Acknowledgements |
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xxii | |
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1 | (9) |
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1.1 The changing landscape of national security review of foreign direct investment (FDI) |
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1 | (1) |
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1.2 An inventory of national security review regimes of FDI |
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2 | (4) |
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2 | (1) |
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3 | (1) |
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4 | (2) |
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1.3 Juggling between protecting national security and investment protectionism |
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6 | (1) |
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1.4 Achieving the regulatory goal |
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7 | (1) |
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8 | (2) |
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10 | (1) |
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Part I Examines the theoretical conceptions and lays the foundation of this research |
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10 | (1) |
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Part II Conducts country-specific studies |
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10 | (1) |
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Part III Conducts comparison and evaluation, and concludes this research by giving policy recommendations |
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11 | (6) |
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PART I Establishing a normative framework |
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17 | (40) |
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2 The conceptualization of national security |
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19 | (13) |
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19 | (1) |
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2.2 A vernacular conceptualization |
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20 | (2) |
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2.3 Identifying national security (risks) in the FDI context |
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22 | (2) |
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2.4 National security as a subject to be protected |
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24 | (2) |
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2.5 The international investment law conceptualization |
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26 | (2) |
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2.6 The self-determinant nature of national security concerns |
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28 | (4) |
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3 The jurisprudential foundation of national security review of FDI |
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32 | (9) |
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3.1 A public international law justification: state sovereignty |
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32 | (3) |
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3.1.1 Sovereignty in the public international law context |
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32 | (1) |
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3.1.2 Sovereignty in the foreign investment context |
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33 | (2) |
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3.2 An international investment law justification: the right to regulate |
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35 | (1) |
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3.3 Privileging the rule of law in the national security review regime |
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36 | (5) |
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4 A quest for theoretical principles establishing the national security review regime of FDI |
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41 | (16) |
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4.1 Addressing the institutional concern in national security review of FDI |
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41 | (3) |
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4.1.1 An institutional concern: politicization |
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41 | (2) |
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4.1.2 The agency model as a solution |
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43 | (1) |
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4.2 Reconciling conflicting interests: the principle of proportionality |
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44 | (3) |
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4.2.1 Proportionality analysis as a tool for rights-balancing |
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44 | (1) |
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4.2.2 Assuring regulatory proportionality in the national security review regime |
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45 | (2) |
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4.3 The principle of non-discrimination |
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47 | (2) |
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4.4 Procedural fairness: transparency, predictability and accountability |
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49 | (8) |
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4.4.1 Principles of administrative law |
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49 | (1) |
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4.4.2 Transparency and predictability |
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50 | (1) |
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51 | (6) |
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PART II Country-specific studies |
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57 | (126) |
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5 The national security review regime of China |
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59 | (33) |
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59 | (1) |
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5.2 FDI inflow in China and the policy context 1979-2018 |
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60 | (3) |
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5.3 China's FDI regulatory regime for market access |
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63 | (6) |
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5.3.1 China's FDI regulatory regime 1979-2013 |
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63 | (2) |
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5.3.2 China's FDI regulatory regime in the Pilot Free Trade Zones since 2013 |
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65 | (2) |
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5.3.3 China's FDI regulatory regime for market access currently applicable nationwide since 2016 |
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67 | (1) |
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5.3.4 The foreign investment law |
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68 | (1) |
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5.4 The evolutional trajectory of China's national security review regime |
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69 | (7) |
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5.4.1 The emergence and development from 2003 to 2009 |
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69 | (2) |
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5.4.2 The review regime currently in effect established in 2011 |
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71 | (2) |
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5.4.3 The national security review regime applicable in the PFTZs |
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73 | (1) |
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5.4.4 The national security review regime in the draft FIL (2015) |
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74 | (1) |
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5.4.5 National security review in the FIL |
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75 | (1) |
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5.5 The review framework currently effective in China |
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76 | (4) |
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5.5.1 Substantive provisions |
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76 | (1) |
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76 | (1) |
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5.5.1.2 Sectors and transactions subject to review |
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76 | (1) |
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5.5.1.3 Factors to be considered |
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77 | (1) |
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5.5.2 Procedural provisions |
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78 | (1) |
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5.5.2.1 The initiation of the procedure |
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78 | (1) |
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5.5.2.2 The two-tier review proceeding |
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79 | (1) |
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5.5.2.3 Review decision and implementation |
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79 | (1) |
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5.6 Case study: a process in a black-box? |
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80 | (1) |
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81 | (11) |
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6 The national security review regime of the US |
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92 | (60) |
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92 | (1) |
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6.2 FDI inflow in the US and its policy context 1980-2018 |
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93 | (3) |
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6.3 Formation and development of the US national security review regime |
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96 | (15) |
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6.3.1 Embryonic period: sectoral restrictions |
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96 | (1) |
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6.3.1.1 The early stage from 1917 to 1970 |
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96 | (1) |
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6.3.1.2 The establishment of the CFIUS in 1975 |
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97 | (1) |
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6.3.2 Formation period: the Exon-Florio |
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97 | (1) |
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6.3.2.1 The Exon-Florio Amendment in 1988 |
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97 | (2) |
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6.3.2.2 The Byrd Amendment in 1993 |
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99 | (1) |
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6.3.2.3 Comments and critiques |
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100 | (1) |
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6.3.3 Reformation period: FINSA in 2007 |
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101 | (1) |
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6.3.3.1 Legislative history |
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101 | (1) |
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6.3.3.2 Major modifications |
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102 | (2) |
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6.3.3.3 Comments and critiques |
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104 | (1) |
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6.3.4 The current CFIUS framework: FIRRMA in 2018 |
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105 | (1) |
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6.3.4.1 The legislative background |
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105 | (3) |
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6.3.4.2 Major modifications |
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108 | (1) |
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6.3.4.3 Future policy implications |
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109 | (2) |
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6.4 The current review framework |
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111 | (10) |
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6.4.1 Substantive provisions |
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111 | (1) |
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111 | (1) |
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112 | (1) |
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6.4.1.3 Transactions subject to review |
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113 | (2) |
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6.4.1.4 Factors to be considered |
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115 | (1) |
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6.4.2 Procedural provisions |
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116 | (1) |
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6.4.2.1 The pre-notice consultation |
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116 | (1) |
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116 | (1) |
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6.4.2.3 The 45-day review |
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117 | (1) |
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6.4.2.4 The 45(+15)-day investigation |
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117 | (1) |
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6.4.2.5 Actions by the President |
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118 | (1) |
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6.4.2.6 The withdrawal and the resubmission of the notification |
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118 | (1) |
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119 | (1) |
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6.4.2.8 Supervision by the Congress |
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119 | (1) |
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6.4.2.9 The safe harbour and the evergreen provision |
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120 | (1) |
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121 | (1) |
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121 | (7) |
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6.5.1 Fujitsu Ltd - Fairchild Semiconductor Corp |
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121 | (1) |
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6.5.2 Thomson CSF - LTV Corporation's missile division |
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122 | (1) |
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123 | (1) |
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6.5.4 Dubai Ports World - Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co |
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124 | (1) |
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6.5.5 Huawei - 3Com and Huawei - 3Leaf |
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125 | (1) |
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126 | (2) |
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6.6 The CFIUS clearance patterns in practice and the rationale behind |
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128 | (6) |
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6.6.1 Covered transactions and withdrawals |
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128 | (2) |
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6.6.2 Covered transactions by country |
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130 | (2) |
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6.6.3 A reformed CFIUS to address China-specific concerns? |
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132 | (2) |
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134 | (18) |
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7 The national security review regimes in the EU |
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152 | (31) |
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152 | (1) |
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7.2 The strictures of the EU law |
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153 | (11) |
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153 | (1) |
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7.2.2 The free movement of capital - Article 63(1) TFEU |
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154 | (1) |
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7.2.3 The direct control of FDI on the EU level |
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155 | (2) |
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7.2.4 Legitimate derogations to the free movement of capital in the TFEU |
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157 | (1) |
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7.2.4.1 Public policy or public security |
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157 | (1) |
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7.2.4.2 Prudential measures |
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158 | (1) |
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7.2.4.3 Third-country restrictions |
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158 | (1) |
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7.2.4.4 Other exceptions stipulated in the TFEU |
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159 | (1) |
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7.2.5 Legitimate derogations to the free movement of capital in the ECJ Jurisprudence - the general interest |
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159 | (1) |
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7.2.6 The EU regulation screening foreign direct investment |
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159 | (1) |
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7.2.6.1 The legislative background |
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159 | (1) |
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7.2.6.2 The regulatory framework |
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160 | (1) |
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7.2.6.3 Future policy implications to different stakeholders |
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161 | (3) |
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7.3 The national security review regime of Germany |
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164 | (10) |
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164 | (3) |
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7.3.2 Substantial provisions |
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167 | (1) |
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167 | (1) |
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7.3.2.2 Sectors and transactions subject to review |
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167 | (1) |
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7.3.2.3 Criteria for evaluation |
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168 | (1) |
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7.3.3 Procedural provisions |
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169 | (1) |
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7.3.3.1 The cross-sectoral review procedure |
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169 | (3) |
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7.3.3.2 The sector-specific review procedure |
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172 | (1) |
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172 | (1) |
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7.3.4 The compatibility between EU law strictures and the German review regime |
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172 | (2) |
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174 | (9) |
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PART III Comparison, conclusions, and recommendations |
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183 | (52) |
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8 Revealing similarities and differences |
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185 | (15) |
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185 | (1) |
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8.2 Comparison of substantive attributes |
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185 | (7) |
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8.2.1 The subject to be protected |
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185 | (2) |
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8.2.2 Transactions and sectors subject to review |
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187 | (3) |
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8.2.3 Factors to be considered |
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190 | (2) |
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8.3 Comparison of procedural attributes |
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192 | (8) |
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192 | (3) |
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8.3.2 The review procedure |
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195 | (5) |
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9 An evaluation to the comparative results |
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200 | (10) |
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9.1 Evaluation of substantive attributes |
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200 | (4) |
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9.1.1 The subject to be protected |
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200 | (1) |
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9.1.2 Transactions and sectors subject to review |
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201 | (2) |
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9.1.3 Factors to be considered |
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203 | (1) |
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9.2 Evaluation of procedural attributes |
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204 | (3) |
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204 | (1) |
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9.2.2 The review procedure |
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205 | (2) |
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207 | (3) |
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10 Conclusions and policy recommendations |
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210 | (25) |
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210 | (6) |
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10.1.1 A tendency towards tightened and heightened national security review regimes |
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210 | (1) |
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10.1.2 National security-related concerns are self-determinant |
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211 | (2) |
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10.1.3 National security review regimes are legitimate regulation justified by state sovereignty |
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213 | (1) |
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10.1.4 National security review regimes are investment-restrictive-measures and are prone to protectionism if abused by the host state |
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213 | (2) |
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10.1.5 National security review regimes should comply with the rule of law in order to achieve the regulatory goal |
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215 | (1) |
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10.2 Policy recommendations: a proposition of a normative framework establishing the national security review regime |
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216 | (13) |
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10.2.1 National security review regimes should adhere to proportionality |
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216 | (2) |
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10.2.2 The use of rules of thumb in the scope of review |
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218 | (2) |
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10.2.3 The sectors subject to the national security review should be confined to the public sector |
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220 | (3) |
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10.2.4 The review body should be established assimilating the agency model |
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223 | (3) |
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10.2.5 The review procedure should enhance transparency and maximize predictability |
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226 | (2) |
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10.2.6 The national security review regime should guarantee accountability |
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228 | (1) |
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229 | (6) |
Selected bibliography |
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235 | (12) |
Index |
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247 | |