| Preface |
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vi | |
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xv | |
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xix | |
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1 | (11) |
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I What is this Book About? |
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1 | (5) |
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6 | (4) |
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III Provisos to the Following Discussion |
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10 | (2) |
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2 Defining Corporate Governance as a Subject of Legal Enquiry |
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12 | (50) |
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I The Problem of Corporate-Managerial Power |
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17 | (14) |
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A The Multifarious Nature of Power as a Social Phenomenon |
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17 | (1) |
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B The Distinctiveness of Corporate-Managerial Power |
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18 | (2) |
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C Power Imbalance in the Corporate Equity Relation |
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20 | (4) |
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D The Legal Foundations of Power Imbalance in the Corporate Equity Relation |
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24 | (7) |
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II The Structural Imperative of Legitimating Corporate-Managerial Power |
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31 | (13) |
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A The Centrality of Power-Legitimacy in Sustaining Power Imbalance |
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31 | (3) |
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B Cost of Capital as the Principal Criterion of Managerial Power-Legitimacy |
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34 | (2) |
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C Accountability as the Key Factor in Legitimating Power Imbalance |
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36 | (3) |
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D Power and Accountability as Non-Mutually-Reducing Phenomena |
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39 | (2) |
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E Accountability as a `Double-Edged Sword' |
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41 | (3) |
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III Why Shareholder Exclusivity? |
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44 | (14) |
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A The Non-Exclusivity of Equity as the Collective Subject of Corporate-Managerial Power |
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44 | (1) |
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B Power Imbalance in the Employment Relation |
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45 | (4) |
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C Collective Adversarialism as a Legitimating Counterbalance to Employer Power |
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49 | (5) |
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D Why has Collective Adversarialism been the Preferred Structural Response to Employer Power? |
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54 | (4) |
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58 | (4) |
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3 The Contractarian Paradigm of Corporate Governance Law |
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62 | (37) |
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I The Purported `Privity' of Anglo-American Corporate Law |
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63 | (4) |
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II (A Brief) Historical and Intellectual Background to Corporate Contractarianism |
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67 | (5) |
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III How Do Contractarians Rationalise the Most Prominent Features of Anglo-American Corporate Governance? |
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72 | (14) |
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A The Conceptual Starting Point: The Corporation (or `Firm') as a Nexus of Contracts |
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72 | (2) |
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B The Three Most Prominent Features of Anglo-American Corporate Governance |
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74 | (12) |
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IV Legitimating Reciprocal Power Imbalance Within the Contractarian Paradigm |
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86 | (10) |
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A Contractarianism and the Core Elements of Corporate Governance Enquiry |
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86 | (1) |
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B The Principal Normative Dimensions of the Contractarian Paradigm |
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87 | (9) |
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96 | (3) |
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4 The Contractual Dimensions of US Corporate Governance Law |
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99 | (37) |
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I `Opt-Out', `Opt-In', and Reversible-Default Rules |
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101 | (5) |
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II Competitive Federalism |
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106 | (5) |
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III Judicial Deference to Private Ordering: The Business Judgment Rule |
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111 | (4) |
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IV Anti-Takeover Measures |
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115 | (11) |
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A The Contractual Nature of Staggered Boards and Poison Pills |
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115 | (2) |
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B The Legitimacy of Anti-Takeover Measures Within the Contractarian Paradigm |
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117 | (3) |
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C The Legitimacy of Anti-Takeover Measures Under Delaware Corporate Law |
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120 | (6) |
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V Federal Deference to Private Ordering: The Rule 14a-8 Proposal |
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126 | (7) |
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VI The US Corporate Board as a Pre-Regulatory Institution |
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133 | (1) |
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134 | (2) |
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5 The Contractual Dimensions of UK Corporate Governance Law |
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136 | (41) |
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I The Contractual Principle |
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139 | (5) |
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A Section 33 of the Companies Act 2006: The Articles as a Contract |
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139 | (3) |
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B The Contractual Basis of the Board's Authority |
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142 | (2) |
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II Judicial Deference to Private Ordering |
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144 | (19) |
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A The Internal Management Doctrine |
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144 | (6) |
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B Judicial Non-Interventionism in Business Objectives and Decisions |
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150 | (7) |
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C Retrospective Judicial Liability Relief for Negligent Directors |
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157 | (6) |
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III The Endogeneity of the British Corporate Board |
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163 | (4) |
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IV Market-Invoking Regulation |
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167 | (7) |
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174 | (3) |
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6 The (Expanding) Regulatory Dimensions of Anglo-American Corporate Governance Law |
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177 | (50) |
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I The `De-Privatisation' of Anglo-American Corporate Governance Law? |
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180 | (18) |
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A Developments in the United States |
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180 | (7) |
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B Developments in the United Kingdom |
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187 | (10) |
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197 | (1) |
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II The Mandatory Nature of Corporate Disclosure Regulation in the United States and United Kingdom |
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198 | (8) |
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A Is Corporate Information-Production a Contractual or Regulatory Phenomenon? |
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198 | (2) |
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B Information as a `Public Good' |
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200 | (1) |
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C The Normative Significance of Distinguishing Corporate and Securities Law |
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201 | (2) |
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D The Definitional Grey Area: Corporate Governance Norms in Securities Law Clothing |
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203 | (2) |
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E The Inherent Arbitrariness of the Corporate / Securities Law Conceptual Dichotomy |
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205 | (1) |
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III The Regulatory Division of Corporate Decision-Making Power in the UK |
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206 | (12) |
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A The Distinctiveness of the `Anglo' in the Anglo-American Descriptor |
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206 | (2) |
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B The (Paradoxical) Mandatory Basis of the Contractual Principle |
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208 | (2) |
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C Shareholders' Statutory `Shotgun' Right |
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210 | (2) |
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D Shareholders' Statutory Anti-Dilution Rights |
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212 | (6) |
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IV The Counter-Contractual Nature of the Equitable Fiduciary Principle under Anglo-American Law |
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218 | (7) |
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225 | (2) |
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7 Rationalising Regulatory State Paternalism within an Expanded Contractarian Paradigm |
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227 | (52) |
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I Are Mandatory Rules `Mandatory' at all? |
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230 | (3) |
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II The Acceptable Ambit of State Interventionism in Private Ordering: Negative Externalities and Public Goods |
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233 | (5) |
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III The `Market Mimicking' Rationalisation of Regulatory State Interventionism |
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238 | (9) |
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A The Extraordinary Scope and Controversiality of the `Market Mimicking' Rationalisation |
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238 | (5) |
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B Why Can Investors Not be Trusted to Bargain for Protectionist Governance Terms' Privately? |
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243 | (4) |
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IV The Limitations of the `Market Mimicking' Rationalisation |
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247 | (9) |
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A The Inherent Arbitrariness of Hypothetical Bargaining Rationality |
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247 | (5) |
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B Are Hypothetical Contracts Really `Contractarian' at All? |
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252 | (4) |
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V Expanding the Frontiers of the Contractarian Paradigm |
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256 | (20) |
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256 | (2) |
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B Managerial Accountability as the Principal Rationale for Mandatory Corporate Governance Laws |
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258 | (6) |
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C The Relationship Between Managerial Accountability and Cost of Capital |
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264 | (7) |
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D Ramifications of Expanded Contractarian Paradigm for Current Issues in Anglo-American Corporate Governance Law |
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271 | (5) |
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276 | (3) |
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279 | (4) |
| Bibliography |
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283 | (12) |
| Index |
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295 | |