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E-raamat: Nature of Legislative Intent [Oxford Scholarship Online e-raamatud]

(Tutorial Fellow in Law, St. John's College, Oxford)
  • Formaat: 320 pages
  • Sari: Oxford Legal Philosophy
  • Ilmumisaeg: 11-Oct-2012
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-13: 9780199646999
  • Oxford Scholarship Online e-raamatud
  • Raamatu hind pole hetkel teada
  • Formaat: 320 pages
  • Sari: Oxford Legal Philosophy
  • Ilmumisaeg: 11-Oct-2012
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-13: 9780199646999
Are legislatures able to form and act on intentions? The question matters because the interpretation of statutes is often thought to centre on the intention of the legislature and because the way in which the legislature acts is relevant to the authority it does or should enjoy. Many scholars argue that legislative intent is a fiction: the legislative assembly is a large, diverse group rather than a single person and it seems a mystery how the intentions of the individual legislators might somehow add up to a coherent group intention.

This book argues that in enacting a statute the well-formed legislature forms and acts on a detailed intention, which is the legislative intent. The foundation of the argument is an analysis of how the members of purposive groups act together by way of common plans, sometimes forming complex group agents. The book extends this analysis to the legislature, considering what it is to legislate and how members of the assembly cooperate to legislate. The book argues that to legislate is to choose to change the law for some reason: the well-formed legislature has the capacity to consider what should be done and to act to that end. This argument is supported by reflection on the centrality of intention to the nature of language use. The book then explains in detail how members of the assembly form and act on joint intentions, which do not reduce to the intentions of each member, before outlining some implications of this account for the practice of statutory interpretation.

Developing a robust account of the nature and importance of legislative intention, the book represents a significant contribution to the literature on deliberative democracy that will be of interest to all those thinking about legal interpretation and constitutional theory.

Oxford Legal Philosophy publishes the best new work in philosophically-oriented legal theory. It commissions and solicits monographs in all branches of the subject, including works on philosophical issues in all areas of public and private law, and in the national, transnational, and international realms; studies of the nature of law, legal institutions, and legal reasoning; treatments of problems in political morality as they bear on law; and explorations in the nature and development of legal philosophy itself. The series represents diverse traditions of thought but always with an emphasis on rigour and originality. It sets the standard in contemporary jurisprudence.
List of Abbreviations
xiii
1 Introduction
1(14)
2 Sceptical Arguments
15(32)
I Stipulating Legislative Intent
15(5)
II Hermes and `the Catalogue of Mysteries'
20(10)
III The Unitary Model and Its Discontents
30(4)
IV An Alternative: the Voting Machine Model
34(6)
V Arrow's Theorem and the Legislative Process
40(7)
3 Joint Intention and Group Agency
47(30)
I The Futility of Summing Intentions
47(5)
II Joint Intention and Group Action
52(5)
III Complex Group Action
57(9)
IV Discursive Dilemmas and Collective Irrationality
66(5)
V The Idea of Group Agency
71(6)
4 Legislating Without Reasoning
77(41)
I The Forum of Policy
77(8)
II Technical Problems With Preference Aggregation
85(3)
III Reasons and Preferences
88(6)
IV The Authority of Unintentional Legislation
94(5)
V Rationality and the Voting Machine
99(8)
VI The Minimal Intention Argument
107(5)
VII Intelligible Legislating
112(6)
5 What It Is to Legislate
118(25)
I Legislative Capacity
118(9)
II How One Reasons to Legislate
127(8)
III The Act of Legislating
135(4)
IV Legislative Integrity
139(4)
6 The Legislative Assembly
143(37)
I The Problem of the Sole Legislator
143(3)
II Representation and Deliberation
146(9)
III The Advantage of an Assembly
155(6)
IV The Internal Hierarchy of the Legislature
161(8)
V Washington and Westminster
169(4)
VI Prospects for Reasoned Action
173(7)
7 Language Use and Intention
180(38)
I The Language Code
181(12)
II Language Use Is Rational Action
193(3)
III The Underdetermination Thesis
196(9)
IV Pragmatics
205(6)
V Legislative Language Use
211(7)
8 The Nature of Legislative Intent
218(26)
I The Standing Intention of the Legislature
219(5)
II Parliamentary Procedure
224(6)
III Legislative Intent in Particular Acts
230(6)
IV Agency and Compromise
236(8)
9 Intentions in Interpretation
244(41)
I The Object of Interpretation
244(5)
II Intentions, Purposes, and Applications
249(7)
III Legislative Context
256(5)
IV The Use and Misuse of Context: Some Examples
261(7)
V The Relevance of Legislative History
268(7)
VI Equitable Interpretation
275(10)
Bibliography 285(9)
Index 294
Richard Ekins is a Fellow of St John's College, Oxford. He previously taught at Balliol College, Oxford and the Faculty of Law at the University of Auckland and served as a Judge's Clerk at the High Court of New Zealand at Auckland. He is the editor of Modern Challenges to the Rule of Law (2011) and has published articles in The Law Quarterly Review, Ratio Juris, New Zealand Law Review, Public Law and the Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy. His work has been cited in the House of Lords and in the superior courts and Parliament of New Zealand.