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E-raamat: Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Law [Oxford Scholarship Online e-raamatud]

(Professor of Criminal Law, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Faculty of law)
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Individual Criminal Responsibility in International LawSuurem pilt
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Wiley OnlineRohkem infot Oxford Scholarship Online e-raamatute kohta
Raamatu kodulehekülg: http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199560363.001.0001/acprof-9780199560363
This book examines the concept of individual criminal responsibility for serious violations of international law, i.e. aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Such crimes are rarely committed by single individuals. Rather, international crimes generally connote a plurality of offenders, particularly in the execution of the crimes, which are often orchestrated and masterminded by individuals behind the scene of the crimes who can be termed 'intellectual perpetrators'. For a determination of individual guilt and responsibility, a fair assessment of the mutual relationships between those persons is indispensable.

By setting out how to understand and apply concepts such as joint criminal enterprise, superior responsibility, duress, and the defence of superior orders, this work provides a framework for that assessment. It does so by bringing to light the roots of these concepts, which lie not merely in earlier phases of development of international criminal law but also in domestic law and legal doctrine. The book also critically reflects on how criminal responsibility has been developed in the case law of international criminal tribunals and courts. It thus illuminates and analyses the rules on individual responsibility in international law.
Abbreviations xix
Table of Cases
xxi
PART 1 INTRODUCTION
1 Criminal Responsibility in International Law
3(14)
1.1 War and law
3(1)
1.2 From war crimes law to international criminal law
4(1)
1.3 State responsibility vis-a-vis individual responsibility
5(3)
1.4 International criminal law
8(9)
1.4.1 Nature of norms
8(1)
1.4.2 Pluralism or uniformity?
9(3)
1.4.3 Sources of law
12(5)
2 Collective Criminality, Individual Responsibility
17(22)
2.1 Individual criminal responsibility
17(3)
2.1.1 Developments in municipal criminal law
17(1)
2.1.2 International criminal responsibility
18(2)
2.2 System criminality
20(2)
2.3 Bernays' collective criminality theory
22(8)
2.3.1 Conspiracy---criminal responsibility at leadership level
23(3)
2.3.2 Criminal organizations---criminal responsibility at execution level
26(4)
2.4 Subsequent proceedings
30(6)
2.4.1 Membership liability
32(1)
2.4.2 Common design
33(2)
2.4.3 Complicity
35(1)
2.5 Concluding observations
36(3)
3 Parameters of Criminal Responsibility
39(22)
3.1 Terminology
39(1)
3.2 Subjective element
40(12)
3.2.1 ICC Statute
45(5)
3.2.2 Ad hoc tribunals
50(2)
3.3 Objective element
52(9)
3.3.1 Broad and narrow understanding
53(1)
3.3.2 Commission and omission
54(7)
PART 2 ATTRIBUTING CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
4 Perpetration and Participation
61(16)
4.1 Codifying individual criminal responsibility
61(4)
4.2 Participation in crime: a comparative perspective
65(9)
4.2.1 Unitary and differentiated models
65(2)
4.2.2 Derivative and autonomous models
67(3)
4.2.3 Contribution and crime-oriented models
70(1)
4.2.4 Naturalistic and normative models
71(2)
4.2.5 Differentiated and unitary: a fading distinction
73(1)
4.3 International models of participation: preliminary observations
74(1)
4.4 Concluding remarks
74(3)
5 Principals and Accessories
77(12)
5.1 Introduction
77(1)
5.2 The principal-accessory distinction
77(4)
5.2.1 The advance of the normative approach
77(3)
5.2.2 Bolstering the principal status
80(1)
5.3 Distinguishing criteria: Roxin's theory
81(2)
5.4 `Control of the crime'
83(5)
5.4.1 Dualism
85(1)
5.4.2 Roxin's theory and the ICC
86(2)
5.5 Concluding observations
88(1)
6 Forms of Criminal Responsibility
89(68)
6.1 Introduction
89(1)
6.2 Direct and indirect perpetration
89(6)
6.2.1 Comparative perspective
89(2)
6.2.2 International criminal tribunals
91(2)
6.2.3 ICC
93(2)
6.3 Co-perpetration
95(7)
6.3.1 Comparative perspective
95(1)
6.3.2 International criminal tribunals
96(3)
6.3.3 ICC
99(3)
6.4 Instigation, ordering, soliciting, and inducing
102(8)
6.4.1 Comparative perspective
102(2)
6.4.2 International criminal tribunals
104(3)
6.4.3 ICC
107(3)
6.5 Planning
110(2)
6.5.1 Comparative perspective
110(1)
6.5.2 International criminal tribunals
110(2)
6.6 Aiding and abetting
112(19)
6.6.1 Common law origin
112(4)
6.6.2 Comparative perspective
116(4)
6.6.3 International criminal tribunals
120(7)
6.6.4 ICC
127(4)
6.7 Common purpose liability
131(16)
6.7.1 Comparative perspective
131(2)
6.7.2 International criminal tribunals
133(12)
6.7.3 ICC
145(2)
6.8 Attempt
147(6)
6.8.1 Comparative perspective
147(3)
6.8.2 International criminal tribunals
150(1)
6.8.3 ICC
151(2)
6.9 Conclusion: mixed models of criminal participation
153(4)
7 Crime-Specific and Leadership Modalities
157(26)
7.1 Introduction
157(1)
Leadership modalities
7.2 JCE at leadership level
157(8)
7.2.1 Indirect co-perpetration and interlinked JCE
158(5)
7.2.2 Observations
163(2)
7.3 Indirect co-perpetration at the ICC
165(5)
7.3.1 Observations
168(2)
7.4 Indirect co-perpetration and interlinked JCE compared
170(1)
Crime-specific modalities
7.5 Complicity in genocide
171(8)
7.5.1 International criminal tribunals
172(6)
7.5.2 ICC
178(1)
7.6 Inchoate offences
179(2)
7.6.1 Conspiracy to commit genocide
179(1)
7.6.2 Incitement to commit genocide
180(1)
7.7 Concluding observations: theories of imputation
181(2)
8 Superior Responsibility
183(30)
8.1 Introduction
183(1)
8.2 Developments in the law on superior responsibility
184(11)
8.2.1 The Celebici case
185(2)
8.2.2 Successor superior responsibility
187(2)
8.2.3 Loosening the superior-subordinate relationship
189(3)
8.2.4 Observations
192(3)
8.3 The ambiguous nature of superior responsibility
195(2)
8.4 Article 28 of the ICC Statute
197(5)
8.4.1 Textual analysis
197(2)
8.4.2 Nature of liability
199(3)
8.5 Superior responsibility in national law
202(2)
8.6 A multilayered concept
204(2)
8.7 Superior responsibility as parallel liability
206(3)
8.7.1 Revisiting its nature
206(1)
8.7.2 Superior responsibility as `lex specialis'
207(2)
8.8 Concluding observations
209(4)
PART 3 DEFENCES
9 Grounds for Excluding Criminal Responsibility
213(56)
9.1 Introduction
213(1)
9.2 Preliminary observations
214(7)
9.2.1 International law defences and criminal law defences
215(1)
9.2.2 Justification and excuse
215(2)
9.2.3 The mental element and defences
217(2)
9.2.4 The reasonable person standard and Garantenstellung
219(2)
9.2.5 The culpa in causa or `conduct-in-causing' analysis
221(1)
9.3 Article 31 of the ICC Statute
221(3)
9.4 Mental defect
224(4)
9.4.1 Text
224(1)
9.4.2 Comparative perspective
224(2)
9.4.3 International jurisprudence
226(2)
9.5 Intoxication
228(5)
9.5.1 Text
228(2)
9.5.2 Comparative perspective
230(3)
9.5.3 International jurisprudence
233(1)
9.6 Self-defence
233(9)
9.6.1 Preliminary observations
233(2)
9.6.2 Text
235(4)
9.6.3 Comparative perspective
239(1)
9.6.4 International jurisprudence
240(2)
9.7 Duress
242(18)
9.7.1 Text
242(1)
9.7.2 Comparative perspective
243(6)
9.7.3 International jurisprudence
249(11)
9.8 Non-statutory defences
260(7)
9.8.1 Belligerent reprisals
261(2)
9.8.2 Tu quoque
263(1)
9.8.3 Military necessity
264(3)
9.9 Concluding observations
267(2)
10 Mistake of Fact and Law
269(18)
10.1 Introduction
269(1)
10.2 The defence of mistake
269(5)
10.2.1 Descriptive and normative elements
269(2)
10.2.2 Mistake of fact
271(1)
10.2.3 Mistake of law
271(1)
10.2.4 The scope of mistake of law in ICL
272(2)
10.3 International jurisprudence
274(2)
10.4 Comparative perspective
276(5)
10.4.1 Anglo-American law
276(2)
10.4.2 Civil law
278(3)
10.5 Article 32 of the ICC Statute
281(4)
10.5.1 The interplay between Articles 32 and 30 of the ICC Statute
281(3)
10.5.2 Interpreting Article 32
284(1)
10.6 Concluding observations
285(2)
11 Superior Orders
287(20)
11.1 Introduction
287(1)
11.2 Legal history
287(6)
11.3 Article 33 of the ICC Statute
293(3)
11.3.1 Text
293(2)
11.3.2 Three conditions
295(1)
11.4 International jurisprudence
296(3)
11.5 Superior orders in national law
299(5)
11.5.1 The conditional liability approach
299(2)
11.5.2 Absolute liability approach
301(1)
11.5.3 A combined approach
302(1)
11.5.4 Justification or excuse?
303(1)
11.6 Battlefield reality
304(2)
11.7 Concluding observations
306(1)
Annex: Selected Provisions 307(6)
Bibliography 313(20)
Index 333
Elies van Sliedregt is Professor of Criminal Law at VU University Amsterdam. She is a senior editor of the Leiden Journal of International Law and a member of The Young Academy of The Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences. Her research interests lie in the field of international, European, and comparative criminal law. Van Sliedregt has published extensively in the field of international and European criminal law. She currently heads a research group on the harmonization of international criminal law in the field of substantive international criminal law.
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