Muutke küpsiste eelistusi

E-raamat: Choice for Banking Union: Power, Politics and the Trap of Credible Commitments [Taylor & Francis e-raamat]

(Technical University of Munich, Gerrmany)
  • Formaat: 234 pages, 8 Tables, black and white; 7 Line drawings, black and white; 7 Illustrations, black and white
  • Sari: Routledge/UACES Contemporary European Studies
  • Ilmumisaeg: 31-Dec-2021
  • Kirjastus: Routledge
  • ISBN-13: 9781003153818
  • Taylor & Francis e-raamat
  • Hind: 161,57 €*
  • * hind, mis tagab piiramatu üheaegsete kasutajate arvuga ligipääsu piiramatuks ajaks
  • Tavahind: 230,81 €
  • Säästad 30%
  • Formaat: 234 pages, 8 Tables, black and white; 7 Line drawings, black and white; 7 Illustrations, black and white
  • Sari: Routledge/UACES Contemporary European Studies
  • Ilmumisaeg: 31-Dec-2021
  • Kirjastus: Routledge
  • ISBN-13: 9781003153818
"This book explains why the European Union member states - in response to the Euro crisis - agreed to establish banking union, despite previous objections, and why they chose its hybrid institutional design. Analysing its establishment from 2012 to 2020,the book offers a comprehensive view of the preferences of the member states and EU institutions, as well as of the negotiation dynamics and latest developments in the three pillars of banking union, namely; the single supervisory mechanism, the single resolution mechanism and the common backstop, and the European deposit insurance scheme. Furthermore, empirically, the book looks beyond the usual focus of the northern and southern coalition of states to underline the influence of powerful smaller member states in the intergovernmental bargaining process. Adopting a range of theoretical perspectives, it questions the solidity of the northern versus southern camps and reveals distinctive and particular positioning from individual countries during the process. This book will be of key interest to scholars and students of European financial market regulation, European economic governance, EU institutions, European integration theory and European Union politics more broadly"--

This book explains why the European Union member states – in response to the Euro crisis – agreed to establish banking union, despite previous objections, and why they chose its hybrid institutional design.

List of figures
viii
List of tables
ix
1 Introduction
1(17)
The paradox and puzzle of European Banking Union
3(4)
The case: Explaining the establishment of a hybrid European Banking Union
7(3)
Research design of the book
10(8)
2 European Banking Union as a grand bargain
18(28)
An atypical grand bargain: The different legislative packages in EBU
18(4)
European Banking Union: A question of delegation
22(1)
Explaining a hybrid European Banking Union: European integration theory
22(18)
Liberal intergoverntnentalist explanation
24(6)
Liberal intcrgovernmentalism extended: Historical institutionalist explanation
30(5)
Supranational governance: Alternative explanation
35(5)
Conclusion
40(6)
3 The Single Supervisory Mechanism: The "supranationalized" pillar
46(51)
From the De Larosiere report to the SSM: Timeline of events
48(3)
Spain's sovereign debt crisis and the euro area summit on 28--29 June 2012
50(1)
Main controversial issues and outcomes
51(6)
First outcome: EU leaders* political commitment to an SSM
53(2)
Second outcome: SSM regulation
55(2)
Liberal Intergovemmentalist explanation of the establishment of the SSM
57(16)
Member States' preferences and positions
58(5)
Member States' relative bargaining power and interstate negotiations
63(3)
LI explanation of the establishment of a centralized SSM
66(7)
LI and HI explanation of the SSM: The trap of Economic and Monetary Union
73(6)
Critical juncture: The Spanish sovereign debt crisis in June 2012
73(2)
Unintended consequences, spillovers from EMU asymmetries and path-dependence
75(4)
Supranationalism: An alternative explanation?
79(8)
Eu institutions' preferences and positions
80(3)
Eu institutions' power and influence in the negotiations
83(4)
Conclusion
87(10)
4 The Single Resolution Mechanism and the common backstop: The "hybrid" pillar
97(51)
From the bank recovery and resolution directive to the Single Resolution Mechanism: Timeline of events
100(3)
Main controversial issues and outcomes
103(6)
First outcome: EU leaders' commitment to an SRM and a common backstop
104(1)
Second outcome: SRM regulation
105(4)
Liberal intergovernmentalist explanation of the establishment of a hybrid SRM
109(17)
Member States' preferences and positions
109(6)
Member States' relative bargaining power and interstate negotiations
115(6)
Li explanation of the establishment of a hybrid SRM
121(5)
Li and HI explanation of the SRM: The traps of the SSM (and EMU)
126(5)
Critical juncture: The Spanish sovereign debt crisis in June 2012
126(1)
Unintended consequences, spillovers from the SSM (and EMU) and path-dependence
127(4)
Supranationalism: An alternative explanation?
131(9)
Eu institutions' preferences and positions
131(4)
Eu institutions' power and influence in the negotiations
135(5)
Conclusion
140(8)
5 The European Deposit Insurance Scheme: The "decentralized" pillar
148(51)
From the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive to EDIS: Timeline of events
150(2)
Main controversial issues and status of the negotiations
152(4)
Liberal intergovernmentalist explanation of a decentralized EDIS
156(20)
Member States' preferences and positions
156(6)
Member States' relative bargaining power and interstate negotiations
162(8)
Li explanation of the establishment of a decentralized EDIS
170(6)
Li and Hi explanation: The traps of banking union (and EMU)?
176(3)
Critical juncture: The euro area sovereign debt crisis
176(1)
Unintended consequences, spillovers from EMU, EBU and path-dependence
177(2)
Supranationalism: An alternative explanation?
179(12)
Eu institutions' preferences and positions
179(5)
Eu institutions' power and influence in the negotiations
184(7)
Conclusion
191(8)
6 Conclusion
199(13)
Bibliography 212(16)
Index 228
Elena Ríos Camacho is Research Associate and Lecturer at the TUM School of Social Sciences and Technology of the Technical University of Munich (TUM), Germany.