Muutke küpsiste eelistusi

National Security Review of Foreign Investment: A Comparative Legal Analysis of China, the United States and the European Union [Kõva köide]

  • Formaat: Hardback, 250 pages, kõrgus x laius: 234x156 mm, kaal: 453 g, 9 Tables, black and white; 6 Line drawings, black and white
  • Sari: The Rule of Law in China and Comparative Perspectives
  • Ilmumisaeg: 09-Apr-2020
  • Kirjastus: Routledge
  • ISBN-10: 0367425157
  • ISBN-13: 9780367425159
  • Formaat: Hardback, 250 pages, kõrgus x laius: 234x156 mm, kaal: 453 g, 9 Tables, black and white; 6 Line drawings, black and white
  • Sari: The Rule of Law in China and Comparative Perspectives
  • Ilmumisaeg: 09-Apr-2020
  • Kirjastus: Routledge
  • ISBN-10: 0367425157
  • ISBN-13: 9780367425159
"In recent years, China, the US, and the EU and its Member States have either promulgated new national laws and regulations or drastically revised existing ones to exert more rigorous government control over inward foreign direct investment (FDI). Such government control concerns the establishment of an ex-ante review regime of FDI in the host state in sectors that are considered as 'sensitive' or 'strategic', with an aim to mitigate the security-related implications. This monograph conducts a systematicand up-to-date comparative study of the national security review regimes of China, the US, and the EU, using Germany as an exampling Member State. It answers a central research question of how domestic law should be formulated to adequately protect national security of the host state whilst posing minimum negative impacts to the free flow of cross-border investment. In addition to discussing the latest development of the national security review regimes in aforementioned jurisdictions and identifying their commonalities and disparities, this monograph establishes a normative framework regarding the design of a national security review regime in general and proposes specific legislative recommendations to further clarify the law"--

In recent years, China, the US, and the EU and its Member States have either promulgated new national laws and regulations or drastically revised existing ones to exert more rigorous government control over inward foreign direct investment (FDI). Such government control pertains to the establishment of an ex-ante review regime of FDI in the host state in sectors that are considered as ‘sensitive’ or ‘strategic’, with an aim to mitigate the security-related implications. This book conducts a systematic and up-to-date comparative study of the national security review regimes of China, the US, and the EU, using Germany as an exampling Member State. It answers a central research question of how domestic law should be formulated to adequately protect national security of the host state whilst posing minimum negative impacts to the free flow of cross-border investment. In addition to analyzing the latest development of the national security review regimes in aforementioned jurisdictions and identifying their commonalities and disparities, this book establishes a normative framework regarding the design of a national security review regime in general and proposes specific legislative recommendations to further clarify the law.

This book will be of interest to scholars in the field of international and comparative investment law, investors who seek better compliance programs in the host state, and policymakers who aim for high-quality regulation on foreign investment.

Acknowledgements xii
List of abbreviations
xiii
List of legislations
xv
List of figures
xxi
List of tables
xxii
1 Introduction
1(9)
1.1 The changing landscape of national security review of foreign direct investment (FDI)
1(1)
1.2 An inventory of national security review regimes of FDI
2(4)
1.2.1 China
2(1)
1.2.2 The US
3(1)
1.2.3 The EU
4(2)
1.3 Juggling between protecting national security and investment protectionism
6(1)
1.4 Achieving the regulatory goal
7(1)
1.5 Methodology
8(2)
1.6 Structure
10(1)
Part I Examines the theoretical conceptions and lays the foundation of this research
10(1)
Part II Conducts country-specific studies
10(1)
Part III Conducts comparison and evaluation, and concludes this research by giving policy recommendations
11(6)
PART I Establishing a normative framework
17(40)
2 The conceptualization of national security
19(13)
2.1 Introduction
19(1)
2.2 A vernacular conceptualization
20(2)
2.3 Identifying national security (risks) in the FDI context
22(2)
2.4 National security as a subject to be protected
24(2)
2.5 The international investment law conceptualization
26(2)
2.6 The self-determinant nature of national security concerns
28(4)
3 The jurisprudential foundation of national security review of FDI
32(9)
3.1 A public international law justification: state sovereignty
32(3)
3.1.1 Sovereignty in the public international law context
32(1)
3.1.2 Sovereignty in the foreign investment context
33(2)
3.2 An international investment law justification: the right to regulate
35(1)
3.3 Privileging the rule of law in the national security review regime
36(5)
4 A quest for theoretical principles establishing the national security review regime of FDI
41(16)
4.1 Addressing the institutional concern in national security review of FDI
41(3)
4.1.1 An institutional concern: politicization
41(2)
4.1.2 The agency model as a solution
43(1)
4.2 Reconciling conflicting interests: the principle of proportionality
44(3)
4.2.1 Proportionality analysis as a tool for rights-balancing
44(1)
4.2.2 Assuring regulatory proportionality in the national security review regime
45(2)
4.3 The principle of non-discrimination
47(2)
4.4 Procedural fairness: transparency, predictability and accountability
49(8)
4.4.1 Principles of administrative law
49(1)
4.4.2 Transparency and predictability
50(1)
4.4.3 Accountability
51(6)
PART II Country-specific studies
57(126)
5 The national security review regime of China
59(33)
5.1 Introduction
59(1)
5.2 FDI inflow in China and the policy context 1979-2018
60(3)
5.3 China's FDI regulatory regime for market access
63(6)
5.3.1 China's FDI regulatory regime 1979-2013
63(2)
5.3.2 China's FDI regulatory regime in the Pilot Free Trade Zones since 2013
65(2)
5.3.3 China's FDI regulatory regime for market access currently applicable nationwide since 2016
67(1)
5.3.4 The foreign investment law
68(1)
5.4 The evolutional trajectory of China's national security review regime
69(7)
5.4.1 The emergence and development from 2003 to 2009
69(2)
5.4.2 The review regime currently in effect established in 2011
71(2)
5.4.3 The national security review regime applicable in the PFTZs
73(1)
5.4.4 The national security review regime in the draft FIL (2015)
74(1)
5.4.5 National security review in the FIL
75(1)
5.5 The review framework currently effective in China
76(4)
5.5.1 Substantive provisions
76(1)
5.5.1.1 The review body
76(1)
5.5.1.2 Sectors and transactions subject to review
76(1)
5.5.1.3 Factors to be considered
77(1)
5.5.2 Procedural provisions
78(1)
5.5.2.1 The initiation of the procedure
78(1)
5.5.2.2 The two-tier review proceeding
79(1)
5.5.2.3 Review decision and implementation
79(1)
5.6 Case study: a process in a black-box?
80(1)
5.7 Conclusion
81(11)
6 The national security review regime of the US
92(60)
6.1 Introduction
92(1)
6.2 FDI inflow in the US and its policy context 1980-2018
93(3)
6.3 Formation and development of the US national security review regime
96(15)
6.3.1 Embryonic period: sectoral restrictions
96(1)
6.3.1.1 The early stage from 1917 to 1970
96(1)
6.3.1.2 The establishment of the CFIUS in 1975
97(1)
6.3.2 Formation period: the Exon-Florio
97(1)
6.3.2.1 The Exon-Florio Amendment in 1988
97(2)
6.3.2.2 The Byrd Amendment in 1993
99(1)
6.3.2.3 Comments and critiques
100(1)
6.3.3 Reformation period: FINSA in 2007
101(1)
6.3.3.1 Legislative history
101(1)
6.3.3.2 Major modifications
102(2)
6.3.3.3 Comments and critiques
104(1)
6.3.4 The current CFIUS framework: FIRRMA in 2018
105(1)
6.3.4.1 The legislative background
105(3)
6.3.4.2 Major modifications
108(1)
6.3.4.3 Future policy implications
109(2)
6.4 The current review framework
111(10)
6.4.1 Substantive provisions
111(1)
6.4.1.1 The review body
111(1)
6.4.1.2 Sectors of focus
112(1)
6.4.1.3 Transactions subject to review
113(2)
6.4.1.4 Factors to be considered
115(1)
6.4.2 Procedural provisions
116(1)
6.4.2.1 The pre-notice consultation
116(1)
6.4.2.2 The notice
116(1)
6.4.2.3 The 45-day review
117(1)
6.4.2.4 The 45(+15)-day investigation
117(1)
6.4.2.5 Actions by the President
118(1)
6.4.2.6 The withdrawal and the resubmission of the notification
118(1)
6.4.2.7 The mitigation
119(1)
6.4.2.8 Supervision by the Congress
119(1)
6.4.2.9 The safe harbour and the evergreen provision
120(1)
6.4.2.10 The CFIUS fund
121(1)
6.5 Cases and comments
121(7)
6.5.1 Fujitsu Ltd - Fairchild Semiconductor Corp
121(1)
6.5.2 Thomson CSF - LTV Corporation's missile division
122(1)
6.5.3 CNOOC - Unocal
123(1)
6.5.4 Dubai Ports World - Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co
124(1)
6.5.5 Huawei - 3Com and Huawei - 3Leaf
125(1)
6.5.6 Ralls-Terna
126(2)
6.6 The CFIUS clearance patterns in practice and the rationale behind
128(6)
6.6.1 Covered transactions and withdrawals
128(2)
6.6.2 Covered transactions by country
130(2)
6.6.3 A reformed CFIUS to address China-specific concerns?
132(2)
6.7 Conclusion
134(18)
7 The national security review regimes in the EU
152(31)
7.1 Introduction
152(1)
7.2 The strictures of the EU law
153(11)
7.2.1 Introduction
153(1)
7.2.2 The free movement of capital - Article 63(1) TFEU
154(1)
7.2.3 The direct control of FDI on the EU level
155(2)
7.2.4 Legitimate derogations to the free movement of capital in the TFEU
157(1)
7.2.4.1 Public policy or public security
157(1)
7.2.4.2 Prudential measures
158(1)
7.2.4.3 Third-country restrictions
158(1)
7.2.4.4 Other exceptions stipulated in the TFEU
159(1)
7.2.5 Legitimate derogations to the free movement of capital in the ECJ Jurisprudence - the general interest
159(1)
7.2.6 The EU regulation screening foreign direct investment
159(1)
7.2.6.1 The legislative background
159(1)
7.2.6.2 The regulatory framework
160(1)
7.2.6.3 Future policy implications to different stakeholders
161(3)
7.3 The national security review regime of Germany
164(10)
7.3.1 Introduction
164(3)
7.3.2 Substantial provisions
167(1)
7.3.2.1 The review body
167(1)
7.3.2.2 Sectors and transactions subject to review
167(1)
7.3.2.3 Criteria for evaluation
168(1)
7.3.3 Procedural provisions
169(1)
7.3.3.1 The cross-sectoral review procedure
169(3)
7.3.3.2 The sector-specific review procedure
172(1)
7.3.3.3 Judicial review
172(1)
7.3.4 The compatibility between EU law strictures and the German review regime
172(2)
7.4 Conclusion
174(9)
PART III Comparison, conclusions, and recommendations
183(52)
8 Revealing similarities and differences
185(15)
8.1 Introduction
185(1)
8.2 Comparison of substantive attributes
185(7)
8.2.1 The subject to be protected
185(2)
8.2.2 Transactions and sectors subject to review
187(3)
8.2.3 Factors to be considered
190(2)
8.3 Comparison of procedural attributes
192(8)
8.3.1 The review body
192(3)
8.3.2 The review procedure
195(5)
9 An evaluation to the comparative results
200(10)
9.1 Evaluation of substantive attributes
200(4)
9.1.1 The subject to be protected
200(1)
9.1.2 Transactions and sectors subject to review
201(2)
9.1.3 Factors to be considered
203(1)
9.2 Evaluation of procedural attributes
204(3)
9.2.1 The review body
204(1)
9.2.2 The review procedure
205(2)
9.3 Conclusion
207(3)
10 Conclusions and policy recommendations
210(25)
10.1 Conclusions
210(6)
10.1.1 A tendency towards tightened and heightened national security review regimes
210(1)
10.1.2 National security-related concerns are self-determinant
211(2)
10.1.3 National security review regimes are legitimate regulation justified by state sovereignty
213(1)
10.1.4 National security review regimes are investment-restrictive-measures and are prone to protectionism if abused by the host state
213(2)
10.1.5 National security review regimes should comply with the rule of law in order to achieve the regulatory goal
215(1)
10.2 Policy recommendations: a proposition of a normative framework establishing the national security review regime
216(13)
10.2.1 National security review regimes should adhere to proportionality
216(2)
10.2.2 The use of rules of thumb in the scope of review
218(2)
10.2.3 The sectors subject to the national security review should be confined to the public sector
220(3)
10.2.4 The review body should be established assimilating the agency model
223(3)
10.2.5 The review procedure should enhance transparency and maximize predictability
226(2)
10.2.6 The national security review regime should guarantee accountability
228(1)
10.3 Concluding remarks
229(6)
Selected bibliography 235(12)
Index 247
Cheng Bian is an academic researcher at Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam. His research area covers international investment law; international investment dispute settlement; Chinese law and in particular Chinese foreign investment law; and comparative law. He holds a PhD in law from Erasmus University Rotterdam. Prior to his doctorate, he obtained a Masters degree in international law and a Bachelors degree in Chinese law from Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, China.