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Comprehensibility of the Universe: A New Conception of Science [Kõva köide]

(Emeritus Reader in Philosophy of Science, University of London)
  • Formaat: Hardback, 332 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 244x166x23 mm, kaal: 654 g, 7 figures, tables
  • Ilmumisaeg: 15-Oct-1998
  • Kirjastus: Clarendon Press
  • ISBN-10: 0198237766
  • ISBN-13: 9780198237761
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Comprehensibility of the Universe: A New Conception of ScienceSuurem pilt
  • Formaat: Hardback, 332 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 244x166x23 mm, kaal: 654 g, 7 figures, tables
  • Ilmumisaeg: 15-Oct-1998
  • Kirjastus: Clarendon Press
  • ISBN-10: 0198237766
  • ISBN-13: 9780198237761
Teised raamatud teemal:
Püsilink: https://www.kriso.ee/db/9780198237761.html
Märksõnad:
The Comprehensibility of the Universe puts forward a radically new conception of science. At present scientific enquiry is shaped by the orthodox view that in accepting or rejecting theories scientists are impartial with respect to evidence and make no permanent assumptions about the world independently of the evidence. Nicholas Maxwell argues that this view is untenable, and that we need a new orthodoxy, which sees science as making a hierarchy of increasingly attenuated metaphysical assumptions about the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe.

This new conception has significant implications, as Maxwell explains. One is that it is part of current scientific knowledge that the universe is comprehensible, even physically comprehensible. A second is that metaphysics and philosophy are central to scientific knowledge. A third is that science possesses a rational, though fallible, method of discovery. A fourth is that we need a new understanding of scientific method and rationality. Maxwell points the way towards the solution, within his new conception, of long-standing philosophical problems about science, concerning simplicity, induction, and progress. His goal is the reform not just of the philosophy of science but of science itself, and the healing of the rift between the two.

Arvustused

This is not a book to read quickly or easily, but I hope that many may make the effort, because it seems to me to be an important contribution to the philosophy of physics. * British Journal for the Philosophy of Science * Maxwell performs a heroic feat in making the physics accessible to the non-physicist ... Philosophically, there is much here to stimulate and provoke ... those who share Maxwell's intuitions about progress, even those uncommitted to "theories of everything", will find encouragement here for thinking about how one does justice to such a possibility. * Anjan Chakravartty, THES * This admirably ambitious book contains more thought-provoking material than can even be mentioned here. Maxwell's treatment of the descriptive problem of simplicity, and his novel proposals about quantum mechanics deserve special note. * The Philosophical Review *

List of Figures and Tables
xiv(1)
List of Abbreviations xv
1. A NEW CONCEPTION OF SCIENCE
1(35)
1. How does science make progress?
1(1)
2. The orthodox conception of science is untenable
2(2)
3. The fundamental epistemological dilemma of science
4(2)
4. Aim-oriented empiricism
6(7)
5. How aim-oriented empiricism solves the fundamental dilemma
13(4)
6. Aim-oriented empiricism as the key to scientific progress
17(2)
7. Traditional rationalism and empiricism
19(2)
8. Clashing principles
21(2)
9. From standard to aim-oriented empiricism
23(3)
10. Implications of adopting the new conception of science
26(6)
11. Can philosophy of science have implications for science?
32(1)
12. The limitations of physics
33(1)
13. Plan of the book
34(2)
2. THE FAILINGS OF STANDARD EMPIRICISM
36(39)
1. Failure of standard empiricism to do justice to achievements of modern science
36(1)
2. Bare and dressed standard empiricism
37(1)
3. How widely held is standard empiricism?
38(7)
4. Ten problems standard empiricism cannot solve
45(1)
5. The ten problems concern natural science as a whole and not just theoretical physics
46(1)
6. Fundamental objection to standard empiricism
46(1)
7. Three problems of induction
47(9)
8. Two problems of simplicity
56(12)
9. Two problems about evidence
68(1)
10. Three problems of scientific progress
69(5)
11. Conclusion
74(1)
3. COMPREHENSIBILITY
75(28)
1. Introduction
75(1)
2. What does comprehensibility mean?
75(3)
3. Unity through diversity: the Presocratics
78(2)
4. Blueprints for a physically comprehensible universe
80(9)
5. Aspects of physical comprehensibility
89(4)
6. From non-aberrance to unity
93(10)
4. SIMPLICITY
103(61)
1. Introduction
103(1)
2. Pragmatic and epistemological notions of simplicity
103(1)
3. Diverse aspects of the problem of what simplicity is
104(2)
4. How aim-oriented empiricism solves the problem of what simplicity is
106(3)
5. Content and form
109(1)
6. Terminological simplicity
110(3)
7. Further questions
113(5)
8. Is physicalism meaningful?
118(2)
9. Unity throughout diversity
120(1)
10. The problematic vagueness of physicalism
121(2)
11. Two examples of theoretical unification from the history of physics
123(8)
12. Global and local gauge invariance of Maxwell's equations
131(1)
13. Further unifying achievements of modern physics
132(9)
14. How can what exists at one instant necessarily determine what exists subsequently?
141(14)
15. Goodman-type objections
155(2)
16. Simplicity
157(2)
17. How is the physical comprehensibility of a new theory to be assessed?
159(4)
18. Conclusion
163(1)
5. INDUCTION
164(45)
1. Introduction
164(1)
2. Outline of the solution and three objections answered
165(3)
3. Rivals to comprehensibility
168(4)
4. The induction theorem
172(1)
5. Proof of the induction theorem
173(20)
r = 2
175(2)
r = 3
177(3)
r = 4
180(3)
r = 5
183(1)
r = 6
184(1)
r = 7
184(2)
r = 10
186(1)
r = 9
187(4)
r = 8
191(2)
6. Knowledge must be explanatory
193(3)
7. Necessary connections
196(3)
8. All three problems of induction solved
199(2)
9. Reply to objections
201(8)
6. EVIDENCE, PROGRESS, AND DISCOVERY
209(19)
1. Introduction
209(1)
2. Two problems about evidence
209(2)
3. Two problems about scientific progress
211(8)
4. A problem concerning scientific discovery
219(4)
5. Is aim-oriented empiricism required for the solution to the ten problems?
223(5)
7. QUANTUM THEORY
228(27)
1. Why orthodox quantum theory poses a challenge for aim-oriented empiricism
228(2)
2. Six defects of orthodox quantum theory that result from the failure to solve the wave/particle problem
230(5)
3. Probabilism as the key to the solution to the great quantum mystery
235(12)
4. When do probabilistic jumps occur? An idea as old as quantum theory itself
247(2)
5. The precise postulate
249(3)
6. Why has the idea been ignored?
252(1)
7. Conclusion
253(2)
Mathematical and Physical Appendix 255(14)
1. Differential equations 255(1)
2. Maxwell's equations of the electromagnetic field 256(1)
3. The role of symmetry and group theory in physics 257(5)
4. Is symmetry necessary for unity, or is it just one possible ingredient? 262(2)
5. Groups and matrices 264(1)
6. Introduction to quantum theory 265(4)
Notes 269(28)
References 297(10)
Index 307


Nicholas Maxwell is Emeritus Reader in Philosophy of Science at the University of London.