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E-raamat: Forensic Evidence in Court - Evaluation and Scientific Opinion: Evaluation and Scientific Opinion [Wiley Online]

(Keele University)
  • Formaat: 336 pages
  • Ilmumisaeg: 30-Sep-2016
  • Kirjastus: Wiley-Blackwell
  • ISBN-10: 1119054443
  • ISBN-13: 9781119054443
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  • Hind: 79,30 €*
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Forensic Evidence in Court - Evaluation and Scientific Opinion: Evaluation and Scientific OpinionSuurem pilt
  • Formaat: 336 pages
  • Ilmumisaeg: 30-Sep-2016
  • Kirjastus: Wiley-Blackwell
  • ISBN-10: 1119054443
  • ISBN-13: 9781119054443
Teised raamatud teemal:
Wiley Online e-raamatudRohkem infot Wiley Online kohta
Raamatu kodulehekülg: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/book/10.1002/9781119054443

The interpretation and evaluation of scientific evidence and its presentation in a court of law is central both to the role of the forensic scientist as an expert witness and to the interests of justice. This book aims to provide a thorough and detailed discussion of the principles and practice of evidence interpretation and evaluation by using real cases by way of illustration. The presentation is appropriate for students of forensic science or related disciplines at advanced undergraduate and master’s level or for practitioners engaged in continuing professional development activity.

The book is structured in three sections. The first sets the scene by describing and debating the issues around the admissibility and reliability of scientific evidence presented to the court. In the second section, the principles underpinning interpretation and evaluation are explained, including discussion of those formal statistical methods founded on Bayesian inference. The following chapters present perspectives on the evaluation and presentation of evidence in the context of a single type or class of scientific evidence, from DNA to the analysis of documents. For each, the science underpinning the analysis and interpretation of the forensic materials is explained, followed by the presentation of cases which illustrate the variety of approaches that have been taken in providing expert scientific opinion.

Preface xvi
Part 1 1(64)
1 An Introduction to the Admissibility of Expert Scientific Opinion
3(17)
1.1 Admissibility, Reliability and Scientific Evidence
3(2)
1.2 The Impact of the DNA Revolution
5(1)
1.3 The Miscarriage of Justice
6(3)
1.3.1 The United Kingdom
7(1)
1.3.2 The United States
8(1)
1.3.3 Canada
8(1)
1.3.4 Australia
9(1)
1.4 DNA Reveals Wrongful Convictions
9(1)
1.5 The Causes of Wrongful Conviction
10(1)
1.6 Unreliable Scientific Evidence
11(5)
1.6.1 The Status and Expertise of the Expert Witness
11(1)
1.6.2 The Expert is not Impartial
12(1)
1.6.3 The Evidence was Wrong
13(1)
1.6.4 Exaggerated Evaluation by the Expert
13(1)
1.6.5 Unethical Behaviour
14(1)
1.6.6 Human Error
14(1)
1.6.7 Non-validated Methodology
15(1)
1.6.8 Overconfidence in New Techniques
15(1)
1.7 The Scientist and the Laboratory
16(1)
1.8 Conclusions
17(1)
References
17(1)
Further Reading
18(2)
2 Admissibility from the Legal Perspective
20(19)
2.1 Admissibility, Relevance and Reliability of Evidence
20(2)
2.2 Admissibility in the United States
22(5)
2.2.1 Reliability and the Frye Test
22(1)
2.2.2 Meeting the Frye Criterion: US v Stifel 1970
23(1)
2.2.3 Admissibility and the Gatekeeper Role: The Daubert Test
23(2)
2.2.4 The Daubert Trilogy
25(1)
2.2.5 General Electric v Joiner 1997
25(1)
2.2.6 Kumo Tire Company v Patrick Carmichael 1999
26(1)
2.2.7 Post-Daubert Hearings: US v Dennis Mooney 2002
26(1)
2.3 Admissibility in Canada
27(3)
2.3.1 R v Mohan 1994
27(2)
2.3.2 R v Abbey 2009
29(1)
2.3.3 R v Trochym 2007
29(1)
2.4 Admissibility in Australia
30(2)
2.4.1 R v Bonython 1984
30(1)
2.4.2 Makita v Sprowles 2001
31(1)
2.4.3 Dasreef Pty Limited v Hawchar 2011
31(1)
2.5 Admissibility in England and Wales
32(3)
2.5.1 R v Turner 1975
33(1)
2.5.2 R v Gilfoyle 2001
33(1)
2.5.3 R v Luttrell 2004
34(1)
2.6 Conclusions on Admissibility
35(2)
2.6.1 Relevance and Expertise
35(1)
2.6.2 The Scientific Basis of the Opinion
35(2)
2.6.3 Weight of Evidence
37(1)
References
37(1)
Further Reading
38(1)
3 Forensic Science and the Law: The Path Forward
39(17)
3.1 National and Legal Developments in the United States
39(5)
3.1.1 Federal Rules of Evidence
40(1)
3.1.2 Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States 2009
41(2)
3.1.3 US Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence
43(1)
3.2 National and Legal Developments in Canada
44(2)
3.2.1 Legal Enquiries into Miscarriages of Justice
44(1)
3.2.2 The Science Manual for Canadian Judges
45(1)
3.3 National and Legal Developments in Australia
46(2)
3.3.1 The Uniform Rules of Evidence
47(1)
3.4 National and Legal Developments in England and Wales
48(5)
3.4.1 Forensic Science on Trial 2005
49(1)
3.4.2 The Law Commission Report 2011
49(2)
3.4.3 The Royal Statistical Society Guides
51(1)
3.4.4 HCSTSC Report Forensic Science 2013
52(1)
3.4.5 UK Government Response (2013) to the Law Commission Report
52(1)
3.5 Conclusions
53(1)
References
53(1)
Further Reading
54(2)
4 Scientific Opinion and the Law in Practice
56(9)
4.1 Scientific Opinion and the Judicial System
56(2)
4.1.1 Adversarial and Inquisitorial Systems of Justice
56(1)
4.1.2 Scientific Evidence Within the Inquisitorial System
57(1)
4.1.3 Inquisitorial Versus Adversarial
57(1)
4.2 The Scientist in Court
58(1)
4.3 The Role and Duties of the Scientific Expert Witness
59(2)
4.3.1 Definitions of the Role
59(1)
4.3.2 Duties and Responsibilities of the Expert Witness
60(1)
4.4 Quality Control of Analysis and Opinion
61(2)
4.4.1 An Australian Standard for Forensic Analysis
61(1)
4.4.2 Regulation of Forensic Science in the United Kingdom
62(1)
4.4.3 Codes of Conduct and Practice
62(1)
4.4.4 Accreditation of the Expert
63(1)
4.5 Conclusion
63(1)
References
64(1)
Further Reading
64(1)
Part 2 65(62)
5 Fundamentals of the Interpretation and Evaluation of Scientific Evidence
67(11)
5.1 Analysis, Interpretation and Evaluation
67(1)
5.2 The Role and Outcomes of Forensic Investigation
68(1)
5.2.1 Investigative Forensic Science
68(1)
5.2.2 Evaluative Forensic Science
69(1)
5.3 Fact and Opinion
69(1)
5.3.1 Categorisation of Opinions
70(1)
5.3.2 Factual Opinion
70(1)
5.3.3 Investigative Opinion
70(1)
5.4 Expert Opinion and the Forensic Science Paradigm
70(4)
5.4.1 Categorical Opinion
71(1)
5.4.2 Posterior Probabilities
72(1)
5.4.3 Explanations
73(1)
5.4.4 Where Does this Take Us?
74(1)
5.5 What are Propositions?
74(2)
5.5.1 The Hierarchy of Propositions
74(1)
5.5.2 The Importance of Activity Level
75(1)
5.6 Competing Propositions in the Court
76(1)
References
77(1)
Further Reading
77(1)
6 Case Studies in Expert Opinion
78(12)
6.1 Case Study 1: Facial Comparison Evidence
78(3)
6.1.1 The Crime and Conviction
78(1)
6.1.2 Expert Evidence and Opinion
79(1)
6.1.3 Opinion in Atkins
80(1)
6.2 Case Study 2: Ear-mark Identification
81(3)
6.2.1 The Crime and the Evidence
81(1)
6.2.2 Interpreting the Evidence and Challenges to the Opinion
81(2)
6.2.3 The Conclusion of the Appeal
83(1)
6.2.4 Opinion in Dallagher
83(1)
6.3 Case Study 3: Glass and Gunshot Residue
84(4)
6.3.1 The Crime and Trial
84(1)
6.3.2 Analysis and Interpretation of the Scientific Evidence
84(1)
6.3.3 Propositions for Evaluation
85(1)
6.3.4 Evaluative Opinion: Glass
86(1)
6.3.5 Evaluative Opinion: GSR
86(2)
6.3.6 Opinion in Bowden
88(1)
6.4 Conclusions
88(1)
References
88(1)
Further Reading
89(1)
7 Formal Methods for Logical Evaluation
90(14)
7.1 Frequentist and Bayesian Approaches to Evaluation
90(2)
7.1.1 The Frequentist Approach to Formulating Opinion
90(1)
7.1.2 The Logical Evaluation of Evidence
91(1)
7.1.3 The Debate on Formulating Opinion
92(1)
7.2 The Likelihood Ratio Method
92(1)
7.3 Expressing Opinion Through Likelihood Ratio
93(1)
7.3.1 Statements of Evaluative Opinion
93(1)
7.3.2 Likelihood Ratio and Verbal Equivalent Statements
94(1)
7.4 Evaluation and Bayes' Theorem
94(3)
7.4.1 Bayes' Theorem: Prior and Posterior Odds
95(2)
7.4.2 Combining Likelihood Ratios
97(1)
7.5 Prior Odds
97(2)
7.6 Posterior Probabilities
99(1)
7.6.1 Opinion and Posterior Probabilities
99(1)
7.6.2 The Prosecutor's Fallacy
99(1)
7.7 Working Out Conditional Probabilities and Likelihood Ratio
100(2)
7.7.1 Likelihood Ratio at Source Level
100(1)
7.7.2 Likelihood Ratio at Activity Level
101(1)
7.8 Conclusions
102(1)
References
102(1)
Further Reading
103(1)
8 Case Studies in Probabilistic Opinion
104(13)
8.1 People v Collins 1968
104(1)
8.2 R v Michael Shirley 2003
105(3)
8.2.1 A Logical Evaluation of Scientific Evidence
106(2)
8.2.2 The Outcome of the Appeal
108(1)
8.3 RvDJ Adams 1996, 1998
108(7)
8.3.1 The Crime and the Evidence
109(1)
8.3.2 A Probabilistic Analysis of the Evidence: Prior Odds
109(1)
8.3.3 The Non-Scientific Evidence
110(1)
8.3.4 The Scientific Evidence
111(1)
8.3.5 Total Likelihood Ratio and Posterior Odds
112(1)
8.3.6 The Appeals
113(1)
8.3.7 Review of the Issues in R v DJ Adams
114(1)
8.4 The Defendant's Fallacy: R v J 2009
115(1)
8.5 Conclusion
116(1)
References
116(1)
Further Reading
116(1)
9 Cognitive Bias and Expert Opinion
117(10)
9.1 Cognitive Bias
117(1)
9.2 Contextual Bias
118(2)
9.2.1 Confirmation Bias
119(1)
9.2.2 Expectation Bias
119(1)
9.2.3 Motivational Bias
119(1)
9.2.4 Anchoring
120(1)
9.3 Other Sources of Bias
120(1)
9.4 Fingerprint Examination: A Case Study in Bias
120(2)
9.4.1 The Review of the Brandon Mayfield Case 2004
120(1)
9.4.2 The Fingerprint Inquiry Scotland 2009
121(1)
9.4.3 Bias Within Fingerprint Examination
121(1)
9.5 Mitigating Bias
122(1)
9.6 Mitigating Bias Versus Research on Traces
123(1)
9.7 Conclusions
124(1)
References
124(1)
Further Reading
125(2)
Part 3 127(179)
10 The Evaluation of DNA Profile Evidence
129(22)
10.1 DNA Profiling Techniques - A Brief History
130(1)
10.2 Databases in DNA Profiling
131(1)
10.2.1 Allele Frequency Databases
131(1)
10.2.2 Identification Databases
131(1)
10.3 Interpretation and Evaluation of Conventional DNA Profiles
131(2)
10.3.1 Combined Probability of Inclusion (CPI) or Exclusion (CPE)
132(1)
10.3.2 Random Match Probability (RMP)
132(1)
10.3.3 Likelihood Ratio
133(1)
10.4 Suspect Identification from a DNA Database
133(2)
10.4.1 The Frequentist Interpretation
133(1)
10.4.2 The Likelihood Ratio Approach
134(1)
10.4.3 Database Search Evidence in Court
134(1)
10.5 Case Studies of DNA in the Court
135(7)
10.5.1 R v Andrew Philip Deen 1994
135(1)
10.5.2 Issues Raised by Expert Opinion in R v Deen
136(2)
10.5.3 R v Alan Doheny 1996
138(1)
10.5.4 The Doheny Trial
138(1)
10.5.5 The Doheny Appeal
139(1)
10.5.6 R v Gary Adams 1996
140(1)
10.5.7 Challenges to the Interpretation of DNA Profiles: US v Shea 1997
141(1)
10.6 Current Practice for Evaluating DNA Profile Evidence
142(4)
10.6.1 The Impact of Doheny and Adams in the United Kingdom
142(2)
10.6.2 Current Practice in the United Kingdom
144(1)
10.6.3 Current Practice in Australia
145(1)
10.7 DNA - The Only Evidence
146(1)
10.8 Errors and Mistakes in Forensic DNA Analysis
147(2)
10.8.1 Adam Scott 2012
147(1)
10.8.2 R v S 2013
148(1)
10.8.3 Laboratory Error Rates Versus the RMP
148(1)
10.9 Conclusions
149(1)
References
149(1)
Further Reading
150(1)
11 Low Template DNA
151(18)
11.1 Technical Issues
151(3)
11.1.1 Terminology
151(1)
11.1.2 Samples
152(1)
11.1.3 Technical Issues in Interpretation
152(1)
11.1.4 Quantitative Evaluation in LTDNA Profiles
153(1)
11.2 Importance of the Chain of Custody: Queen v Sean Hoey 2007
154(1)
11.3 The Caddy Report 2008
155(1)
11.4 Case Studies in LTDNA opinion in the UK Courts
156(7)
11.4.1 Partial Profiles
156(1)
11.4.2 Quantities of DNA; Interpretive Issues on Transfer
157(2)
11.4.3 Very Low Quantities of DNA
159(1)
11.4.4 Opinion Without Statistics
160(2)
11.4.5 Experts Differ in Opinion
162(1)
11.5 LTDNA in Jurisdictions Outside the United Kingdom
163(4)
11.5.1 United States
164(1)
11.5.2 Australia
165(2)
11.6 Conclusions
167(1)
References
167(1)
Further Reading
168(1)
12 Footwear Marks in Court
169(20)
12.1 The Analysis and Interpretation of Footwear Marks
169(1)
12.2 Match Opinion: R v D S Hall 2004
170(2)
12.2.1 The Crime and the Evidence
170(1)
12.2.2 Footwear Mark Evidence and Opinion
171(1)
12.2.3 Review of Expert Opinion in R v Hall
172(1)
12.3 The Likelihood Ratio Approach to Evaluation of Footwear Marks
172(1)
12.4 Standardising Scales for Expert Opinion
173(2)
12.4.1 SWGTREAD Scales of Opinion
173(2)
12.4.2 ENFSI Scales of Opinion
175(1)
12.5 Challenges to Opinion on Footwear Evidence: R v T 2010
175(5)
12.5.1 Outline of the Footwear Mark Evidence in R v T
176(1)
12.5.2 The Expert Witness' Notes
177(2)
12.5.3 Evaluation Using an Alternative Database
179(1)
12.5.4 The Summary by the Appeal Court Judge
179(1)
12.6 Discussion of R v T
180(4)
12.6.1 Terminology, Probabilities and Statistical Methodology
180(1)
12.6.2 Footwear Databases
181(1)
12.6.3 Was the Jury Told the Basis of the Expert Opinion?
182(1)
12.6.4 The Appeal Court Ruling: Bayes, Mathematics and Formulae
183(1)
12.7 Footwear Mark Evidence After R v T: R v South 2011
184(2)
12.7.1 The Crime and Evidence
184(1)
12.7.2 Evaluation of the Footwear Evidence
184(1)
12.7.3 Review of the Expert Opinion
185(1)
12.8 ENFSI Recommendations on Logical Evaluation 2015
186(1)
12.9 Conclusions
187(1)
References
187(1)
Further Reading
188(1)
13 Fingerprints and Finger-Marks - Identifying Individuals?
189(21)
13.1 Fingerprint Identification on Trial
189(1)
13.2 ACE-V: A Scientific Method?
190(1)
13.3 Evaluation Criteria
191(5)
13.3.1 Thresholds for Categorical Evaluation
191(1)
13.3.2 The Balthazard Model
192(1)
13.3.3 Identification Thresholds and the Points Standard in the United Kingdom
192(1)
13.3.4 The Basis of the Non-Numeric (Holistic) Approach
193(1)
13.3.5 Identification Thresholds in Other Jurisdictions
194(1)
13.3.6 R v Buckley 1999
194(2)
13.4 Evolution of the Basis of Fingerprint Opinion in the Court
196(2)
13.5 A Critical Summary of Fingerprint Identification
198(1)
13.6 Challenges to Fingerprint Testimony
198(4)
13.6.1 RvPK Smith 2011
198(2)
13.6.2 Shirley McKie and the Scottish Fingerprint Inquiry 1997-2011
200(2)
13.7 Identifying a Mark from a Database
202(2)
13.7.1 AFIS Versus Manual Systems
202(1)
13.7.2 The Madrid Bombing Case (Brandon Mayfield) 2004
203(1)
13.8 Admissibility of Fingerprint Evidence
204(2)
13.8.1 US v Byron Mitchell 2004
204(1)
13.8.2 US v Llera Plaza 2002
205(1)
13.9 Towards a Probabilistic Evaluation of Fingerprint Evidence
206(2)
13.10 Conclusions
208(1)
References
208(1)
Further Reading
209(1)
14 Trace Evidence, Databases and Evaluation
210(19)
14.1 Analytical Methodologies for Glass, Fibres and GSR
210(2)
14.1.1 Glass Analysis
211(1)
14.1.2 Fibre Analysis
211(1)
14.1.3 GSR Analysis
211(1)
14.2 Databases for Source and Activity Levels
212(2)
14.2.1 Source Level
212(1)
14.2.2 Activity Level
212(1)
14.2.3 Glass
213(1)
14.2.4 Fibres
213(1)
14.2.5 GSR
213(1)
14.2.6 Statistical Models and Case Pre-Assessment
214(1)
14.3 Glass Evidence in Court
214(4)
14.3.1 R v Abadom 1983
214(1)
14.3.2 R v Lewis-Barnes 2014
215(1)
14.3.3 R v L and Others 2010
216(1)
14.3.4 People v Smith 2012
216(1)
14.3.5 Review of the Evaluation of Trace Glass Evidence
217(1)
14.4 Fibre Evidence in Court: R v Dobson 2011, R v Norris 2013
218(4)
14.4.1 Fibre Evidence: Dobson
219(1)
14.4.2 Fibre Evidence: Norris
220(1)
14.4.3 Review of the Evaluation of the Fibre Evidence
221(1)
14.5 Gunshot Residue (GSR) Evidence in Court
222(5)
14.5.1 R v Wooton and Others 2012
222(2)
14.5.2 R v Gjikokaj 2014
224(1)
14.5.3 Review of the Evaluation of GSR Evidence
225(1)
14.5.4 R v George 2007
226(1)
14.6 Conclusions
227(1)
References
227(1)
Further Reading
227(2)
15 Firearm and Tool-Mark Evidence
229(14)
15.1 Pattern Matching of Mechanical Damage
229(1)
15.2 The Interpretation and Evaluation of Tool-Mark Evidence
230(2)
15.2.1 US Opinion
230(2)
15.2.2 UK Opinion
232(1)
15.3 Critical Review of Tool-Mark Evaluation
232(2)
15.4 Consecutive Matching Striations
234(1)
15.5 Databases
234(1)
15.6 Tool-Marks and Evaluation by Likelihood Ratio
235(1)
15.7 Firearms Evidence in the US Courts
236(5)
15.7.1 United States v Hicks 2004
236(1)
15.7.2 United States v Darryl Green et al. 2005
237(3)
15.7.3 US v Glynn 2008
240(1)
15.8 Concluding Comments on Firearms Cases
241(1)
References
241(1)
Further Reading
242(1)
16 Expert Opinion and Evidence of Human Identity
243(16)
16.1 Introduction to Ear-Marks
243(1)
16.2 R v Kempster 2003, 2008
244(3)
16.2.1 The First Appeal 2003
245(1)
16.2.2 The Second Appeal 2008
245(1)
16.2.3 Conclusions From R v Kempster
246(1)
16.3 State v Kunze 1999
247(2)
16.3.1 The Frye Hearing
247(1)
16.3.2 The Trial
248(1)
16.3.3 The Appeal
249(1)
16.4 Review of Ear-Mark Cases
249(1)
16.5 Introduction to Bite-Mark Evidence
250(1)
16.6 The ABFO Guidelines and Expert Opinion
250(1)
16.7 Bite-Mark Cases in the United States
251(4)
16.7.1 People v Marx 1975
252(1)
16.7.2 The Appeal
252(1)
16.7.3 State v Garrison 1978
253(1)
16.7.4 State v Stinson 1986
254(1)
16.7.5 Bite-Mark Testimony in The Courts
255(1)
16.8 Body Biometrics: Facial Mapping and Gait
255(2)
16.8.1 R v Hookway 1999
255(1)
16.8.2 R v Otway 2011
256(1)
16.9 Conclusion
257(1)
References
257(1)
Further Reading
258(1)
17 Questioned Documents
259(18)
17.1 Handwriting and Signature Comparison - A Scientific Methodology?
260(1)
17.2 Scales of Expert Opinion
261(2)
17.3 Jarrold v Isajul and Others 2013
263(3)
17.3.1 Dr Strach's Testimony
264(1)
17.3.2 Mr Holland's Testimony
264(1)
17.3.3 Mr Lacroix's Testimony
265(1)
17.3.4 The Appeal Court Judge's Conclusion
265(1)
17.4 Gale v Gale 2010
266(2)
17.4.1 ESDA Analysis
267(1)
17.4.2 Signature Analysis
267(1)
17.5 The Bridgewater Four (R v Hickey and Others) 1997
268(2)
17.5.1 Molloy's 'Confession'
269(1)
17.6 R v Previte 2005
270(1)
17.7 Admissibility and Other Issues in Handwriting and Signature Evidence
271(1)
17.8 Admissibility and Evaluation in the US Courts
272(3)
17.8.1 US v Starzecpyzel 1995
272(2)
17.8.2 US v Velasquez 1995
274(1)
17.9 Conclusions
275(1)
References
275(1)
Further Reading
276(1)
18 Bloodstain Pattern Analysis
277(16)
18.1 The Nature of Bloodstain Pattern Evidence
277(1)
18.2 Issues for BPA Expert Opinion in the Courts
278(3)
18.2.1 The Scientific Basis of BPA
278(1)
18.2.2 Who is the Expert?
279(1)
18.2.3 The Courts' and Lawyers' Knowledge of BPA
280(1)
18.2.4 The Evaluation and Significance of BPA Evidence
280(1)
18.3 The Scientific Basis of Bloodstain Pattern Analysis: The Murder of Marilyn Sheppard
281(1)
18.4 Three Approaches to the Presentation of Blood Evidence
282(3)
18.4.1 Activity and Propositions: R v Thompson 2013
283(1)
18.4.2 No Expert Testimony: R v White 1998
283(1)
18.4.3 Reconstructing Activity as a Narrative: R v Hall 2010
284(1)
18.5 The Problem of Expirated Blood
285(4)
18.5.1 R v O'Grady 1995, 1999
286(1)
18.5.2 R v Jenkins: The Trial and First Appeal 1999
287(2)
18.5.3 R v Jenkins: The Second Appeal (2004) and Two More Retrials
289(1)
18.6 Experts in Disagreement: R v Perlett 2006
289(2)
18.7 Conclusions
291(1)
References
291(1)
Further Reading
292(1)
19 Conflicting Expert Opinion: SIDS and the Medical Expert Witness
293(13)
19.1 Eminent Experts: Issues and Conflicts
293(1)
19.2 R v Clark 2000, 2003
294(4)
19.2.1 The Testimony of Meadow
295(2)
19.2.2 The Second Appeal 2003
297(1)
19.3 A Bayesian Analysis: Murder or SIDS?
298(2)
19.3.1 Pr(H2) - The Probability of Two SIDS Deaths in the Same Family
298(1)
19.3.2 Pr(H1) - The Probability of Two Murdered Infants in the Same Family
299(1)
19.3.3 The Posterior Odds
299(1)
19.4 R v Cannings 2004
300(2)
19.5 Trupti Patel 2003
302(2)
19.5.1 The Rib Fracture Evidence
302(1)
19.5.2 The Judge's Summing Up
303(1)
19.6 Conclusions
304(1)
References
304(1)
Further Reading
305(1)
Appendix: Some Legal Terminology 306(1)
Index of Cases, Individuals and Inquiry Reports 307(2)
General Index 309
Craig Adam is based at the School of Physical and Geographical Sciences, Keele University, Keele, UK. He has been involved in forensic science education and research for almost fifteen years while working at Keele University. Originally a physicist by training, he has particular interests in the mathematical and statistical aspects of the discipline, in addition to his research on the physicochemical characterisation of forensic materials, document analysis and blood dynamics. He has published across all these areas, including the textbook Essential Mathematics and Statistics for Forensic Science, available from Wiley-Blackwell. He has extensive experience in developing teaching resources across the spectrum of forensic science and, over recent years, has focused on the interface between science and the court. This has led him to explore the legal, scientific and statistical perspectives driving the evolution of the crucial step in the progress of scientific evidence from the crime scene through the legal debate to its influence on the ultimate decision by the court.
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