political concerns or a botched implementation of its game plan.' John B. Taylor, Mary and Robert Raymond Professor of Economics, Stanford University 'The official narrative of any crisis is not always the most accurate. Professor Laurence M. Ball's authoritative account of Lehman's demise debunks the Fed's narrative of the calamity and raises uncomfortable questions about the Fed's inconsistent use of its discretionary authority. This captivating book should be required reading for anyone with a stake in preventing the next financial collapse.' Athanasios Orphanides, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 'Ball supports his hypothesis with ample documentation. Whether readers come away convinced that the Fed made a grievous error in not being the lender of last resort to Lehman will probably depend on their view of the Fed. And even if future Fed leaders 'take the Lehman lesson to heart', they may be hamstrung in their actions.' Brenda Jubin, Talk Markets (www.talkmarkets.com) 'Laurence Ball's new book The Fed and Lehman Brothers is an excellent book on the 2008 Financial Crisis ... This is a valuable lesson I have learned from Professor Ball's explanation of how the Fed could have saved Lehman. Merely by broadening the types of collateral accepted for cash funding from the Fed and maintaining the functioning of the repo market, the Fed can ensure solvent financial institutions being able to withstand the turbulence of financial crisis.' Seeking Alpha (www.seekingalpha.com) 'The bank that precipitated the [ financial] crisis was Lehman Brothers. In The Fed and Lehman Brothers, [ Laurence M. Ball], a senior American economics professor, has written an entire book on this episode, based on a careful archival reconstruction of events. His findings are fascinating and significant, and so is his villain: not Lehman Brothers but the Federal Reserve.' Paul Collier, The Times Literary Supplement

Muu info

This book sets the record straight on why the Federal Reserve failed to rescue Lehman Brothers during the financial crisis.
Preface ix
Acknowledgments xvi
A Chronology of the Lehman Disaster xviii
1 Introduction
1(18)
A Preview of the Argument
Sources of Evidence
2 The Crisis of 2008
19(30)
Investment Banking on the Eve of the Crisis
The Bear Stearns Crisis and the Fed's Response, March 2008
The Lehman Brothers Crisis, March-September 2008
Lehman's Final Weekend
After Lehman's Bankruptcy
3 The Legal Criteria for Fed Assistance
49(6)
Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act
What Is "Satisfactory Security!"
4 Lehman's Balance Sheet and Solvency
55(26)
An Overview of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.
LBHI's Balance Sheet
Asset Valuation and Lehman's Solvency
Fed Officials' Claims about Lehman's Solvency
Lehman in Bankruptcy
5 Lehman's Liquidity Crisis
81(14)
Lehman's Strategy for Liquidity Management
Changes in Lehman's Liquidity, May 31--September 9
The Run on Lehman, September 10--12
Lehman's Predicament on September 13--14
6 Lehman's Collateral and the Feasibility of Liquidity Support
95(18)
The Implications of Lehman's Long-Term Debt
A Realistic Scenario for Fed Assistance
Comparison to Actual Assistance to LBI
7 Fed Discussions of Collateral and Liquidity Support
113(32)
Discussions before September 15
Bernanke's Testimony on September 23
Fed Claims about Legal Authority, October 2008--Present
The FCIC Challenges Fed Officials
Did Lehman Need a "Naked Guarantee!"
8 Fed Actions That Ensured Lehman's Bankruptcy
145(20)
An Overview of the Fed's Actions
The Fed Tells Lehman to File for Bankruptcy
Confusion about the PDCF Restrictions
No Support for LBIE
The Friday Criterion
9 Possible Long-Term Outcomes for Lehman
165(12)
Possible Outcome #1 Completing the Barclays Deal
Possible Outcome #2 Survival of an Independent Lehman
Possible Outcome #3 An Orderly Wind Down
10 How Risky Were the Fed's Rescues of Other Firms?
177(18)
Liquidity Support for Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs
The Bear Stearns Rescue
The AIG Rescue
The Commercial Paper Funding Facility
11 Who Decided that Lehman Should Fail?
195(14)
The Fed and the Treasury in 2008
Henry Paulson's Role in the Lehman Crisis
Ben Bernanke's Role in the Lehman Crisis
Why Was Paulson in Charge!
12 Explaining the Lehman Decision
209(16)
Fear of Political Backlash
Expectations about the Costs of Lehman's Failure
The Fed's Shift on AIG
13 Conclusion
225(4)
Notes 229(21)
References 250(5)
Index 255
Laurence M. Ball is Professor of Economics at The Johns Hopkins University. He has previously worked as a Visiting Scholar at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, foreign central banks including the Bank of England and Bank of Japan, and at the International Monetary Fund. His current research topics include the long-term damage from the Great Recession and the case for raising central banks' inflation targets to four percent.