Preface and Acknowledgments |
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xiii | |
About the Editor |
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xv | |
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xvii | |
Introduction |
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1 | (1) |
Editor's Introduction to Chapter 1 |
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2 | (2) |
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1 Data, Generative Models, and Mechanisms: More on the Principles of Analytical Sociology |
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4 | (49) |
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4 | (3) |
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1.2 The Principles of Analytical Sociology |
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7 | (3) |
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10 | (2) |
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12 | (2) |
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1.5 Generative Models (P3) |
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14 | (3) |
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1.6 Structural Methodological Individualism (P4a) |
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17 | (4) |
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1.7 Logics of Action (P4b) |
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21 | (6) |
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1.8 Structural Interdependency (P4c) |
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27 | (2) |
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1.9 Agent-Based Modeling (P5) |
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29 | (6) |
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1.10 Back to Data (P6 and P7) |
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35 | (2) |
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37 | (3) |
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1.12 How to Read this Book |
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40 | (13) |
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41 | (11) |
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52 | (1) |
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53 | (180) |
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54 | (1) |
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Editor's Introduction to Chapter 2 |
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55 | (2) |
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2 Analytical Sociology and Rational-Choice Theory |
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57 | (17) |
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2.1 Rational-Choice Theory |
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58 | (1) |
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2.2 Sociological Rational-Choice Theory |
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59 | (1) |
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2.3 Analytical Sociology as a Meta-Theory |
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60 | (1) |
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2.4 The Key Ideas of Analytical Sociology |
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61 | (3) |
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2.4.1 Mechanism-Based Explanation |
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61 | (1) |
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62 | (1) |
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2.4.3 Theories of Middle Range |
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63 | (1) |
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64 | (1) |
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64 | (1) |
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2.6 The Assumed Special Role of RCT |
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65 | (2) |
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67 | (7) |
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69 | (1) |
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70 | (1) |
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71 | (1) |
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Editor's Introduction to Chapter 3 |
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72 | (2) |
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3 Why Crime Happens: A Situational Action Theory |
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74 | (23) |
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3.1 Situational Action Theory |
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75 | (1) |
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76 | (1) |
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3.3 The Situational Model |
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77 | (1) |
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3.4 The Situational Process |
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78 | (4) |
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79 | (1) |
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3.4.2 Perception of Action Alternatives: The Moral Filter |
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80 | (1) |
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3.4.3 The Process of Choice: Habits and Deliberation |
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80 | (2) |
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3.4.4 Controls: Self-Control and Deterrence |
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82 | (1) |
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82 | (2) |
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3.6 Integrating the Social and Situational Models |
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84 | (1) |
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85 | (5) |
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3.7.1 The Peterborough Adolescent and Young Adult Development Study |
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85 | (1) |
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3.7.2 Measuring Crime, Crime Propensity and Criminogenic Exposure |
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86 | (1) |
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3.7.3 Crime Involvement by Crime Propensity and Criminogenic Exposure |
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87 | (1) |
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3.7.4 The Impact of Criminogenic Exposure on Crime for Groups with Different Levels of Crime Propensity |
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88 | (2) |
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3.8 Explaining Crime Concentrations (Hot Spots) |
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90 | (2) |
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92 | (5) |
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92 | (2) |
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94 | (1) |
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Editor's Introduction to Chapter 4 |
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95 | (2) |
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4 Frames, Scripts, and Variable Rationality: An Integrative Theory of Action |
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97 | (30) |
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97 | (2) |
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4.2 The Model of Frame Selection (MFS) |
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99 | (7) |
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4.2.1 Frames, Scripts, and Actions |
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99 | (1) |
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4.2.2 Dual-processes: Spontaneous vs. Reflected Modes of Selection |
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100 | (4) |
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4.2.3 The Determinants of Variable Rationality |
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104 | (2) |
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4.3 Hypotheses and Previous Applications |
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106 | (2) |
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4.4 An Exemplary Application Using Survey Data: Explaining Voter Participation |
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108 | (7) |
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108 | (4) |
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112 | (1) |
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113 | (2) |
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4.5 Applying the MFS to Study Social Dynamics |
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115 | (3) |
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4.5.1 The MFS and the Study of Social Movements and Collective Action |
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116 | (1) |
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4.5.2 Strategic Interaction with Variable Rationality and Framing |
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117 | (1) |
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118 | (9) |
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119 | (4) |
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123 | (1) |
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124 | (1) |
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Editor's Introduction to Chapter 5 |
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125 | (2) |
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5 Analytical Sociology and Quantitative Narrative Analysis: Explaining Lynchings in Georgia (1875--1930) |
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127 | (24) |
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5.1 Strange Fruits on Southern Trees |
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127 | (1) |
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128 | (1) |
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5.3 Quantitative Narrative Analysis (QNA) |
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129 | (10) |
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5.3.1 Step 1: Story Grammars |
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130 | (2) |
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5.3.2 Step 2: PC-ACE (Program for Computer-Assisted Coding of Events) |
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132 | (2) |
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5.3.3 Step 3: Data Analysis: Actor-Centered vs. Variable-Centered Tools of Analysis |
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134 | (5) |
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139 | (3) |
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142 | (2) |
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144 | (7) |
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146 | (1) |
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146 | (1) |
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147 | (2) |
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Editor's Introduction to Chapter 6 |
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149 | (2) |
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6 Identity and Opportunity in Early Modern Politics: How Job Vacancies Induced Witch Persecutions in Scotland, 1563--1736 |
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151 | (21) |
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151 | (2) |
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6.2 Theories about Witches and Research on State Making |
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153 | (2) |
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6.3 Towards a Theory of Persecution |
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155 | (2) |
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156 | (1) |
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6.3.2 Elite Social Structure and Government |
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157 | (1) |
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6.4 Witch-Hunting in Scotland |
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157 | (2) |
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159 | (5) |
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6.5.1 Prosecution as Career Device I: Waves of Witch-Hunting and their Historical Correlates |
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159 | (2) |
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6.5.2 Prosecution as Career Device II: Witch-Hunters Become Justices of the Peace |
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161 | (1) |
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6.5.3 Competing Explanations I: The Godly State Ideology |
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162 | (1) |
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6.5.4 Competing Explanations II: Witches as Scapegoats for Disaster |
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163 | (1) |
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164 | (8) |
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165 | (1) |
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165 | (3) |
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168 | (1) |
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169 | (1) |
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Editor's Introduction to Chapter 7 |
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170 | (2) |
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7 Mechanisms of Cooperation |
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172 | (29) |
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172 | (2) |
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7.2 Cooperation Problems in Dyadic Settings |
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174 | (7) |
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7.2.1 Models of Trust Problem |
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175 | (3) |
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7.2.2 Cooperation Mechanisms in Embedded Settings |
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178 | (1) |
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7.2.3 Empirical Research on Trust in Embedded Settings |
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179 | (1) |
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7.2.4 Dyadic Embeddedness |
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180 | (1) |
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7.2.5 Network Embeddedness |
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180 | (1) |
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7.3 Cooperation Problems Involving More than Two Actors |
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181 | (6) |
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7.3.1 Reciprocity and Non-Standard Utility Models |
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183 | (1) |
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7.3.2 Empirical Evidence on Heterogeneous Preferences |
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184 | (3) |
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7.4 Discussion and Concluding Remarks |
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187 | (14) |
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190 | (4) |
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194 | (2) |
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Editor's Introduction to Chapter 8 |
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196 | (2) |
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Baldassarri's Preface to Chapter 8 |
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198 | (3) |
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8 The Impact of Elections on Cooperation: Evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Uganda |
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201 | (32) |
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8.1 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses |
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203 | (3) |
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8.2 Research Site, Sampling, and Experimental Design |
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206 | (1) |
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207 | (1) |
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8.4 Sampling and Data Collection |
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208 | (1) |
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208 | (2) |
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8.6 Experimental Findings |
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210 | (4) |
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8.7 Monitors' Sanctioning Behavior |
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214 | (2) |
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8.8 Discussion of the Experimental Part |
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216 | (1) |
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217 | (2) |
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8.10 Comparing Behavior in the Experiment and Real Life |
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219 | (2) |
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221 | (12) |
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223 | (1) |
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224 | (4) |
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228 | (1) |
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228 | (4) |
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232 | (1) |
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233 | (186) |
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234 | (1) |
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Editor's Introduction to Chapter 9 |
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235 | (2) |
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9 Social Networks and Agent-Based Modelling |
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237 | (26) |
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9.1 Social Network Properties |
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238 | (5) |
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9.1.1 Surveys of Personal Networks |
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239 | (4) |
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9.2 Network Construction Techniques |
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243 | (3) |
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9.2.1 Global Reference or Full Information |
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243 | (1) |
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9.2.2 Random Graph Local Networks |
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243 | (1) |
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9.2.3 Two-Dimensional Lattices or Grid-Based Networks |
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244 | (1) |
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9.2.4 One-Dimensional Lattice or Small-World Method |
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245 | (1) |
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9.2.5 Biased or Structured Random Networks |
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245 | (1) |
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9.3 Networks as Pipes: A Basic Demonstration |
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246 | (10) |
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9.3.1 Global Networks and Group Size |
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248 | (3) |
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9.3.2 Results with Network Construction Methods |
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251 | (5) |
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256 | (7) |
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257 | (3) |
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260 | (1) |
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Editor's Introduction to Chapter 10 |
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261 | (2) |
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10 Online Networks and the Diffusion of Protest |
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263 | (19) |
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264 | (4) |
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10.1.1 Models of Diffusion |
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264 | (2) |
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266 | (2) |
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10.2 Thresholds and Critical Mass |
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268 | (3) |
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10.3 Networks and Social Influence |
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271 | (4) |
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10.4 Conclusion: Digital Data and Analytical Sociology |
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275 | (7) |
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276 | (2) |
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278 | (1) |
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Homophily and Status Hierarchies |
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279 | (1) |
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Editor's Introduction to Chapter 11 |
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280 | (2) |
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11 Liability to Rupture: Multiple Mechanisms and Subgroup Formation. An Exploratory Theoretical Study |
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282 | (17) |
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282 | (1) |
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283 | (1) |
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284 | (3) |
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11.4 Homophily (H-theory) |
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287 | (1) |
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288 | (1) |
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11.6 Developing a Dynamic Mechanism for Balance Theory |
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289 | (2) |
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11.7 Developing a Dynamic Mechanism for H-theory |
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291 | (2) |
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11.8 The Dynamic Interaction of Balance and H-theories |
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293 | (1) |
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294 | (5) |
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Appendix 11.A Micro--Macro Inferences and Scale |
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294 | (1) |
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295 | (1) |
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296 | (1) |
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Editor's Introduction to Chapter 12 |
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297 | (2) |
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12 Network Size and Network Homophily: Same-Sex Friendships in 595 Scandinavian Schools |
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299 | (18) |
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299 | (2) |
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12.2 Theoretical Considerations |
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301 | (7) |
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12.2.1 Biased Urn Model Without Replacement for Network Formation |
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301 | (4) |
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12.2.2 Role of Group Size for Homophily |
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305 | (3) |
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12.3 Empirical Application: Same-Sex Ties in School Classes |
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308 | (2) |
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308 | (1) |
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309 | (1) |
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310 | (2) |
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312 | (5) |
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313 | (1) |
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314 | (1) |
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Editor's Introduction to Chapter 13 |
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315 | (2) |
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13 Status and Participation in Online Task Groups: An Agent-Based Model |
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317 | (25) |
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317 | (2) |
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319 | (2) |
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13.3 E-state Structuralism: A Very Brief Review with an Add-On |
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321 | (3) |
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13.4 Case Study: Strategies and Discussions in Massively Multi-Player Online Games |
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324 | (2) |
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13.5 Analysis of the Model |
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326 | (5) |
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13.6 Empirical Test/Validation of the Model |
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331 | (5) |
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336 | (6) |
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337 | (1) |
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338 | (1) |
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339 | (1) |
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Editor's Introduction to Chapter 14 |
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340 | (2) |
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14 Turbulent Careers: Social Networks, Employer Hiring Preferences, and Job Instability |
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342 | (31) |
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342 | (1) |
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343 | (3) |
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14.2.1 The Rise of Turbulence in Individual Employment Trajectories |
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343 | (1) |
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14.2.2 Inequality in Insecurity |
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344 | (2) |
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346 | (3) |
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14.3.1 Network Structure and Inequality in Information |
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346 | (2) |
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348 | (1) |
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349 | (6) |
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14.4.1 The Simulation Environment |
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349 | (1) |
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350 | (3) |
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14.4.3 Experimental Structure |
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353 | (2) |
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355 | (7) |
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14.6 Summary and Conclusions |
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362 | (11) |
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Technical Appendix 14.A Detailed Description of jobMatch Simulation Model |
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364 | (3) |
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367 | (1) |
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367 | (3) |
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370 | (1) |
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Editor's Introduction to Chapter 15 |
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371 | (2) |
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15 Employer Networks, Priming, and Discrimination in Hiring: An Experiment |
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373 | (27) |
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373 | (3) |
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376 | (3) |
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15.2.1 Experimental Design |
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376 | (2) |
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378 | (1) |
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378 | (1) |
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379 | (12) |
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379 | (3) |
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15.3.2 Hierarchical Models |
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382 | (3) |
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15.3.3 From Traditional Testing Toward Finding Indicators for Mechanisms |
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385 | (6) |
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391 | (9) |
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393 | (1) |
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393 | (3) |
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396 | (1) |
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397 | (1) |
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Editor's Introduction to Chapter 16 |
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398 | (2) |
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16 The Duality of Organizations and Audiences |
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400 | (19) |
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400 | (1) |
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16.2 Similarity and the Duality of Organizations and their Audiences |
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401 | (2) |
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16.3 Organizational Similarity, Audiences, and Arguments for Extending Structural Equivalence |
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403 | (3) |
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16.4 A Representation for Dual Similarity of Organizations and their Audiences |
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406 | (1) |
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16.5 Empirical Illustration: The Duality of Restaurants and their Reviewers |
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407 | (1) |
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16.6 Similarity as a Basis for Prediction: Validating the Model |
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408 | (4) |
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16.7 Discussion, Implications, and Limitations |
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412 | (3) |
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16.8 Connections to Analytical Sociology |
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415 | (4) |
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415 | (3) |
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418 | (1) |
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419 | (8) |
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Problem Shift in Sociology: Mechanisms, Generic Instruments, and Fractals |
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420 | (7) |
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Index |
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427 | |