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E-raamat: Foundations of European Union Competition Law: The Objective and Principles of Article 102 [Oxford Scholarship Online e-raamatud]

(Professor of Law, King's College, London)
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Foundations of European Union Competition Law: The Objective and Principles of Article 102Suurem pilt
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Wiley OnlineRohkem infot Oxford Scholarship Online e-raamatute kohta
Raamatu kodulehekülg: http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199226153.001.0001/acprof-9780199226153
Article 102 TFEU prohibits the abuse of a dominant position as incompatible with the internal market. Its application in practice has been controversial with goals as diverse as the preservation of an undistorted competitive process, the protection of economic freedom, the maximisation of consumer welfare, social welfare, or economic efficiency all cited as possible or desirable objectives. These conflicting aims have raised complex questions as to how abuses can be assessed and how a dominant position should be defined.

This book addresses the conceptual problems underlying the tests to be applied under Article 102 in light of the objectives of EU competition law. Adopting an interdisciplinary approach, the book covers all the main issues relating to Article 102, including its objectives, its relationship with other principles and provisions of EU law, the criteria for the assessment of individual abusive practices, and the definition of dominance. It provides an in-depth doctrinal and normative commentary of the case law with the aim of establishing an intellectually robust and practically workable analytical framework for abuse of dominance.
List of Figures
xv
List of Abbreviations
xvii
Table of Cases
xix
Table of Treaties and Conventions
xxxix
Table of European Union Legislation
xli
Table of National Legislation
xlv
1 Introduction
1(10)
A The problem
1(2)
B The method
3(2)
C The structure of the inquiry
5(6)
I NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS
2 Normative Theory of Competition Law
11(40)
A Introduction
11(3)
B Non-welfare objectives
14(18)
(1) The competitive process and a competitive market structure
14(4)
(2) Economic freedom
18(3)
(3) Fairness
21(3)
(4) Protection of competitors and small and medium-sized enterprises
24(2)
(5) Market integration
26(3)
(6) Market liberalization
29(1)
(7) Consumer choice
30(2)
C Social welfare
32(17)
(1) `The search for the economic purpose of the law
32(1)
(2) Social welfare, consumer welfare, and economic efficiency
33(6)
(3) Theoretical and normative superiority of the long-term social welfare objective
39(1)
(4) Consumer welfare
40(1)
(a) Definition of the long-term consumer welfare objective
40(1)
(b) Redistribution of wealth
41(2)
(c) Imperfections in corporate governance
43(1)
(d) Enforcement, efficiency, and institutional capability
43(1)
(e) The misuse of the consumer welfare objective
44(1)
(5) A different perspective: consumer harm as a test to achieve a social welfare objective
45(1)
(a) The problem
45(1)
(b) Information asymmetry
46(1)
(c) Self-selection
46(2)
(d) Lobbying
48(1)
(e) Limited (not general) validity of consumer harm as a test
48(1)
D Conclusion
49(2)
3 The Design of the Optimal Abuse Tests
51(56)
A Introduction
51(1)
B The search for a single test
52(5)
C Intent
57(9)
(1) Origins of the test
57(1)
(2) Defining intent
57(2)
(3) Naked abuse as a test of intent
59(4)
(4) The test of intent beyond naked abuse and its limitations
63(3)
D The no economic sense test
66(6)
E The as efficient competitor test
72(20)
(1) Consistency of the as efficient competitor test with fundamental principles
72(2)
(2) Under-inclusiveness of the as efficient competitor test
74(2)
(3) Over-inclusiveness of the as efficient competitor test
76(1)
(4) The problem of multi-product firms
77(2)
(5) Extension of the as efficient competitor test to abusive discrimination
79(1)
(a) The problem
79(1)
(b) General welfare effects of discrimination
80(8)
(c) Competitive implications of discrimination on intermediate markets
88(3)
(d) The market-distorting discrimination test
91(1)
F The consumer harm test
92(8)
(1) General formulations of the consumer harm test
92(1)
(2) Advantages of the consumer harm test
93(1)
(3) Problems of over- and under-enforcement associated with the consumer harm test
94(1)
(4) Administrability of the consumer harm test
95(2)
(5) Exploitative abuses and consumer harm
97(3)
G Conclusion
100(7)
II LEGAL FOUNDATIONS
4 The Objective of Article 102
107(48)
A Introduction
107(1)
B Interpretation of Article 102
108(7)
(1) The general prohibition of an abuse of a dominant position
108(2)
(2) The illustrative list
110(3)
(3) The internal market
113(1)
(a) The link between the competition rules and the internal market
113(2)
b The internal market and economic freedom
115(18)
(c) The social welfare objective of the internal market
116(3)
(d) The competition rules and the objectives of the Union
119(2)
(4) Historical background and travaux preparatoires
121(1)
(a) A methodological gloss
121(1)
(b) The Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community
122(1)
(c) From the ECSC Treaty to the Spaak Report
122(4)
(d) The drafting of the text of Article 102
126(5)
(e) Long-term social welfare in the travaux preparatoires
131(2)
C Tine problem of the objective of the EU competition rules in the case law and secondary legislation
133(19)
(1) Integrated analysis of Article 102, Article 101, and merger control
133(1)
(2) The EU competition rules and the objectives of the Treaties
134(1)
(a) Article 102
134(1)
(b) Article 101
134(3)
(c) Merger control
137(1)
(3) Rejection of consumer welfare as an objective of EU competition law
138(6)
(4) Fairness
144(1)
(a) Fairness and equally efficient competitors
144(4)
(b) Fairness and less efficient competitors
148(2)
(5) Economic freedom
150(2)
D Conclusion
152(3)
5 The General Framework of the Abuse Tests in EU Law
155(32)
A Introduction
155(2)
B The proportionality test in context
157(7)
(1) Proportionality as an analytical structure
157(1)
(2) Proportionality as a general principle of EU law
158(3)
(3) The proportionality framework under Article 101
161(3)
C Proportionality under Article 102
164(5)
(1) The proportionality framework in the case law
164(3)
(2) The proportionality framework in the Guidance on Article 102
167(2)
D The limited usefulness of the definition of abuse in Hoffmann-La Roche
169(3)
E Continental Can and the concept of effective competition
172(2)
F The special responsibility of the dominant undertaking
174(2)
G Causal link between dominance, conduct, and effect
176(9)
(1) Causal link between dominance and competitive harm
176(3)
(2) Multi-matket abuses
179(1)
(a) Input/output and complementary products
179(1)
(b) Neighbouring markets
180(5)
(c) The test for multi-market abuses
185(1)
H Conclusion
185(2)
III TESTS OF ABUSE
6 The Tests of Intent
187(34)
A Introduction
187(1)
B The naked abuse test
188(13)
(1) Naked abuse as a general test
188(3)
(2) Naked abuse and free trade
191(1)
(a) Free trade as a key driver of long-term social welfare
191(1)
(b) Above-cost rebates
191(2)
(c) Refusal to supply
193(2)
(d) `Raising rivals' costs
195(2)
(e) Discrimination
197(3)
(f) Naked exploitation
200(1)
C Intent and the risk of systematic false convictions
201(10)
(1) Predation
201(1)
(a) The problem
201(2)
(b) Inadequacy of the recoupment test
203(2)
(c) The test of intent in predation
205(1)
(d) Recoupment as predatory incentive
206(2)
(e) The no economic sense test as a test of intent
208(1)
(f) The predation test in the Guidance on Article 102
209(1)
(2) Abuse of contractual rights
210(1)
D Intent and the risk of systematic false acquittals
211(6)
(1) Tying
211(1)
(a) The problem
211(1)
(b) The enforcement risks associated with tying
212(3)
(c) Intent and incentive for anti-competitive tying
215(2)
E Evidence of intent as circumstantial evidence
217(2)
F Conclusion
219(2)
7 The As Efficient Competitor Test
221(36)
A Introduction
221(1)
B Predatory conduct
222(7)
(1) Predation and exclusion of as efficient competitors
222(1)
(2) The problem of the permissible cost benchmarks
223(6)
C Margin squeeze
229(3)
D Conditional above-cost rebates
232(10)
(1) Protection of less efficient undertakings incompatible with Article 102
232(3)
(2) Static application of the as efficient competitor test
235(4)
(3) Dynamic application of the as efficient competitor test
239(3)
E Unconditional above-cost rebates
242(2)
F Mixed bundling
244(1)
G Exclusivity
245(3)
H Discrimination
248(7)
(1) Article 102(c) as the exclusive legal basis
248(1)
(2) Criticism of the application of Article 102(c) to exclusionary conduct
249(1)
(3) Market-distorting discrimination and competitive disadvantage
250(5)
I Conclusion
255(2)
8 The Consumer Harm Test
257(30)
A Introduction
257(1)
B The consumer harm test in vertical foreclosure
257(18)
(1) The concept of vertical foreclosure
257(1)
(2) Refusal to supply
258(1)
(a) The problem of balancing investment incentives and competitive harm
258(4)
(b) Indispensability
262(3)
(c) Intensity of the exclusionary effect
265(2)
(d) Raising rivals' costs
267(2)
(e) Clarifying the consumer harm rest in refusal to supply
269(3)
(f) Refusal to supply an existing customer
272(1)
(3) Margin squeeze as a vertical foreclosure strategy
273(2)
C Exploitative abuses
275(7)
(1) The need for limiting principles
275(2)
(2) Enhanced dominance test
277(2)
(3) Enhanced consumer harm test
279(1)
(4) Post-exclusionary exploitation test
280(2)
D Consumer harm as the default test for exclusionary abuses
282(2)
E Conclusion
284(3)
9 Defences
287(40)
A Introduction
287(2)
B Burden of proof and evidential burden
289(5)
C Thresholds of anti-competitive effects
294(6)
D Proportionality defences
300(4)
(1) Structure of the test
300(1)
(2) The meeting competition defence
301(3)
E Objective justification defences
304(17)
(1) Structure of the test
304(5)
(2) Efficiency defences
309(1)
(a) AI locative efficiency
309(2)
(b) Productive efficiency
311(2)
(c) Dynamic efficiency
313(4)
(3) Social welfare defences
317(4)
F Conclusion
321(6)
IV ANALYTIC OF THE CONCEPT OF DOMINANCE
10 Single Dominance
327(32)
A Introduction
327(1)
B Dominance as the ability to harm competition
328(5)
C Dominance as market power
333(9)
D Barriers to entry
342(13)
(1) Dynamic test of barriers to entry
342(4)
(2) Sunk costs
346(1)
(3) Economies of scale
347(1)
(4) Economies of scope and product range
348(1)
(5) Network effects
349(1)
(6) Switching costs
349(2)
(7) Vertical integration and exclusive or preferential access to inputs or customers
351(2)
(8) Financial strength
353(1)
(9) Spare capacity
354(1)
E Countervailing buyer power
355(2)
E Conclusion
357(2)
11 Collective Dominance
359(30)
A Introduction
359(1)
B The emergence of the concept of collective dominance
360(4)
C Non-oligopolistic collective dominance
364(6)
(1) Horizontal non-oligopolistic collective dominance
364(1)
(a) The two-pronged structure of the test
364(10)
(b) Collective entity test
364(3)
(c) Dominance test
367(1)
(2) Vertical non-oligopolistic collective dominance
368(2)
D Oligopolistic collective dominance
370(15)
(1) Structure of the test
370(5)
(2) Integrated analysis of structural and behavioural factors
375(1)
(a) The Impala approach
375(1)
(b) Ability to coordinate
375(7)
(c) Incentive to coordinate
382(1)
(d) No incentive to deviate
383(2)
E Abuse of collective dominance
385(2)
F Conclusion
387(2)
V THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK OF ARTICLE 102
12 General Conclusion
389(14)
A Introduction
389(1)
B Towards a coherent analytical framework for the application of Article 102
389(2)
C Objectives, principles, and tests clarified
391(6)
(1) Objectives and general principles
391(2)
(2) Assessment of conduct
393(4)
(3) Assessment of dominance
397(1)
D Addressing the main shortcomings of the current case law and enforcement practice
397(6)
Bibliography 403(24)
Index 427
Renato Nazzini is Professor of Law and Director of Research of the Centre of Construction Law and Dispute Resolution at King's College London.
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