This book considers how continental great powers have attempted to develop and wield strong navies from 1801 onwards.
Continental Powers and Naval Development argues that a continental great power’s ability to build and effectively use a strong navy are greatly affected by two factors: a naval force design capable of executing national strategy (strategy coherence) and the deployment of that navy to places or for purposes that minimize the dominant naval power’s threat perception (threat diffusion). Each factor is deceptively difficult for a continental great power to achieve but, through an analysis of four historical case studies, this book shows how both factors are vital not just for successful naval development, but for keeping the peace among great powers. Finally, it highlights how states commonly thought of as “unnatural” naval powers can nonetheless achieve their political objectives at sea.
This book will be of much interest to students of naval history, maritime strategy, and International Relations.
This book considers how continental great powers have attempted to develop and wield strong navies from 1801 onwards.
1. Introduction
2. On Continental Great-Power Naval Development
3. A
Brilliant Second: Frances Experience with Naval Development
4. Too Large to
Die Gloriously: Germanys Experience with Naval Development
5. An Artificial
Imposition: Imperial Russias Experience with Naval Development
6. Luxuries
Should Not Be Permitted: The Soviet Unions Experience with Naval Development
7. A New, Historic Mission: Chinas Experience with Naval Development
8.
Conclusion
Brian C. Chao is an assistant professor in the National Security Affairs Department at the US Naval War College and a non-resident associate of the Center for the Study of Contemporary China at the University of Pennsylvania.
Rohkem infot Taylor & Francis e-raamatute kohta