Preface |
|
ix | |
1 Introduction |
|
1 | (22) |
|
1.1 Social dilemmas and social networks |
|
|
1 | (5) |
|
1.1.1 Cooperation and social networks |
|
|
4 | (1) |
|
1.1.2 Coordination and social networks |
|
|
5 | (1) |
|
1.2 Dynamic networks, co-evolution, and research questions |
|
|
6 | (3) |
|
1.3 Social networks and social dilemmas between sociology and economics |
|
|
9 | (1) |
|
1.4 Approach: Models, simulation, and empirical tests |
|
|
10 | (5) |
|
|
13 | (1) |
|
|
14 | (1) |
|
1.5 Description of the remaining chapters |
|
|
15 | (2) |
|
|
17 | (6) |
2 Consent or conflict: Co-evolution of coordination and networks |
|
23 | (24) |
|
|
23 | (5) |
|
2.1.1 Polarization, conflict, and coordination |
|
|
24 | (2) |
|
2.1.2 Coordination and social networks |
|
|
26 | (2) |
|
|
28 | (1) |
|
|
29 | (3) |
|
|
32 | (3) |
|
|
35 | (6) |
|
2.5.1 Predicting stable states I: Polarization |
|
|
36 | (3) |
|
2.5.2 Predicting stable states II: Efficiency |
|
|
39 | (2) |
|
2.6 Conclusions and discussion |
|
|
41 | (1) |
|
|
42 | (5) |
3 Cooperation and reputation in dynamic networks |
|
47 | (34) |
|
|
47 | (5) |
|
3.1.1 Cooperation and network effects |
|
|
48 | (1) |
|
3.1.2 The case for network dynamics |
|
|
49 | (1) |
|
3.1.3 Learning in networks |
|
|
50 | (1) |
|
3.1.4 Related theoretical literature |
|
|
51 | (1) |
|
|
52 | (8) |
|
3.2.1 Formalization of the problem |
|
|
52 | (2) |
|
3.2.2 Individual strategies |
|
|
54 | (2) |
|
|
56 | (2) |
|
|
58 | (1) |
|
|
59 | (1) |
|
3.3 Analysis of the model |
|
|
60 | (5) |
|
3.3.1 Dynamics of behavior with two actors |
|
|
60 | (1) |
|
3.3.2 Stable states in fixed networks |
|
|
61 | (2) |
|
3.3.3 Stable states in dynamic networks |
|
|
63 | (2) |
|
3.4 Setup of the simulation |
|
|
65 | (3) |
|
3.4.1 Dependent variables |
|
|
66 | (1) |
|
3.4.2 Parameters of the simulation |
|
|
66 | (1) |
|
3.4.3 Initial conditions of the simulation |
|
|
67 | (1) |
|
3.4.4 Convergence of the simulation |
|
|
68 | (1) |
|
|
68 | (5) |
|
3.5.1 Results for fixed networks |
|
|
68 | (2) |
|
3.5.2 Results for dynamic networks |
|
|
70 | (3) |
|
3.6 Conclusions and discussion |
|
|
73 | (4) |
|
|
77 | (4) |
4 Co-evolution of conventions and networks: An experimental study |
|
81 | (32) |
|
|
81 | (5) |
|
4.1.1 Coordination, conventions, and networks |
|
|
82 | (3) |
|
4.1.2 An experimental approach |
|
|
85 | (1) |
|
|
86 | (10) |
|
|
86 | (2) |
|
|
88 | (2) |
|
|
90 | (3) |
|
4.2.4 Overview of micro-level and macro-level hypotheses |
|
|
93 | (3) |
|
|
96 | (1) |
|
|
97 | (10) |
|
4.4.1 Macro-level results |
|
|
97 | (4) |
|
4.4.2 Individual behavior I: Decisions in the coordination game |
|
|
101 | (3) |
|
4.4.3 Individual behavior II: Linking decisions |
|
|
104 | (3) |
|
4.5 Conclusions and discussion |
|
|
107 | (2) |
|
|
109 | (4) |
5 Alcohol use among adolescents as a coordination problem in a dynamic network |
|
113 | (26) |
|
|
113 | (7) |
|
5.1.1 Coordination, influence, and alcohol use |
|
|
115 | (2) |
|
5.1.2 Approaches to the study of selection and influence |
|
|
117 | (3) |
|
|
120 | (3) |
|
|
123 | (2) |
|
|
123 | (1) |
|
5.3.2 Variables and measures |
|
|
123 | (2) |
|
|
125 | (1) |
|
|
126 | (8) |
|
5.5.1 Descriptive results |
|
|
126 | (4) |
|
5.5.2 Multilevel regression using combined network measures |
|
|
130 | (2) |
|
5.5.3 Multilevel regression using non-reciprocated friendship ties |
|
|
132 | (1) |
|
5.5.4 Additional analyses |
|
|
132 | (2) |
|
|
134 | (2) |
|
|
136 | (3) |
6 Conclusions |
|
139 | (12) |
|
6.1 Summary of the findings |
|
|
139 | (3) |
|
6.2 Theory, computer simulation, and empirical tests |
|
|
142 | (3) |
|
6.3 Suggestions for further research |
|
|
145 | (4) |
|
6.3.1 Theoretical extensions |
|
|
145 | (3) |
|
6.3.2 Suggestions for empirical studies |
|
|
148 | (1) |
|
|
149 | (2) |
Appendix A: Instructions used in the experiment |
|
151 | (8) |
Appendix B: The computer interface used for the experiment |
|
159 | (8) |
Reference |
|
167 | (2) |
Index |
|
169 | |