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xiii | |
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The Evolution of the Law of Command Responsibility and the Principle of Legality |
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3 | (10) |
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The shortcomings of international criminal law and the recognition of command responsibility |
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3 | (2) |
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A doctrine born in sin---the Yamashita precedent |
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5 | (3) |
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The development of the law of command responsibility and the principle of legality |
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8 | (4) |
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The ICC and judicial law-making |
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12 | (1) |
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The Resurgence of International Criminal Justice and the Rebirth of Command Responsibility |
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13 | (8) |
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Command Responsibility under Customary International Law and the Statute of the International Criminal Court |
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21 | (16) |
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The ad hoc tribunals, the ICC and customary international law |
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21 | (3) |
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Superior responsibility in the ICC Statute |
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24 | (13) |
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24 | (2) |
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Disjointed doctrines of superior responsibility |
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26 | (4) |
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Different mens rea standards for military and non-military superiors |
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30 | (1) |
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Duty of superiors to take `necessary and reasonable' measures under the ICC Statute |
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31 | (2) |
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Requirement of causality under the ICC Statute |
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33 | (4) |
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PART II NATURE AND SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY |
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Command Responsibility as a Sui Generis Form of Liability for Omission |
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37 | (59) |
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37 | (16) |
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General remarks---what sort of liability is it? |
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37 | (2) |
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Command responsibility and complicity |
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39 | (5) |
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No liability for personal involvement in the crime, nor a form of strict liability |
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44 | (3) |
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A pre-existing legal duty to act |
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47 | (6) |
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Material ability to prevent or punish crimes |
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53 | (1) |
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53 | (3) |
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Division of labour between international law and domestic law |
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56 | (7) |
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Personal dereliction of duty |
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63 | (11) |
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63 | (2) |
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Duties of commanders and duties of subordinates |
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65 | (4) |
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Duties of commanders and duties of states |
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69 | (3) |
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Gravity of breach of duty |
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72 | (2) |
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Connection with the underlying offence |
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74 | (15) |
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Relation of superior-subordinate and effective control |
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74 | (1) |
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75 | (4) |
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79 | (3) |
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82 | (7) |
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Extent of liability and sentencing |
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89 | (5) |
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Overlap of types of liabilitiess |
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94 | (2) |
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Scope of Application of the Doctrine of Command Responsibility---International and Internal Conflicts as well as Peacetime? |
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96 | (4) |
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Military Commanders, Civilian Leaders, and Other Superiors, whether De Jure or De Facto |
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100 | (29) |
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100 | (2) |
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Civilian and other non-military leaders |
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102 | (8) |
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General scope of application of the doctrine of superior responsibility |
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102 | (1) |
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103 | (7) |
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Paramilitary commanders and rebel leaders |
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110 | (4) |
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Responsible command and paramilitary leaders |
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110 | (3) |
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Specific evidential challenges |
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113 | (1) |
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Leaders of terrorist groups |
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114 | (8) |
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Undefined legal status of terrorists under international law |
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114 | (2) |
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Difficulties involved in prosecuting leaders of terrorist outfits |
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116 | (5) |
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121 | (1) |
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De jure superiors and de facto superiors |
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122 | (1) |
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Several superiors criminally responsible in relation to the same crimes |
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123 | (6) |
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PART III ELEMENTS OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND UNDERLYING OFFENCES |
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129 | (2) |
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131 | (7) |
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Commission of a criminal offence and manner of commission |
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131 | (3) |
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Perpendicular command responsibility |
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134 | (4) |
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A Superior-Subordinate Relationship Between the Accused and Those Who Committed the Underlying Offences |
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138 | (55) |
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Relationship of subordination |
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138 | (18) |
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An inter-personal relationship |
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138 | (1) |
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139 | (3) |
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142 | (4) |
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146 | (10) |
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156 | (34) |
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156 | (3) |
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Parties to that relationship |
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159 | (4) |
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Establishing `effective control' |
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163 | (19) |
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Threshold of `effective control' and other forms of authority |
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182 | (6) |
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Relationships of authority in a civilian structure |
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188 | (2) |
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Requirement of temporal coincidence |
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190 | (3) |
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193 | (36) |
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193 | (4) |
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Requirement of knowledge: from Yamashita to the ICC |
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193 | (1) |
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Customary international law and the ICC |
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194 | (3) |
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197 | (16) |
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Raison d'etre of the requirement of knowledge |
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197 | (1) |
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198 | (1) |
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199 | (9) |
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Categories and forms of knowledge |
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208 | (5) |
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Establishing the required mens rea |
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213 | (5) |
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213 | (3) |
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No imputation of knowledge |
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216 | (1) |
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Information in possession of the superior |
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217 | (1) |
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Intent not to act despite knowledge |
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218 | (5) |
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218 | (1) |
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Intentional failure to act |
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219 | (4) |
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223 | (3) |
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No liability without fault |
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223 | (1) |
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224 | (2) |
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226 | (3) |
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Breach of a Duty and Consequential Failure to Prevent or to Punish Crimes of Subordinates |
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229 | (38) |
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A dual source of liability---failure to prevent or failure to punish crimes |
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229 | (6) |
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Two distinct duties---to prevent and to punish crimes |
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229 | (2) |
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231 | (2) |
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233 | (1) |
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Relationship between the two duties |
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234 | (1) |
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235 | (25) |
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General remarks---failure to adopt `necessary and reasonable' measures |
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235 | (2) |
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237 | (2) |
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239 | (3) |
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Assessing the propriety of the superior's conduct |
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242 | (17) |
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259 | (1) |
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Seriousness of the breach of duty relevant to superior responsibility |
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260 | (3) |
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Criteria relevant to assess the gravity of the breach |
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260 | (1) |
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260 | (2) |
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Disciplinary vs. penal sanctions |
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262 | (1) |
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Requirement of causality between the failure of the superior and the crimes |
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263 | (1) |
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263 | (4) |
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Concluding Remarks: A Workable Standard of Liability for Superiors |
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267 | (6) |
| Annex: Relevant Provisions |
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273 | (12) |
| Bibliography |
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285 | (12) |
| Index |
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297 | |