Qualia, or phenomenal consciousness, refer to mental states which are supposedly ineffable, intrinsic, private, and immediately apprehensible in consciousness. This book argues that qualia do not exist, and there is no phenomenal consciousness. Furthermore, it articulates and defends holistic behaviorism.
This book argues that qualia do not exist, and there is no phenomenal consciousness. Furthermore, it articulates and defends holistic behaviorism.
“Qualia” or “phenomenal consciousness” refers to mental states that are supposedly ineffable, intrinsic, private, and directly or immediately apprehensible in consciousness. In order to have experience, there must be qualia. This book argues that everyone is a philosophical zombie, or an individual without phenomenal consciousness. The author critically engages philosophers who believe in qualia—such as Ned Block, Thomas Nagel, David Chalmers, John Searle, and Galen Strawson—demonstrating how the intuitions that would support the belief in the existence of qualia are mutually inconsistent and self-contradictory. He proceeds to claim that the physical cannot be demarcated from the nonphysical, and so the hard problem of consciousness can be dissolved or dismissed. In the second part of the book, the author offers a defense of holistic behaviorism by drawing on Hegel’s philosophy of mind.
Against Qualia, For Behaviorism
will appeal to researchers and graduate students working in philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and cognitive science.
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