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Political Economy of Lobbying: Channels of Influence and their Regulation [Pehme köide]

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  • Formaat: Paperback / softback, 384 pages, kõrgus x laius: 235x155 mm, 10 Illustrations, color; 11 Illustrations, black and white, 1 Paperback / softback
  • Sari: Studies in Public Choice 43
  • Ilmumisaeg: 28-Jan-2025
  • Kirjastus: Springer International Publishing AG
  • ISBN-10: 3031443950
  • ISBN-13: 9783031443954
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  • Formaat: Paperback / softback, 384 pages, kõrgus x laius: 235x155 mm, 10 Illustrations, color; 11 Illustrations, black and white, 1 Paperback / softback
  • Sari: Studies in Public Choice 43
  • Ilmumisaeg: 28-Jan-2025
  • Kirjastus: Springer International Publishing AG
  • ISBN-10: 3031443950
  • ISBN-13: 9783031443954
Lobbying is not only the subject of ongoing, heated debates in politics and the public sphere but has also been a focus of the social sciences for decades. This edited volume provides an overview of the current state of research on lobbying from the perspective of Public Choice as a subfield of political science and economics. After a brief introduction to the field, Part I provides an overview of basic concepts and political-economic theories of lobbying from the standpoints of various subfields of Public Choice. Subsequently, Part II investigates the various channels used by interest groups to influence policymakers, such as party donations, informational lobbying, hiring politicians, etc. These chapters also discuss the possibilities and limits of regulating the respective channels. Lastly, Part III sheds light on lobbying in selected regions (i.e., the United States, European Union, Russia, and China). 
Chapter 1 Introduction.- Part I: Theoretical Background.
Chapter 2
Lobbying A Public Choice Perspective.
Chapter 3 Lobbying from the
Perspective of Behavioral Political Economy.
Chapter 4 Policy Failure and
Lobbying.
Chapter 5 Lobbying and Macroeconomic Development.- Part II:
Channels of Influence and their Regulation.
Chapter 6 Informational
Lobbying.
Chapter 7 Campaign Finance.
Chapter 8 The Revolving Door
Phenomenon.
Chapter 9 Politicians Extra-Parliamentary Activities and
Lobbying.
Chapter 10 Lobbying through Gifts.
Chapter 11 Commercial Lobbying
Firms: Lobbying as Business.
Chapter 12 The Evolution of Modern Democracy as
a Process of Constitutional Lobbying.
Chapter 13 Lobbying and Trade
Protection.- Part III: Lobbying in selected World Regions.
Chapter 14
Lobbying in the United States.
Chapter 15 Lobbying in the European Union.-
Chapter 16 Lobbying in Russia.
Chapter 17 Lobbying in China.
Dr. Karsten Mause is Senior Lecturer in Political Economy at the University of Münster, Germany. He received an M.A. in Political Science and a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Marburg, Germany. Mauses research focuses on lobbying, corruption, and political accountability. His work has been published in Constitutional Political Economy, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Parliamentary Affairs, and other social science journals and books.





Dr. Andreas Polk is Professor of Economics at the Berlin School of Economics & Law (HWR Berlin), Germany. He received an M.A. in Economics from the University of Heidelberg (Germany) and a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Zurich (Switzerland). Polks research focus is on industrial organization, competition policy, regulation, and lobbying. His research has been published in journals including the European Journal of Political Economy, Review of Economics, Utilities Policy, and other academic outlets. He is a member of the advisory board of Transparency International Germany.