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E-raamat: Corporate Governance in the Shadow of the State [Hart e-raamatud]

(University College London, UK)
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This book provides a fundamental re-conceptualisation of the main aspects of corporate governance law and regulation in the UK, with the aim of highlighting the significant and integral role of the political state in the corporate rule-making process. It seeks to demonstrate that the key laws and regulations pertaining to corporate governance in the UK are motivated less by the private search for efficient institutional structures, and more by the public goal of ensuring a form of quasi-democratic legitimacy consistent with the state's role as ultimate bearer of economic risk in respect of large, socially significant corporate organisations. It argues that the legitimate function of corporate law is not simply that of mimicking the market by providing the sets of rules which participants themselves would rationally have bargained for in the absence of a formal legal framework. Rather, the book's analysis portrays the corporate rule-making process as a complex hybrid of publicly- and privately-driven pressures motivating compliance with accountability norms, and entailing continual adaptation of institutional structures to dual political and economic forces. This has the dual effect of widening the ambit of the state's legitimate policy-making role in corporate governance, while at the same refuting the purported survival value of prevailing governance structures in British public companies.

This book provides a fundamental re-conceptualization of the main aspects of corporate governance law and regulation in the UK, with the aim of highlighting the significant and integral role of the political State in the corporate rule-making process. It demonstrates that the key laws and regulations pertaining to corporate governance in the UK are motivated, less by the private search for efficient institutional structures, and more by the public goal of ensuring a form of quasi-democratic legitimacy consistent with the State's role as ultimate bearer of economic risk in respect of large, socially significant corporate organizations. The book argues that the legitimate function of corporate law is not simply that of mimicking the market by providing the sets of rules which participants themselves would rationally have bargained for in the absence of a formal legal framework. Rather, its analysis portrays the corporate rule-making process as a complex hybrid of publicly- and privately-driven pressures motivating compliance with accountability norms and entailing continual adaptation of institutional structures to dual political and economic forces. This has the dual effect of widening the ambit of the State's legitimate policy-making role in corporate governance, while at the same refuting the purported survival value of prevailing governance structures in British public companies. (Series: Contemporary Studies in Corporate Law)
Preface vi
Table of Cases
xv
Table of Legislation
xix
1 Introduction
1(11)
I What is this Book About?
1(5)
II The Plan for the Book
6(4)
III Provisos to the Following Discussion
10(2)
2 Defining Corporate Governance as a Subject of Legal Enquiry
12(50)
I The Problem of Corporate-Managerial Power
17(14)
A The Multifarious Nature of Power as a Social Phenomenon
17(1)
B The Distinctiveness of Corporate-Managerial Power
18(2)
C Power Imbalance in the Corporate Equity Relation
20(4)
D The Legal Foundations of Power Imbalance in the Corporate Equity Relation
24(7)
II The Structural Imperative of Legitimating Corporate-Managerial Power
31(13)
A The Centrality of Power-Legitimacy in Sustaining Power Imbalance
31(3)
B Cost of Capital as the Principal Criterion of Managerial Power-Legitimacy
34(2)
C Accountability as the Key Factor in Legitimating Power Imbalance
36(3)
D Power and Accountability as Non-Mutually-Reducing Phenomena
39(2)
E Accountability as a `Double-Edged Sword'
41(3)
III Why Shareholder Exclusivity?
44(14)
A The Non-Exclusivity of Equity as the Collective Subject of Corporate-Managerial Power
44(1)
B Power Imbalance in the Employment Relation
45(4)
C Collective Adversarialism as a Legitimating Counterbalance to Employer Power
49(5)
D Why has Collective Adversarialism been the Preferred Structural Response to Employer Power?
54(4)
IV Summary
58(4)
3 The Contractarian Paradigm of Corporate Governance Law
62(37)
I The Purported `Privity' of Anglo-American Corporate Law
63(4)
II (A Brief) Historical and Intellectual Background to Corporate Contractarianism
67(5)
III How Do Contractarians Rationalise the Most Prominent Features of Anglo-American Corporate Governance?
72(14)
A The Conceptual Starting Point: The Corporation (or `Firm') as a Nexus of Contracts
72(2)
B The Three Most Prominent Features of Anglo-American Corporate Governance
74(12)
IV Legitimating Reciprocal Power Imbalance Within the Contractarian Paradigm
86(10)
A Contractarianism and the Core Elements of Corporate Governance Enquiry
86(1)
B The Principal Normative Dimensions of the Contractarian Paradigm
87(9)
V Summary
96(3)
4 The Contractual Dimensions of US Corporate Governance Law
99(37)
I `Opt-Out', `Opt-In', and Reversible-Default Rules
101(5)
II Competitive Federalism
106(5)
III Judicial Deference to Private Ordering: The Business Judgment Rule
111(4)
IV Anti-Takeover Measures
115(11)
A The Contractual Nature of Staggered Boards and Poison Pills
115(2)
B The Legitimacy of Anti-Takeover Measures Within the Contractarian Paradigm
117(3)
C The Legitimacy of Anti-Takeover Measures Under Delaware Corporate Law
120(6)
V Federal Deference to Private Ordering: The Rule 14a-8 Proposal
126(7)
VI The US Corporate Board as a Pre-Regulatory Institution
133(1)
VII Summary
134(2)
5 The Contractual Dimensions of UK Corporate Governance Law
136(41)
I The Contractual Principle
139(5)
A Section 33 of the Companies Act 2006: The Articles as a Contract
139(3)
B The Contractual Basis of the Board's Authority
142(2)
II Judicial Deference to Private Ordering
144(19)
A The Internal Management Doctrine
144(6)
B Judicial Non-Interventionism in Business Objectives and Decisions
150(7)
C Retrospective Judicial Liability Relief for Negligent Directors
157(6)
III The Endogeneity of the British Corporate Board
163(4)
IV Market-Invoking Regulation
167(7)
V Summary
174(3)
6 The (Expanding) Regulatory Dimensions of Anglo-American Corporate Governance Law
177(50)
I The `De-Privatisation' of Anglo-American Corporate Governance Law?
180(18)
A Developments in the United States
180(7)
B Developments in the United Kingdom
187(10)
C Summary of this Part
197(1)
II The Mandatory Nature of Corporate Disclosure Regulation in the United States and United Kingdom
198(8)
A Is Corporate Information-Production a Contractual or Regulatory Phenomenon?
198(2)
B Information as a `Public Good'
200(1)
C The Normative Significance of Distinguishing Corporate and Securities Law
201(2)
D The Definitional Grey Area: Corporate Governance Norms in Securities Law Clothing
203(2)
E The Inherent Arbitrariness of the Corporate / Securities Law Conceptual Dichotomy
205(1)
III The Regulatory Division of Corporate Decision-Making Power in the UK
206(12)
A The Distinctiveness of the `Anglo' in the Anglo-American Descriptor
206(2)
B The (Paradoxical) Mandatory Basis of the Contractual Principle
208(2)
C Shareholders' Statutory `Shotgun' Right
210(2)
D Shareholders' Statutory Anti-Dilution Rights
212(6)
IV The Counter-Contractual Nature of the Equitable Fiduciary Principle under Anglo-American Law
218(7)
V Summary
225(2)
7 Rationalising Regulatory State Paternalism within an Expanded Contractarian Paradigm
227(52)
I Are Mandatory Rules `Mandatory' at all?
230(3)
II The Acceptable Ambit of State Interventionism in Private Ordering: Negative Externalities and Public Goods
233(5)
III The `Market Mimicking' Rationalisation of Regulatory State Interventionism
238(9)
A The Extraordinary Scope and Controversiality of the `Market Mimicking' Rationalisation
238(5)
B Why Can Investors Not be Trusted to Bargain for Protectionist Governance Terms' Privately?
243(4)
IV The Limitations of the `Market Mimicking' Rationalisation
247(9)
A The Inherent Arbitrariness of Hypothetical Bargaining Rationality
247(5)
B Are Hypothetical Contracts Really `Contractarian' at All?
252(4)
V Expanding the Frontiers of the Contractarian Paradigm
256(20)
A The Challenge at Hand
256(2)
B Managerial Accountability as the Principal Rationale for Mandatory Corporate Governance Laws
258(6)
C The Relationship Between Managerial Accountability and Cost of Capital
264(7)
D Ramifications of Expanded Contractarian Paradigm for Current Issues in Anglo-American Corporate Governance Law
271(5)
VI Summary
276(3)
8 Conclusions
279(4)
Bibliography 283(12)
Index 295
Marc Moore is Professor of Corporate/Financial Law in the Faculty of Laws, University of College London.