Muutke küpsiste eelistusi

Semantics of Belief Change Operators for Intelligent Agents: Iteration, Postulates, and Realizability: Iteration, Postulates, and Realizability [Pehme köide]

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Teised raamatud teemal:
Teised raamatud teemal:
One of the core problems in artificial intelligence is the modelling of human reasoning and intelligent behaviour. The representation of knowledge, and reasoning about it, are of crucial importance in achieving this. This book, Semantics of Belief Change Operators for Intelligent Agents: Iteration, Postulates, and Realizability, addresses a number of significant research questions in belief change theory from a semantic point of view; in particular, the connection between different types of belief changes and plausibility relations over possible worlds is investigated. This connection is characterized for revision over general classical logics, showing which relations are capturing AGM revision. In addition, those classical logics for which the correspondence between AGM revision and total preorders holds are precisely characterized. AGM revision in the Darwiche-Pearl framework for belief change over arbitrary sets of epistemic states is considered, demonstrating, especially, that for some sets of epistemic states, no AGM revision operator exists. A characterization of those sets of epistemic states for which AGM revision operators exist is presented. The expressive class of dynamic limited revision operators is introduced to provide revision operators for more sets of epistemic states. Specifications for the acceptance behaviour of various belief-change operators are examined, and those realizable by dynamic-limited revision operators are described. The iteration of AGM contraction in the Darwiche-Pearl framework is explored in detail, several known and novel iteration postulates for contraction are identified, and the relationships among these various postulates are determined. With a convincing presentation of ideas, the book refines and advances existing proposals of belief change, develops novel concepts and approaches, rigorously defines the concepts introduced, and formally proves all technical claims, propositions and theorems, significantly advancing the state-of-the-art in this field.
Chapter 1 Introduction
1(20)
1.1 Motivation and Research Context
1(4)
1.2 Research Questions and Contributions
5(4)
1.3 Organization of the Thesis
9(3)
1.4 Previous Publications
12(9)
Chapter 2 Preliminaries and Propositional Logic
21(4)
Chapter 3 Background on Belief Change
25(12)
3.1 One-Shot AGM Belief Change
26(3)
3.2 Iterable Change in Propositional Logic
29(2)
3.3 Characterizations in Propositional Logic
31(2)
3.4 Further remarks
33(4)
Part I Base Revision in Tarskian Logics
Introduction to Part I
37(4)
Chapter 4 Revision in Base Logics
41(36)
4.1 Preliminaries
42(10)
4.2 Base Revision in Propositional Logic
52(1)
4.3 Approach for Arbitrary Base Logics
53(8)
4.4 One-Way Representation Theorem
61(7)
4.5 Two-Way Representation Theorem
68(2)
4.6 Base Changes and Syntax Independence
70(3)
4.7 Interim Conclusion and Remarks
73(4)
Chapter 5 Characterization of TPO-Representability
77(34)
5.1 Total-Preorder-Representability
78(1)
5.2 Critical Loops
78(4)
5.3 TPO-Representability to Absence of Critical Loops
82(3)
5.4 No Critical Loops to TPO-Representability
85(16)
5.5 Characterization Theorems and Example
101(4)
5.6 Conclusion and Discussion
105(6)
Part II Non-Prioritized Revision over Epistemic States
Introduction to Part II
111(4)
Chapter 6 Epistemic States and AGM Revision
115(14)
6.1 The Darwiche-Pearl Framework
116(2)
6.2 Sets of Epistemic States S
118(3)
6.3 Revision for Epistemic States
121(8)
Chapter 7 Acceptance and Non-Prioritized Revision
129(34)
7.1 Introduction to Non-Prioritized Revision
130(1)
7.2 Acceptance Descriptions
131(5)
7.3 Scope, Realizability and AGM Revision
136(2)
7.4 Credibility-Limited Revision
138(16)
7.5 Properties of Credibility-Limited Revision
154(3)
7.6 Realizability and CL-Revision
157(5)
7.7 Interim Conclusion
162(1)
Chapter 8 Dynamic-Limited Revision
163(48)
8.1 Acceptance and Treatment of Prior Beliefs
163(3)
8.2 Dynamic-Limited Revision Operators
166(17)
8.3 Postulates of Dynamic-Limited Revision
183(5)
8.4 Properties of Dynamic-Limited Revision
188(6)
8.5 Acceptance and Dynamic-Limited Revision
194(6)
8.6 Realizability and Dynamic-Limited Revision
200(5)
8.7 Challenges for the Relational Approach
205(2)
8.8 Summary
207(4)
Part III Iteration Principles for Contraction
Introduction to Part III
211(4)
Chapter 9 Contraction, Epistemic States, Conditionals
215(18)
9.1 Darwiche-Pearl Framework - Brief Overview
215(2)
9.2 Contraction in Epistemic States
217(8)
9.3 Ramsey Test Conditionals and Revision
225(2)
9.4 Iterated Contraction and Conditionals
227(3)
9.5 a-Equi valence
230(3)
Chapter 10 Cautious Iterated Contraction
233(40)
10.1 Postulates for Iterated Revision
236(2)
10.2 (IR1)-(IR4) as Contraction Postulates
238(3)
10.3 Contraction Analogues to (IR1)-(IR4)
241(11)
10.4 Contraction Analogues to (IRlrel)-(IR4rel)
252(18)
10.5 Summary and Characterization Theorem
270(3)
Chapter 11 Specific Contraction Strategies
273(38)
11.1 Specific Strategies for Revision
274(3)
11.2 Independence for Contraction
277(7)
11.3 Natural and Moderate Contraction
284(8)
11.4 Gentle Contraction Strategies
292(6)
11.5 Relationships among Postulates and Example
298(9)
11.6 Summary
307(4)
Chapter 12 Conclusions and Future Work
311(6)
Bibliography 317(18)
List of Postulates 335(10)
Index 345