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Philosophy of Language 3rd edition [Pehme köide]

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(University of Birmingham, UK)
  • Formaat: Paperback / softback, 448 pages, kõrgus x laius: 216x138 mm, kaal: 544 g, 2 Tables, black and white
  • Ilmumisaeg: 29-Jan-2018
  • Kirjastus: Routledge
  • ISBN-10: 041571897X
  • ISBN-13: 9780415718974
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Philosophy of Language 3rd editionSuurem pilt
  • Formaat: Paperback / softback, 448 pages, kõrgus x laius: 216x138 mm, kaal: 544 g, 2 Tables, black and white
  • Ilmumisaeg: 29-Jan-2018
  • Kirjastus: Routledge
  • ISBN-10: 041571897X
  • ISBN-13: 9780415718974
Teised raamatud teemal:
Teised raamatud sellest sooduspakkumisest: Taylor & Francis humanitaariaraamatud International Student Editions hindadega
Püsilink: https://www.kriso.ee/db/9780415718974.html
Märksõnad:
Philosophy of Language provides a comprehensive, meticulous survey of twentieth-century and contemporary philosophical theories of meaning. Interweaving the historical development of the subject with a thematic overview of the different approaches to meaning, the book provides students with the tools necessary to understand contemporary analytic philosophy. Beginning with a systematic look at Freges foundational theories on sense and reference, Alexander Miller goes on to offer a clear exposition of the development of subsequent arguments in the philosophy of language. Communicating a sense of active philosophical debate, the author confronts the views of the early theorists, taking in Frege, Russell, and logical positivism and going on to discuss the scepticism of Quine, Kripke, and Wittgenstein. The work of philosophers such as Davidson, Dummett, Searle, Fodor, McGinn, Wright, Grice, and Tarski is also examined in depth.

The third edition has been fully revised for enhanced clarity and includes:

· a short introduction for students, outlining the importance of the philosophy of language and the aims of the book; · two substantial new sections on Philip Pettits "ethocentric" account of rule-following and on Hannah Ginsborgs "partial reductionism" about rule-following and meaning; · the addition of chapter summaries and study questions throughout, designed to promote greater understanding and engagement; · updated guides to further reading at the end of every chapter.

This well-established and sophisticated introduction to the philosophy of language is an unrivalled guide to one of the liveliest and most challenging areas of philosophy and is suitable for use on undergraduate degrees and in postgraduate study.

Arvustused

"This book has been on my reading list for philosophy of language since the first edition; Im delighted to see this new edition, with additions, such as study questions, and updated suggestions for further reading that will enhance its value for students."

Michael Beaney, Humboldt University, Germany, and Kings College London, UK

"The third edition of Philosophy of Language provides an exceptionally lucid and accessible overview of both the history of the subject and contemporary debates. Miller covers the topics that are likely to appear on any undergraduate syllabus but he does so with a refreshing twist, emphasising the meta-semantic question, 'what constitutes meaning?. Miller delves into fundamental questions concerning the connections between language, mind and reality, and conveys the centrality of the study of language to philosophy. The book will be an invaluable resource for introducing undergraduates to the subject."

Anandi Hattiangadi, Stockholm University, Sweden

Preface to the first edition xi
Preface to the second edition xiv
Preface to the third edition xv
Acknowledgements, first edition xvi
Acknowledgements, second edition xvii
Acknowledgements, third, edition xviii
Introduction 1(7)
1 Frege: Semantic value and reference
8(26)
1.1 Frege's logical language
8(6)
1.2 Syntax
14(2)
1.3 Semantics and truth
16(2)
1.4 Sentences and proper names
18(3)
1.5 Function and object
21(1)
1.6 Predicates, connectives, and quantifiers
22(4)
1.7 A semantic theory for a simple language
26(8)
Chapter summary
30(1)
Study questions
30(1)
Further reading
31(3)
2 Frege and Russell: Sense and definite descriptions
34(78)
2.1 The introduction of sense
34(5)
2.2 The nature of sense
39(9)
2.3 The objectivity of sense: Frege's critique of Locke
48(7)
2.4 Four problems with Frege's notion of sense
55(10)
2.5 Kripke on naming and necessity
65(6)
2.6 A theory of sense?
71(2)
2.7 Force and tone
73(4)
2.8 Russell on names and descriptions
77(5)
2.9 Scope distinctions
82(3)
2.10 Russell's attack on sense
85(6)
2.11 Russell on communication
91(2)
2.12 Strawson and Donnellan on referring and definite descriptions
93(3)
2.13 Kripke's causal-historical theory of reference
96(3)
2.14 Appendix: Frege's theses on sense and semantic value
99(13)
Chapter summary
101(1)
Study questions
101(1)
Further reading
102(10)
3 Sense and verificationism: Logical positivism
112(42)
3.1 From the Tractatus to the verification principle
112(5)
3.2 The formulation of the verification principle
117(6)
3.3 Foster on the nature of the verification principle
123(5)
3.4 The a priori and the linguistic theory of necessity
128(9)
3.5 Carnap on internal and external questions
137(5)
3.6 Logical positivism and ethical language
142(3)
3.7 Moderate holism
145(9)
Chapter summary
146(1)
Study questions
147(1)
Further reading
148(6)
4 Scepticism about sense (I): Quine on analyticity and translation
154(45)
4.1 Quine's attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction: Introduction
155(1)
4.2 The argument of "Two Dogmas" (part I)
155(6)
4.3 Criticism of "Two Dogmas" (part I)
161(3)
4.4 The argument of "Two Dogmas" (part II)
164(3)
4.5 Criticism of "Two Dogmas" (part II)
167(2)
4.6 Quine on the indeterminacy of translation: Introduction
169(2)
4.7 The argument from below
171(6)
4.8 Evans and Hookway on the argument from below
177(8)
4.9 The argument from above
185(7)
4.10 Conclusion
192(7)
Chapter summary
192(1)
Study questions
193(1)
Further reading
193(6)
5 Scepticism about sense (II): Kripke's Wittgenstein and the sceptical paradox
199(48)
5.1 The sceptical paradox
200(10)
5.2 The sceptical solution and the argument against solitary language
210(2)
5.3 Boghossian's argument against the sceptical solution
212(5)
5.4 Wright's objections to the sceptical solution
217(2)
5.5 Zalabardo's objection to the sceptical solution
219(4)
5.6 The normativity of meaning?
223(3)
5.7 "Factualist" interpretations of Kripke's Wittgenstein
226(21)
Chapter summary
237(1)
Study questions
238(1)
Further reading
238(9)
6 Saving sense: Responses to the sceptical paradox
247(69)
6.1 Linguistic meaning and mental content
248(3)
6.2 Sophisticated dispositionalism
251(5)
6.3 Lewis-style reductionism and ultra-sophisticated dispositionalism
256(4)
6.4 Fodor's "asymmetric dependency" account of meaning
260(5)
6.5 McGinn on normativity and the ability conception of understanding
265(5)
6.6 Wright's judgement-dependent conception of meaning
270(8)
6.7 Pettit's "ethocentric" account
278(11)
6.8 Wittgenstein's dissolution of the sceptical paradox?
289(8)
6.9 Ginsborg's "partial reductionism"
297(19)
Chapter summary
304(1)
Study questions
304(1)
Further reading
305(11)
7 Sense, intention, and speech-acts: Grice's programme
316(28)
7.1 Homeric struggles: Two approaches to sense
316(3)
7.2 Grice on speaker's-meaning and sentence-meaning
319(4)
7.3 Searle's modifications: Illocutionary and perlocutionary intentions
323(5)
7.4 Objections to Gricean analyses
328(6)
7.5 Response to Blackburn
334(3)
7.6 Strawson on referring revisited
337(7)
Chapter summary
339(1)
Study questions
340(1)
Further reading
340(4)
8 Sense and truth: Tarski and Davidson
344(38)
8.1 Davidson and Frege
345(1)
8.2 Davidson's adequacy conditions for theories of meaning
346(2)
8.3 Intensional and extensional theories of meaning
348(3)
8.4 Extensional adequacy and Tarski's Convention (T)
351(5)
8.5 Tarskian truth-theories
356(7)
8.6 Truth and translation: Two problems for Davidson
363(3)
8.7 Radical interpretation and the principle of charity
366(7)
8.8 Holism and T-theorems
373(3)
8.9 Conclusion: Theories of meaning and natural language
376(6)
Chapter summary
377(1)
Study questions
378(1)
Further reading
378(4)
9 Sense, world, and metaphysics
382(40)
9.1 Realism
383(1)
9.2 Non-cognitivism and the Frege-Geach problem
383(3)
9.3 Realism and verification-transcendent truth
386(3)
9.4 Acquisition, manifestation, and rule-following: The arguments against verification-transcendent truth
389(10)
9.5 Twin-Earth, meaning, mind, and world
399(7)
9.6 Grades of objectivity: Wright on anti-realism
406(5)
9.7 Two threats of quietism
411(11)
Chapter summary
414(1)
Study questions
414(1)
Further reading
415(7)
Bibliography 422(17)
Index 439
Alexander Miller is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Otago, New Zealand. He is author of Contemporary Metaethics: An Introduction (Polity Press, second edition, 2013), co-editor of Rule-Following and Meaning (Acumen, 2002) and co-editor of A Companion to the Philosophy of Language (second edition, Wiley-Blackwell, 2017).