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E-raamat: Coherence of EU Free Movement Law: Constitutional Responsibility and the Court of Justice [Oxford Scholarship Online e-raamatud]

(Professor of European Union Law, University of Edinburgh)
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At the heart of the European Union is the establishment of a European market grounded in the free movement of people, goods, services, and capital. The implementation of the free market has preoccupied European lawyers since the inception of the Union's predecessors. Throughout the Union's development, as obstacles to free movement have been challenged in the courts, the European Court of Justice has had to expand on the internal market provisions in the founding Treaties to create a body of law determining the scope and meaning of the EU protection of free movement. In doing so, the Court has often taken differing approaches across the different freedoms, leaving a body of law apparently lacking a coherent set of foundational principles.

This book presents a critical analysis of the European Courts' jurisprudence on free movement, examining the Court's constitutional responsibility to articulate a coherent vision of the EU internal market. Through analysis of restrictions on free movement rights, it argues that four main drivers are distorting the system of the case law and its claims to coherence. The drivers reflect 'good' impulses (the protection of fundamental rights); avoidable habits (the proliferation of principles and conflicting lines of case law authority); inherent ambiguities (the unsettled purpose and objectives of the internal market); and broader systemic conditions (the structure of the Court and its decision-making processes). These dynamics cause problematic instances of case law fragmentation - which has substantive implications for citizens, businesses, and Member States participating in the internal market as well as reputational consequences for the Court of Justice and for the EU more generally. However, ultimately the Member States must take greater responsibility too: only they can ensure that the Court of Justice is properly structured and supported, enabling it to play its critical institutional part in the complex narrative of EU integration.

Examining the judicial development of principles that define the scope of EU free movement law, this book argues that sustaining case law coherence is a vital constitutional responsibility of the Court of Justice. The idea of constitutional responsibility draws from the nature of the duties that a higher court owes to a constitutional text and to constitutional subjects. It is based on values of fairness, integrity, and imagination. A paradigm of case law coherence is less rigid, and therefore more realistic, than a benchmark of legal certainty. But it still takes seriously the Court's obligations as a high-level judicial institution bound by the rule of law. Judges can legitimately be expected - and obliged - to be aware of the public legal resource that they construct through the evolution of case law.
Table of Cases
xii
Table of Legislation
xxv
List of Abbreviations
xxvii
1 Introduction: The Court of Justice, Constitutional Responsibility, and the Scope of EU Free Movement Law
1 Introduction
1(7)
2 The Court of Justice and constitutional responsibility
8(13)
(a) The responsibilities of constitutional courts
8(4)
(b) Constitutional responsibility and the Court of Justice
12(1)
(i) The nature of the EU legal order
13(2)
(ii) Normative perspectives
15(1)
(iii) Functional constitutionalism
16(5)
3 The significance and scope of free movement law
21(10)
(a) Significance: why free movement law?
21(3)
(b) Stages: restriction, justification, and proportionality
24(5)
(c) Scope: general approach and chapter map
29(2)
2 Coherence, Fragmentation, and the Free Movement Case Law
31(32)
1 Introduction
31(1)
2 Coherence and fragmentation
31(10)
(a) From convergence to coherence
32(4)
(b) The meaning---and limits---of coherence and fragmentation
36(5)
3 Key drivers of fragmentation in EU free movement case law
41(21)
(a) Proliferation
41(2)
(b) The multiple---and unsettled---objectives of the internal market
43(7)
(c) Realizing the protection of fundamental rights
50(4)
(d) The structure of the Court
54(8)
4 Conclusion
62(1)
3 The Negative Scope of Free Movement Law: Who-Based' Exclusions
63(52)
1 Introduction
63(1)
2 Definitional exclusion from the scope of the Treaty
64(21)
(a) Material scope
64(2)
(b) Personal scope: the basic framework
66(5)
(c) Personal scope: the substantive dimension
71(3)
(d) Is there a hierarchy of rights in free movement law?
74(1)
(i) The citizen-worker
74(7)
(ii) The human (rights) dimension
81(3)
(e) Definitional exclusion from the scope of the Treaty: interim conclusions
84(1)
3 Abuse of (EU free movement) rights
85(15)
(a) Abuse of rights in free movement law: the emergence of a concept
86(4)
(b) A widening gap between concept and impact?
90(4)
(c) Three points of discord
94(4)
(d) Abuse of rights: interim conclusions
98(2)
4 The horizontal scope of free movement law
100(13)
(a) How horizontal? The different reaches of the Treaty freedoms
100(3)
(i) Collective regulatory impact
103(1)
(ii) Member State responsibility
104(3)
(iii) Full horizontal reach
107(1)
(b) Distilling the Treaty's objectives: the catalyst of discrimination
108(2)
(c) The curbing of private autonomy
110(3)
5 Conclusion
113(2)
4 The Negative Scope of Free Movement Law Cross-Border Connections and the Significance of Movement
115(42)
1 Introduction
115(1)
2 What does movement mean and why does it matter (so much)?
116(7)
3 The incredible shrinking concept: does movement matter less?
123(7)
(a) Admissibility of (internal) national disputes under Article 267 TFEU
124(2)
(b) The changing significance of movement in law
126(4)
4 Standing at the constitutional crossroads: the specific case of citizenship and purely internal situations
130(25)
(a) A changing matrix? Citizenship, movement, and the protection of fundamental rights
131(12)
(b) Recalibrating the weight of movement
143(12)
5 Conclusion
155(2)
5 Between Negative and Positive Scope? The Principles of De Minimis and Remoteness
157(32)
1 Introduction
157(1)
2 Too little: is there a de minimis test in EU free movement law?
158(13)
(a) Free movement and de minimis: the case against
158(5)
(b) Challenges to the status quo
163(6)
(c) De rninimis, remoteness, and conceptual spillage
169(2)
3 Too far: the principle of remoteness
171(14)
(a) Is remoteness a principle or principles?
172(1)
(b) Hypothetical restrictions
173(4)
(c) The core test: too uncertain and indirect
177(8)
4 Between negative and positive scope: renewing or refraining the boundaries of Treaty-caught restrictions on movement?
185(3)
5 Conclusion
188(1)
6 The Positive Scope of Free Movement Law: Discriminatory Restrictions
189(20)
1 Introduction
189(1)
2 Restrictions: the basic framework
190(3)
3 Discriminatory restrictions
193(12)
(a) The significance of discrimination
194(4)
(b) Direct and indirect discrimination
198(1)
(c) Questions at the edge
199(6)
4 The limits of discrimination
205(4)
7 The Positive Scope of Free Movement Law: Non-Discriminatory Restrictions
209(48)
1 Introduction
209(1)
2 Non-discriminatory restrictions and market access: emergence and entrenchment
210(24)
(a) Emergence and evolution: market access and non-discriminatory restrictions
211(13)
(b) Entrenchment: the use of goods case law
224(10)
3 From concept to principle: access to what, and when?
234(22)
(a) Defining access as a principle: what is it trying to achieve?
234(2)
(i) Definitional ambiguity
236(6)
(ii) Questions of overreach
242(8)
(b) Access as a principle: refining the limits
250(6)
4 Conclusion
256(1)
Conclusion 257(4)
Index 261
Niamh Nic Shuibhne is Professor of European Union Law at the University of Edinburgh. She has published widely on EU free movement law and the legal regulation of EU citizenship. She is joint editor of the European Law Review.