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E-raamat: Pension Reform: A Short Guide [Oxford Scholarship Online e-raamatud]

(, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), (, London School of Economics and Political Science)
  • Formaat: 264 pages, 12 black and white line illustrations
  • Ilmumisaeg: 10-Dec-2009
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press Inc
  • ISBN-13: 9780195387728
Teised raamatud teemal:
  • Oxford Scholarship Online e-raamatud
  • Raamatu hind pole hetkel teada
  • Formaat: 264 pages, 12 black and white line illustrations
  • Ilmumisaeg: 10-Dec-2009
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press Inc
  • ISBN-13: 9780195387728
Teised raamatud teemal:
This is an abridgement of Barr and Diamond's 'Reforming Pensions: Principles and Policy Choices' (OUP, 2008), a larger book that is intended for policy makers and as a supplement in college courses. The problem. Mandatory pension systems are a worldwide phenomenon. However, with given contribution rates, monthly benefits and retirement ages, pension systems are not consistent with three long-run trends - declining mortality, declining fertility, and earlier retirement. Thus many systems need reform. Principles. This book gives an extensive but nontechnical explanation of the economics of pension design. The theoretical arguments have three elements. 1. Pension systems have multiple objectives - consumption smoothing, insurance, poverty relief, and redistribution. Good policy needs to bear them all in mind. 2. Good analysis should be framed in a second-best context - simple economic models are a bad guide to policy design in a world with imperfect information and decision-making, incomplete markets and taxation. 3. Any choice of pension system has distributional consequences, which the book recognizes explicitly. The analysis includes discussion of labor markets, capital markets, risk sharing and gender and family, with comparison of PAYG and funded systems, recognizing that the suitable level of funding differs by country. Alongside the economic principles of good design, policy must also take account of a country's capacity to implement the system. Thus the theoretical analysis is complemented by discussion of implementation, and of experiences, both good and bad, in many countries, with particular attention to China and Chile. Policy conclusions: 1. Sound application of the principles outlined above can and does lead to widely different systems in different country settings. 2. Unless there are transfers from outside the system, any improvement to the finances of a pension system must involve one or more of (a) higher contribution rates, (b) lower monthly pensions, (c) later retirement at the same monthly pension, (d) policies designed to increase national output. 3.The previous statement holds whatever the degree of funding. If a public pension is regarded as unsustainable the problem needs to be addressed directly by one of these methods.

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Winner of Written by Peter Diamond, winner of the 2010 Nobel Prize for Economics.
Foreword vii
Nicholas Stern
List of Boxes, Tables, and Figures
xix
The Backdrop
3(23)
The context
3(16)
Policy responses
19(4)
Organization of the book
23(3)
The Basic Economics of Pensions
26(21)
Core purposes of pension systems
26(5)
Individual and household objectives
27(2)
Public policy objectives
29(1)
Other objectives
30(1)
Recognizing costs
30(1)
Basic features of pension systems
31(6)
Fully funded, partially funded, and pay-as-you-go pensions
31(1)
The relationship between contributions and benefits
32(4)
Adjusting contributions and benefits over time
36(1)
Economic framework
37(10)
Simple economics
37(7)
But not too simple
44(3)
Pensions and Labor Markets
47(11)
The effects of benefit design during working life
47(4)
Problems with final salary systems
47(2)
Problems with strict adherence to actuarial benefits
49(2)
Determining benefits at retirement
51(6)
Retirement age and unemployment
51(3)
Mandatory retirement
54(1)
What ``retirement age''?
54(1)
Adjusting pensions for earlier and later retirement
55(2)
The balance between mandatory and voluntary pensions
57(1)
Finance and Funding
58(20)
Background issues
58(2)
Implicit and explicit debt
60(2)
Funding, saving, and growth
62(11)
Funding and national saving
62(5)
Funding and capital market development
67(1)
Funding and demographic change
68(2)
Funding and property rights
70(1)
Conclusion
71(2)
Comparing the returns to PAYG and funding
73(5)
Inappropriate comparison of steady states
73(2)
Adjusting for differences in risk
75(1)
Controlling for administrative costs
75(1)
Conclusion
76(2)
Redistribution and Risk Sharing
78(16)
Sharing burdens across generations
80(1)
Sharing risks
81(6)
Benefit design and risk sharing
81(1)
Indexing pension benefits to prices or wages
82(5)
Adjusting pension systems over time
87(7)
Adjusting for longer life expectancy
87(3)
Adjusting for a changing labor force
90(3)
Adjusting for changing social risks
93(1)
Gender and Family
94(16)
Framing the issues
94(3)
The design of pension systems
97(5)
Pension credits for child care
102(3)
Individual versus family pensions
105(1)
Survivor pensions
105(2)
Divorce
107(2)
Conclusion
109(1)
Implementing Pensions
110(17)
The capacity of government
111(4)
Implementing mandatory individual funded accounts
115(8)
The capacity of consumers
123(2)
Funding
125(2)
International Diversity and Change since 1950
127(21)
Changes over the past fifty years
127(3)
Issues and responses
130(12)
Developments in pension systems and design
130(5)
Economic adjustment to long-term trends
135(3)
The politics of adjustment
138(4)
Policy errors
142(6)
Policy problems
142(3)
Overoptimistic predictions
145(3)
Pension Systems in Different Countries
148(18)
Argentina
149(1)
Chile
150(2)
China
152(1)
The Netherlands
152(2)
New Zealand
154(3)
Poland
157(1)
Singapore
158(2)
Sweden
160(3)
United Kingdom
163(1)
United States
164(1)
Conclusion
165(1)
Close Focus: Pension Reform in Chile and China
166(16)
Pension reform in Chile
166(7)
Individual accounts
166(5)
The basic pension
171(2)
Coverage
173(1)
Pension reform in China
173(9)
The basic pension
174(4)
Individual accounts
178(1)
Coverage
179(3)
Principles and Lessons for Policy
182(25)
Principles
182(7)
Principles of analysis
182(2)
Principles of policy design
184(5)
Lessons for policy
189(13)
Pension design
189(6)
Finance and funding
195(5)
Political and administrative implementation
200(2)
Conclusions
202(5)
Policy conclusions
202(1)
Policy choices and economic development
203(4)
Glossary 207(8)
References 215(8)
Index 223(12)
Contents of Reforming Pensions 235
Nicholas Barr is Professor of Public Economics at the London School of Economics, the author of numerous books and articles, and a Trustee of HelpAge International. He spent two periods at the World Bank working on income transfers in Central and Eastern Europe and has been a Visiting Scholar at the Fiscal Affairs Department at the IMF. He has been active in debates about pension reform and higher education finance, advising governments in the post-communist countries, and in the UK, Australia, Chile, China, Hungary, New Zealand and South Africa.