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E-raamat: Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge [Taylor & Francis e-raamat]

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  • Formaat: 512 pages, 5 Tables, black and white
  • Sari: Routledge Classics
  • Ilmumisaeg: 02-Oct-2008
  • Kirjastus: Routledge
  • ISBN-13: 9780203371107
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Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of KnowledgeSuurem pilt
  • Formaat: 512 pages, 5 Tables, black and white
  • Sari: Routledge Classics
  • Ilmumisaeg: 02-Oct-2008
  • Kirjastus: Routledge
  • ISBN-13: 9780203371107
Teised raamatud teemal:
Taylor & Francis e-raamatudRohkem infot Taylor & Francis e-raamatute kohta
In a letter of 1932, Karl Popper described Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge as a child of crises, above all of the crisis of physics.

Finally available in English, it is a major contribution to the philosophy of science, epistemology and twentieth century philosophy generally.

The two fundamental problems of knowledge that lie at the centre of the book are the problem of induction, that although we are able to observe only a limited number of particular events, science nevertheless advances unrestricted universal statements; and the problem of demarcation, which asks for a separating line between empirical science and non-science.

Popper seeks to solve these two basic problems with his celebrated theory of falsifiability, arguing that the inferences made in science are not inductive but deductive; science does not start with observations and proceed to generalise them but with problems, which it attacks with bold conjectures.

The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge is essential reading for anyone interested in Karl Popper, in the history and philosophy of science, and in the methods and theories of science itself.
Editor's foreword xv
Publisher's acknowledgements xvi
Preface to the first German edition, 1978 xvii
Introduction, 1978 xix
A brief historical comment on scientific knowledge as Socratic ignorance xix
Some critical comments on the text of this book, particularly on the theory of truth xxvi
Exposition [ 1933] xxxix
Comments on the content xxxix
Comments on the relationship of the book to the current theory of knowledge xxxix
BOOK I THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION (EXPERIENCE AND HYPOTHESIS)
The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge Volume I
Formulation of the Problem
3(3)
The problem of induction and the problem of demarcation
3(3)
Deductivism and Inductivism
6(29)
Comments on how the solutions are reached and preliminary presentation of the solutions
6(5)
Rationalism and empiricism - deductivism and inductivism
11(9)
The possibility of a deductivist psychology of knowledge
20(15)
The Problem of Induction
35(10)
The infinite regression (Hume's argument)
35(7)
Inductivist positions
42(3)
The Normal-Statement Positions
45(42)
The normal-statement positions: naive inductivism, strict positivism and apriorism
45(2)
Critique of strict positivism - twofold transcendence of natural laws
47(10)
The transcendental method - presentation of apriorism
57(17)
Critique of apriorism
74(13)
Kant and Fries
87(60)
Supplement to the critique of apriorism.(Psychologism and transcendentalism in Kant and Fries.- On the question of the empirical basis.)
87(60)
The Probability Positions
147(24)
The probability positions - subjective belief in probability
147(3)
Statements about the objective probability of events
150(3)
Probability as an objective degree of validity of universal empirical statements
153(2)
One way of more closely defining the concept of the probability of a hypothesis (primary and secondary probability of hypotheses). The concept of simplicity
155(9)
The concept of the corroboration of a hypothesis - positivist, pragmatist and probabilistic interpretations of the concept of corroboration
164(4)
The infinite regression of probability statements
168(3)
The Pseudo-Statement Positions
171(17)
The pseudo-statement positions: new formulation of the problem
171(2)
Natural laws as ``instructions for the formation of statements''
173(4)
``True - false'' or ``useful - useless''? Consistent pragmatism
177(2)
Difficulties of consistent pragmatism
179(3)
Tool and schema as purely pragmatic constructs
182(2)
Natural laws as propositional functions
184(4)
Conventionalism
188(50)
The pseudo-statement positions will temporarily be put away: conventionalism
188(8)
The three interpretations of axiomatic systems. (The circle of problems surrounding conventionalism)
196(6)
Conventionalist implicit and explicit definitions Propositional function and propositional equation
202(5)
Conventionalist propositional equations as tautological general implications
207(4)
Can axiomatic-deductive systems also be understood as consequence classes of pure propositional functions (of pseudo-statements)?
211(5)
The coordinative definitions of empiricism: synthetic general implications
216(4)
Conventionalist and empiricist interpretations, illustrated by the example of applied geometry
220(18)
Strictly Universal Statements and Singular Statements
238(34)
Implication and general implication
238(8)
General implication and the distinction between strictly universal and singular statements
246(4)
Universal concept and individual concept - class and element
250(12)
Strictly universal statements - the problem of induction and the problem of universals
262(4)
Comments on the problem of universals
266(6)
Back to the Pseudo-Statement Positions
272(29)
Return to the discussion of the pseudo-statement positions
272(4)
Symmetry or asymmetry in the evaluation of natural laws?
276(3)
The negative evaluation of universal statements. Critique of the strictly symmetrical interpretation of pseudo-statements
279(7)
An infinite regression of pseudo-statements
286(4)
An apriorist pseudo-statement position
290(1)
Interpretation of the critique up to this point; comments on the unity of theory and practice
291(6)
A last chance for the pseudo-statement positions
297(4)
Pseudo-Statement Positions and the Concept of Meaning
301(46)
The concept of meaning in logical positivism
301(6)
The concept of meaning and the demarcation problem - the fundamental thesis of inductivism
307(11)
Critique of the inductivist dogma of meaning
318(10)
Fully decidable and partially decidable empirical statements - the antinomy of the knowability of the world. (Conclusion of the critique of the pseudo-statement positions.)
328(19)
Conclusion
347(152)
The dialectical and the transcendental corroboration of the solution
347(11)
Is the problem of induction solved?
358(19)
Appendix The critique of the Problem of Induction in Schematic Representations
363(14)
BOOK II THE PROBLEM OF DEMARCATION: EXPERIENCE AND METAPHYSICS
The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge Volume II (Fragments)
PART ONE FRAGMENTS 1932
Draft of an introduction
377(48)
Is there a philosophical science? (Introductory considerations on the problem of demarcation.)
377(6)
Formulation of the Problem
383(1)
The problem of demarcation
383(1)
Scope of the problem of demarcation
383(2)
The problem of induction
385(1)
Scope of the problem of induction
385(2)
On the Question of Eliminating Subjectivist Psychologism
387(4)
Transition to the Theory of Method
391(1)
An objection to the criterion of falsifiability
391(2)
Critique of non-methodological theories of knowledge
393(2)
Comments on the question: conventionalism or empiricism?
395(3)
The empiricist character of colloquial language-the logical view as a prerequisite for the methodological view
398(2)
Concerning the critique of non-deductive and non-transcendental theories of knowledge
400(3)
Is there a methodology?
403(4)
Universal concept and individual concept - class and element
407(2)
Concerning the language-critical objection to the possibility of a methodology
409(5)
The Method of Exhaustion. - ``State of Affairs'' and ``Fact''. - Universal Diversity
414(3)
Outline of a Theory of Empirical-Scientific Methods (Theory of Experience)
417(1)
Principle of falsifiability
417(1)
Principle of continuity
417(1)
Thesis against strict positivism
418(1)
First thesis against conventionalism: Principle of system closure
418(1)
Second thesis against conventionalism: principle of restricting singular auxiliary assumptions (ad hoc hypothesis)
419(6)
PART TWO FRAGMENTS 1933
Orientation
425(40)
Philosophy
427(1)
[ Introduction]
427(2)
The problem of induction and the problem of demarcation
429(2)
The Problem of Methodology
431(1)
Methodology and the possibility of falsification
431(4)
The demarcation criterion and the theory of method
435(3)
Comments on the so-called problem of free will
438(1)
Introduction
438(2)
The ``event'' and the ``slice of reality''
440(2)
[ The Problem of Free Will]
442(1)
Individuals and universals
442(2)
The doctrine of the two worlds
444(3)
Has quantum physics changed the situation?
447(3)
The Problem of the Randomness of Probability Statements
450(1)
[ Introduction]
450(2)
Sets of the first kind for infinitely extendable series
452(4)
Conditions for infinitely extendable sets of the first kind
456(2)
The problem of random sequences
458(7)
Appendix Summary Excerpt (1932) from The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge
Preliminary Note
465(20)
Formulation of the problem: The problem of induction and the problem of demarcation
466(1)
The transcendental method of the theory of knowledge
467(2)
Deductivism and inductivism
469(1)
Theoreticism. Scientific objectivity
470(1)
Outline of the solutions to the two fundamental problems of the theory of knowledge
470(2)
Prerequisites of falsifiability, construction of theories
472(1)
Transcendental and psychological method. Elimination of the subjective-psychological basis
473(4)
The method of empirical falsification
477(4)
Methodological principles of the conventional stipulation of some basic statements as ``true'' or ``false''
481(2)
Justification of psychologism
483(1)
Concluding note
484(1)
Editor's Postscript
485(14)
Introduction
485(2)
The original copies and editing of the manuscript
487(3)
Popper's revision of the MS in 1975
490(1)
Title and table of contents
491(1)
The mottos
492(1)
Volume II: The Problem of Demarcation
493(6)
Index of Names 499(4)
Index of Subjects 503
Karl Popper (190294). Philosopher, born in Vienna. One of the most influential and controversial thinkers of the twentieth century.
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