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E-raamat: I: The Meaning of the First Person Term [Oxford Scholarship Online e-raamatud]

(College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia)
  • Formaat: 212 pages
  • Ilmumisaeg: 02-Mar-2006
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-13: 9780199287826
  • Oxford Scholarship Online e-raamatud
  • Raamatu hind pole hetkel teada
  • Formaat: 212 pages
  • Ilmumisaeg: 02-Mar-2006
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-13: 9780199287826
I is perhaps the most important and the least understood of our everyday expressions. This is a constant source of philosophical confusion. Max de Gaynesford offers a remedy: he explains what this expression means, its logical form and its inferential role. He thereby shows the way to an understanding of how we express first-personal thinking. He dissolves various myths about how I refers, to the effect that it is a pure indexical. His central claim is that the key to understanding I is that it is the same kind of expression as the other singular personal pronouns, you and he/she: a deictic term, whose reference depends on making an individual salient. He addresses epistemological questions as well as semantic questions, and shows how they interrelate. The book thus not only resolves a key issue in philosophy of language, but promises to be of great use to people working on problems in other areas of philosophy.
Introduction 1(8)
PART I: Questions about the Meaning of I
9(78)
Historical Background
11(18)
To what does I refer?
13(2)
Is I a name?
15(6)
Is I a descriptive term?
21(3)
Is I a (Pure) Indexical?
24(5)
Questions of Reference
29(22)
What is Rule Theory?
32(4)
What is the simple rule?
36(3)
What does the simple rule mean?
39(2)
What does the simple rule determine?
41(3)
What is the context?
44(3)
What role does the simple rule have?
47(4)
Questions of Expression
51(17)
What is Independence?
55(4)
Is Independence to be preferred?
59(1)
What does Independence explain?
60(2)
Is Independence necessary?
62(3)
What does Independence imply?
65(3)
Questions of Logic
68(14)
What is The Guarantee?
71(4)
What does The Guarantee explain?
75(1)
Is The Guarantee supported?
76(3)
Why has The Guarantee seemed convincing?
79(3)
Interim Conclusion
82(5)
Summary
82(1)
Purism
82(2)
An alternative conception
84(3)
PART II: The Meaning of I
87(88)
Logical Character
89(8)
How I behaves in substitution instances
92(3)
What matching constraints reveal
95(2)
Inferential Role
97(12)
How the inferential roles of variant terms are distinguished
97(3)
What is required for the validity of I-inferences
100(2)
How the referential character and inferential role of I are related
102(7)
Referential Function (I)
109(12)
What referential function requires
111(2)
What demonstration is
113(3)
Why demonstration is not the determinant
116(5)
Referential Function (II)
121(13)
What is distinctive about Deictic Terms
121(2)
What referential salience is
123(3)
How the reference of I is determined
126(5)
What has impeded appreciation of I's deictic character
131(3)
Expressive Use
134(13)
How deictic reference is discriminated
137(3)
How the reference of I is discriminated
140(4)
What forms of attention are required
144(3)
Communicative Role
147(16)
What communicative role requires
147(1)
What roles demonstration plays
148(4)
Why the attentive tasks can be easy
152(11)
Conclusion
163(12)
Summary
163(4)
Contrast with the leading theory
167(4)
Where the findings lead
171(4)
Appendix 1: Analytic Table of Contents 175(9)
Appendix 2: Recurrent Terms of Art 184(2)
References 186(7)
Index 193