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E-raamat: Internal Game Theory

(University of Athens, Greece)
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Traditional game theory requires at least two individuals. This book extends game theory to the inner workings of a single person.

Using game theory to analyse single individuals makes sense if one thinks of individuals as consisting of two or more relatively autonomous partitions that might have conflicting motives. This is not to say that individuals are literally made up from multiple selves; it only suffices that we adopt a portrayal of the individual as a multilayered entity or of a dual nature, in a manner similar to Adam Smith’s depiction of an "impartial spectator" existing within the individual,

The notion that individuals may be considered as collections of distinct partitions or "sub-selves" has been challenging writers from diverse fields for many centuries. This book breaks new ground in combining psychological with evolutionary game theory, making for a highly promising way towards a better understanding of the individual and the development of their behaviour, along with the individual’s own perceptions on it.

List of illustrations
vii
Foreword x
Acknowledgements xiii
1 Overview
1(11)
1.1 Inner conflicts and individual choice theory
1(4)
1.2 Partitioned individuals and game theory
5(2)
1.3 Beliefs and psychological game theory
7(2)
1.4 Organisation of the book
9(3)
2 Individual behaviour
12(38)
2.1 Preferences and utility
12(7)
2.2 Individual choice
19(4)
2.3 Uncertainty and expected utility
23(10)
2.4 Criticisms of neoclassical economics' definitions of rationality
33(12)
2.5 The neoclassical defence
45(3)
2.6 Conclusion
48(2)
3 The partitioned self
50(25)
3.1 Introduction
50(1)
3.2 Plato's Republic
51(2)
3.3 The Humean view on the self
53(2)
3.4 Freud and Jung
55(5)
3.5 Theories on the divided self
60(5)
3.6 Jon Elster's `multiple self'
65(5)
3.7 Neuroeconomics
70(2)
3.8 The economic agent in internal game theory
72(3)
4 A critical overview of game theory
75(51)
4.1 The premises of conventional game theory
75(8)
4.2 Nash equilibrium
83(9)
4.3 The famous games of game theory
92(8)
4.4 A brief assessment of the refinement project
100(4)
4.5 An introduction to evolutionary game theory
104(16)
4.6 An introduction to psychological game theory
120(5)
4.7 Conclusion
125(1)
5 The importance of intrapersonal beliefs: psychological game theory and internal games
126(35)
5.1 What psychological game theory is not
126(8)
5.2 Some examples of one-player games in the literature
134(6)
5.3 The `Bravery' game revisited: an introductory example of internal game theory
140(3)
5.4 Internal games
143(1)
5.5 Implications for individual choice theory
144(7)
5.6 Why be in equilibrium?
151(1)
5.7 On the internal impartial spectator
152(5)
5.8 The need for an intertemporal approach for internal games
157(4)
6 Internal games and historical time
161(43)
6.1 Intertemporal beliefs
161(1)
6.2 Internal games and replicator dynamics
162(21)
6.3 The need for stochastic dynamics
183(2)
6.4 Internal games with stochastic dynamics
185(14)
6.5 Internal games and modelling decisions
199(5)
7 Internal game theory: an assessment
204(12)
7.1 Insights from internal game theory
204(2)
7.2 Internal games with more than one player
206(4)
7.3 Intrapersonal beliefs and experimental evidence
210(3)
7.4 Conclusion
213(3)
References 216(6)
Index 222
'Tassos Patokos is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Accounting, Finance and Economics at the University of Hertfordshir