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E-raamat: Logic & Natural Language: On Plural Reference and Its Semantic and Logical Significance [Taylor & Francis e-raamat]

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Frege's invention of the predicate calculus has been the most influential event in the history of modern logic. The calculus’ place in logic is so central that many philosophers think, in fact, of it when they think of logic. This book challenges the position in contemporary logic and philosophy of language of the predicate calculus claiming that it is based on mistaken assumptions. Ben-Yami shows that the predicate calculus is different from natural language in its fundamental semantic characteristics, primarily in its treatment of reference and quantification, and that as a result the calculus is inadequate for the analysis of the semantics and logic of natural language.

Frege's invention of the predicate calculus has been the most influential event in the history of modern logic. The calculus’ place in logic is so central that many philosophers think, in fact, of it when they think of logic. This book challenges the position in contemporary logic and philosophy of language of the predicate calculus claiming that it is based on mistaken assumptions. Ben-Yami shows that the predicate calculus is different from natural language in its fundamental semantic characteristics, primarily in its treatment of reference and quantification, and that as a result the calculus is inadequate for the analysis of the semantics and logic of natural language. Ben-Yami develops both an alternative analysis of the semantics of natural language and an alternative deductive system comparable in its deductive power to first order predicate calculus but more adequate than it for the representation of the logic of natural language. Ben-Yami's book is a revolutionary challenge to classical first order predicate calculus, casting doubt on many of the central claims of modern logic.
Preface vii
1. Introduction 1(6)
PART I: PLURAL REFERRING EXPRESSIONS
2 Plural Referring Expressions in Natural Language
7(21)
2.1 The Common View on Reference
7(1)
2.2 Plural Reference
8(8)
2.3 The Implausibility of Reductive Analyses of Plural Referring Expressions
16(12)
3 Common Nouns as Plural Referring Expressions
28(13)
3.1 The Functioning of Common Nouns
28(3)
3.2 On an Alleged Ambiguity of the Copula
31(1)
3.3 Attributive and Predicative Adjectives
32(3)
3.4 Natural Kind Terms
35(2)
3.5 Empty Names
37(4)
4 The Sources of the Analysis of Referring Nouns as Predicates
41(6)
4.1 Frege
41(3)
4.2 Russell and Bradley
44(3)
5 Reference
47(12)
PART II: QUANTIFICATION
6 Quantification: Natural Language versus the Predicate Calculus
59(19)
6.1 The Nature of Quantification, and the Differences between Its Implementations
59(2)
6.2 Definite and Indefinite Noun Phrases
61(2)
6.3 Geach and Strawson on Plural Reference and Quantification
63(3)
6.4 Binary and Restricted Quantification, and Comparative Quantifiers
66(7)
6.5 Is 'Existence' a Quantifier?
73(5)
7 Multiple Quantification
78(17)
7.1 On Ambiguity and Formalization
78(2)
7.2 Iterative Reading of Multiply Quantified Sentences
80(4)
7.3 Additional Readings of Quantified Sentences
84(6)
7.4 On the Passive, Converse Relation-Names, and the Copula
90(5)
8 Pronouns, Variables, and Bound Anaphors
95(20)
8.1 Pronouns and other Definitive Noun Phrases as Alleged Variables
95(1)
8.2 Variables versus Bound Anaphors
96(2)
8.3 Rules for the Choice of Anaphors
98(2)
8.4 Conditional Donkey Anaphora
100(7)
8.5 Predicate Connectives, and Bound Anaphora across Sentential Connectives
107(2)
8.6 The Relation between the Truth-Value of a Quantified Sentence and those of Its Instances
109(6)
PART III: A DEDUCTIVE SYSTEM FOR NATURAL LANGUAGE
9 Derivation Rules and Consistency
115(13)
9.1 Some General Considerations
115(2)
9.2 Basic Characteristics of the System
117(2)
9.3 Transposition
119(1)
9.4 Universal Elimination
120(1)
9.5 Universal Introduction
121(1)
9.6 Particular Introduction
122(1)
9.7 Particular Elimination
123(1)
9.8 Referential Import
124(4)
10 Applications I: Aristotelian Logic
128(5)
10.1 The Square of Opposition
128(2)
10.2 Immediate Inferences
130(1)
10.3 Syllogisms
131(2)
11 Application II: Beyond Aristotelian Logic
133(15)
11.1 Generalization of Transposition
133(1)
11.2 Multiply Quantified Sentences
134(2)
11.3 Predicate- and Sentence-Connectives
136(4)
11.4 The Logic of Relations
140(2)
11.5 Identity
142(6)
12 Conclusions
148(5)
Bibliography 153(5)
Index 158


Dr Hanoch Ben-Yami works in the Philosophy Department at the Central European University of Hungary