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E-raamat: Law of Command Responsibility [Oxford Scholarship Online e-raamatud]

(, Defence Counsel, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Formerly a legal assistant in the Chambers of the ICTY)
  • Formaat: 332 pages
  • Ilmumisaeg: 19-Mar-2009
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-13: 9780199559329
  • Oxford Scholarship Online e-raamatud
  • Raamatu hind pole hetkel teada
  • Formaat: 332 pages
  • Ilmumisaeg: 19-Mar-2009
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-13: 9780199559329
The book offers a unique study of the law of command or superior responsibility under international law. Born in the aftermath of the Second World War, the doctrine of superior responsibility provides that a military commander, a civilian leader or the leader of a terrorist, paramilitary or rebel group could be held criminally responsible in relation to crimes committed by subordinates even where he has taken no direct or personal part in the commission of these crimes. The basis of this type of liability lies in a grave and culpable failure on the part of the superior to fulfill his duties to prevent or punish crimes of subordinates.

The idea that a superior could be held criminally responsible in relation to crimes of subordinates is central to the ability of international law to ensure compliance with standards of humanitarian law and it remains a most important legal instrument in the fight against impunity. Though it first developed in the international arena, the doctrine of superior responsibility has now spread into many domestic jurisdictions thus offering judicial and prosecutorial authorities a ready-made instrument to hold to account the leaders of men who knew of the crimes of their subordinates and failed to adequately respond to prevent or punish those crimes.

This volume provides a comprehensive and insightful dissection of the doctrine of superior responsibility, the scope of its application, its elements as well as the evidential difficulties involved in establishing the criminal responsibility of a superior in the context of a criminal prosecution.

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Table of Cases
xiii
PART I INTRODUCTION
The Evolution of the Law of Command Responsibility and the Principle of Legality
3(10)
The shortcomings of international criminal law and the recognition of command responsibility
3(2)
A doctrine born in sin---the Yamashita precedent
5(3)
The development of the law of command responsibility and the principle of legality
8(4)
The ICC and judicial law-making
12(1)
The Resurgence of International Criminal Justice and the Rebirth of Command Responsibility
13(8)
Command Responsibility under Customary International Law and the Statute of the International Criminal Court
21(16)
The ad hoc tribunals, the ICC and customary international law
21(3)
Superior responsibility in the ICC Statute
24(13)
Article 28 ICC Statute
24(2)
Disjointed doctrines of superior responsibility
26(4)
Different mens rea standards for military and non-military superiors
30(1)
Duty of superiors to take `necessary and reasonable' measures under the ICC Statute
31(2)
Requirement of causality under the ICC Statute
33(4)
PART II NATURE AND SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY
Command Responsibility as a Sui Generis Form of Liability for Omission
37(59)
Liability for omission
37(16)
General remarks---what sort of liability is it?
37(2)
Command responsibility and complicity
39(5)
No liability for personal involvement in the crime, nor a form of strict liability
44(3)
A pre-existing legal duty to act
47(6)
Material ability to prevent or punish crimes
53(1)
Responsible command
53(3)
Division of labour between international law and domestic law
56(7)
Personal dereliction of duty
63(11)
Attributability
63(2)
Duties of commanders and duties of subordinates
65(4)
Duties of commanders and duties of states
69(3)
Gravity of breach of duty
72(2)
Connection with the underlying offence
74(15)
Relation of superior-subordinate and effective control
74(1)
Mens rea
75(4)
The underlying offence
79(3)
Requirement of causation
82(7)
Extent of liability and sentencing
89(5)
Overlap of types of liabilitiess
94(2)
Scope of Application of the Doctrine of Command Responsibility---International and Internal Conflicts as well as Peacetime?
96(4)
Military Commanders, Civilian Leaders, and Other Superiors, whether De Jure or De Facto
100(29)
Military commanders
100(2)
Civilian and other non-military leaders
102(8)
General scope of application of the doctrine of superior responsibility
102(1)
Civilian leaders
103(7)
Paramilitary commanders and rebel leaders
110(4)
Responsible command and paramilitary leaders
110(3)
Specific evidential challenges
113(1)
Leaders of terrorist groups
114(8)
Undefined legal status of terrorists under international law
114(2)
Difficulties involved in prosecuting leaders of terrorist outfits
116(5)
Conclusions
121(1)
De jure superiors and de facto superiors
122(1)
Several superiors criminally responsible in relation to the same crimes
123(6)
PART III ELEMENTS OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND UNDERLYING OFFENCES
General Remarks
129(2)
Underlying Offences
131(7)
Commission of a criminal offence and manner of commission
131(3)
Perpendicular command responsibility
134(4)
A Superior-Subordinate Relationship Between the Accused and Those Who Committed the Underlying Offences
138(55)
Relationship of subordination
138(18)
An inter-personal relationship
138(1)
De jure
139(3)
De facto
142(4)
Chain of command
146(10)
`Effective control'
156(34)
Definition
156(3)
Parties to that relationship
159(4)
Establishing `effective control'
163(19)
Threshold of `effective control' and other forms of authority
182(6)
Relationships of authority in a civilian structure
188(2)
Requirement of temporal coincidence
190(3)
A Culpable State of Mind
193(36)
General remarks
193(4)
Requirement of knowledge: from Yamashita to the ICC
193(1)
Customary international law and the ICC
194(3)
Knowledge
197(16)
Raison d'etre of the requirement of knowledge
197(1)
Timing of knowledge
198(1)
Knowledge of what?
199(9)
Categories and forms of knowledge
208(5)
Establishing the required mens rea
213(5)
Indicia of knowledge
213(3)
No imputation of knowledge
216(1)
Information in possession of the superior
217(1)
Intent not to act despite knowledge
218(5)
Knowledge insufficient
218(1)
Intentional failure to act
219(4)
Degree of fault
223(3)
No liability without fault
223(1)
Gross negligence
224(2)
Special intent crimes
226(3)
Breach of a Duty and Consequential Failure to Prevent or to Punish Crimes of Subordinates
229(38)
A dual source of liability---failure to prevent or failure to punish crimes
229(6)
Two distinct duties---to prevent and to punish crimes
229(2)
Duty to prevent
231(2)
Duty to punish
233(1)
Relationship between the two duties
234(1)
Dereliction of duty
235(25)
General remarks---failure to adopt `necessary and reasonable' measures
235(2)
`Necessary'
237(2)
`Reasonable'
239(3)
Assessing the propriety of the superior's conduct
242(17)
Concluding remarks
259(1)
Seriousness of the breach of duty relevant to superior responsibility
260(3)
Criteria relevant to assess the gravity of the breach
260(1)
Gross violation of duty
260(2)
Disciplinary vs. penal sanctions
262(1)
Requirement of causality between the failure of the superior and the crimes
263(1)
Concluding remarks
263(4)
PART IV CONCLUSION
Concluding Remarks: A Workable Standard of Liability for Superiors
267(6)
Annex: Relevant Provisions 273(12)
Bibliography 285(12)
Index 297
Guénaël Mettraux is a former legal assistant in the Chambers of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ('ICTY'). He has appeared as counsel before the ICTY on behalf of General Sefer Halilovic, first commander of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Ljube Boskoski, former Minister of Interior of the Republic of Macedonia. He is the author of International Crimes and the ad hoc Tribunals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) and Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).