Introduction |
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xi | |
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Chapter 1 The United States, States and the False Claims of the End of the Global Internet |
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1 | (42) |
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1 | (1) |
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1.2 The creation of the internet and the development of cyberspace by the United States |
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2 | (11) |
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1.2.1 The first international telecommunications systems developed by all states |
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3 | (1) |
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1.2.2 The creation and development of the internet by the United States |
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3 | (1) |
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1.2.3 International management controlled by the United States |
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4 | (6) |
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1.2.4 A sociotechnical system bearing a composite American ideology |
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10 | (1) |
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1.2.5 The false recomposition of the global sociotechnical system: the global summits on the information society |
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11 | (2) |
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1.3 Cyberspace transformed by the arrival in force of states |
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13 | (7) |
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1.3.1 State intentions in "national strategies": a global approach |
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14 | (2) |
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1.3.2 Russian-American structural disagreements on information security and cybersecurity |
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16 | (2) |
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1.3.3 Discussions on cybersecurity: the symbolic international restoration of the coercive state |
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18 | (2) |
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1.4 Praxis of state coercion in cyberspace |
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20 | (9) |
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1.4.1 Intelligence and surveillance activities in the digital environment |
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21 | (3) |
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1.4.2 Non-military cyber operations |
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24 | (2) |
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1.4.3 Interstate digital conflicts, secrecy and coercive diplomacy |
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26 | (3) |
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1.5 The fragmentation of the global internet and the digital sovereignty of states |
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29 | (4) |
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1.5.1 Linguistic balkanization: Digital Babel |
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29 | (2) |
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1.5.2 Political fragmentation: alternative internets |
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31 | (2) |
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1.6 The strong constraint of interstate cooperation for all states |
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33 | (2) |
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1.6.1 Interstate agreements on an embryo of international law |
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33 | (1) |
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1.6.2 State dependence on international cooperation for cybersecurity |
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34 | (1) |
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35 | (1) |
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36 | (7) |
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Chapter 2 Cybersecurity in America: The US National Security Apparatus and Cyber Conflict Management |
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43 | (20) |
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43 | (2) |
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2.2 Societal and institutional dynamics |
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45 | (4) |
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2.3 Organizational and bureaucratic dynamics |
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49 | (4) |
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53 | (4) |
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57 | (1) |
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58 | (5) |
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Chapter 3 Separation of Offensive and Defensive Functions: The Originality of the French Cyberdefense Model Called into Question? |
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63 | (26) |
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63 | (3) |
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3.2 A model designed and developed in response to the threats and challenges of the early 2010s |
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66 | (9) |
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3.2.1 An organizational model apparently based on two main actors |
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66 | (5) |
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3.2.2 The commitment to a strict offensive/defensive separation |
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71 | (4) |
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3.3 A strict separation of offensive and defensive functions and missions: an obstacle to better defense? |
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75 | (10) |
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3.3.1 A rapidly changing context: an increasingly significant threat from the most advanced states |
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76 | (2) |
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3.3.2 Limits that have become obstacles to accomplishing cyberdefense missions |
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78 | (4) |
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3.3.3 An institutionalized rapprochement of the actors of defensive and offensive parts in the name of cyberdefense missions: from mitigation to obliteration? |
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82 | (3) |
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85 | (1) |
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86 | (3) |
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Chapter 4 The Boundary Between Cybercrime and Cyberwar: An Uncertain No-Man's Land |
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89 | (18) |
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89 | (2) |
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4.2 The field of cybercrime up to the limits of the glass ceiling |
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91 | (7) |
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4.2.1 The field of cybercrime: an attempt at delimitation |
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92 | (3) |
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4.2.2 Cybercrime, the "21st century crime" |
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95 | (1) |
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4.2.3 Cyber conflict at the edge of the glass ceiling |
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95 | (3) |
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4.3 War in cyberspace, cyber in war |
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98 | (6) |
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4.3.1 Cyber in war, a daily reality |
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98 | (1) |
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4.3.2 Autonomous warfare in the cyber world: the test of the law of armed conflict |
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99 | (3) |
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4.3.3 Digital cyber persuasion |
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102 | (2) |
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104 | (1) |
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105 | (2) |
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Chapter 5 Cyberdefense, the Digital Dimension of National Security |
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107 | (10) |
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107 | (1) |
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5.2 Cyberdefense in the political and legal framework of digital security |
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108 | (3) |
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5.2.1 A definition of cyberdefense |
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108 | (1) |
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5.2.2 Linking cyberdefense to national security strategy |
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109 | (2) |
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5.3 The emergence of a coherent legal regime for cyberdefense |
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111 | (4) |
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5.3.1 The legal basis of the permanent cyberdefense posture |
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111 | (1) |
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5.3.2 Exceptional instruments for responding to a crisis |
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112 | (3) |
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115 | (1) |
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116 | (1) |
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Chapter 6 Omnipresence Without Omnipotence: The US Campaign Against Huawei in the 5G Era |
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117 | (30) |
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117 | (2) |
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6.2 The unilateral American offensive against Huawei: a disruptive campaign causing significant collateral damage |
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119 | (9) |
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6.2.1 Huawei: an "unusual and extraordinary" threat to the United States' position in the international order |
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120 | (2) |
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6.2.2 A political, legal and economic offensive against Huawei, causing significant collateral damage |
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122 | (6) |
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6.3 The American diplomatic offensive: the limits of American rhetorical coercion of their partners and allies |
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128 | (9) |
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6.3.1 Educating rather than persuading: an attempt to rhetorically coerce partners and allies |
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129 | (2) |
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6.3.2 Successful agenda setting but limited rhetorical coercion |
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131 | (3) |
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6.3.3 American rhetorical coercion in the special relationship |
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134 | (3) |
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6.4 The anti-Huawei offensive: a barometer of American power? |
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137 | (2) |
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139 | (8) |
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Chapter 7 The Issue of Personal and Sovereign Data in the Light of an Emerging "International Law of Intelligence" |
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147 | (22) |
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147 | (3) |
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7.2 The legal rules invoked in the collection of personal and sovereign data |
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150 | (6) |
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7.2.1 Right to privacy versus general communications surveillance |
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150 | (3) |
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7.2.2 Violation of territorial sovereignty versus cyberespionage |
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153 | (3) |
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7.3 Data localization in the light of international intelligence law |
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156 | (7) |
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7.3.1 Data fluidity versus data storage |
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156 | (3) |
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7.3.2 Datasphere versus international intelligence law |
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159 | (4) |
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163 | (1) |
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7.5 Appendix: the quadrants of intelligence law |
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164 | (1) |
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7.6 Sources and references |
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165 | (4) |
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165 | (1) |
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166 | (3) |
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Chapter 8 International Cybersecurity Cooperation |
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169 | (8) |
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8.1 Current attack trends |
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169 | (2) |
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8.2 The multiple paths of international cooperation |
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171 | (4) |
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8.3 The issue of attack attribution |
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175 | (2) |
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Chapter 9 Cyberdefense and Cybersecurity Regulations in the United States: From the Failure of the "Comprehensive Policy" to the Success of the Sectoral Approach |
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177 | (22) |
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177 | (1) |
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9.2 The identification of a new threat and the impact of cyber on how US security and defense policies are designed |
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178 | (3) |
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9.3 From the impact of cyber on policy to the impact of politics on cyber |
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181 | (9) |
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9.4 From a comprehensive cyber policy to a sectoral approach: the success of an undeclared regulatory policy |
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190 | (5) |
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195 | (1) |
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196 | (3) |
List of Authors |
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199 | (2) |
Index |
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201 | |