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E-raamat: Maritime Transportation: Safety Management and Risk Analysis 2nd edition [Taylor & Francis e-raamat]

(Norwegian University of Science and Technology), (Norwegian University of Science and Technology)
  • Formaat: 650 pages, 190 Tables, black and white; 197 Line drawings, black and white; 5 Halftones, black and white; 202 Illustrations, black and white
  • Ilmumisaeg: 15-Dec-2022
  • Kirjastus: Routledge
  • ISBN-13: 9781003055464
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Maritime Transportation: Safety Management and Risk Analysis 2nd editionSuurem pilt
  • Formaat: 650 pages, 190 Tables, black and white; 197 Line drawings, black and white; 5 Halftones, black and white; 202 Illustrations, black and white
  • Ilmumisaeg: 15-Dec-2022
  • Kirjastus: Routledge
  • ISBN-13: 9781003055464
Teised raamatud teemal:
Taylor & Francis e-raamatudRohkem infot Taylor & Francis e-raamatute kohta
Raamatu kodulehekülg: https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781003055464
The environmental and human costs of marine accidents are high, and risks are considerable. At the same time, expectations from society for the safety of maritime transportation, like most other activities, increase continuously. To meet these expectations, systematic methods for understanding and managing the risks in a cost-efficient manner are needed. This book provides readers with an understanding of how to approach this problem.

Firmly set within the context of the maritime industry, systematic methods for safety management and risk assessment are described. The legal framework and the risk picture within the maritime industry provide necessary context. Safety management is a continuous and wide-ranging process, with a set of methods and tools to support the process. The book provides guidance on how to approach safety management, with many examples from the maritime industry to illustrate practical use.

This extensively revised new edition addresses the needs of students and professionals working in shipping management, ship design and naval architecture, and transport management, as well as safety management, insurance and accident investigation.
Preface xix
Authors xxi
1 Introduction
1(10)
2.2 Background
1(1)
1.2 International trade and shipping
2(1)
1.3 Risk and safety
3(2)
1.4 Anatomy of an accident
5(1)
1.5 Managing risk
6(1)
1.6 Motivation for writing the book
7(1)
1.7 Scope
8(1)
1.8 How to use the book
8(3)
References
9(2)
2 The risk picture
11(22)
2.2 Introduction
11(8)
2.4.1 Major accidents
11(2)
2.1.2 Occupational accidents
13(1)
2.1.3 Environmental factors
14(2)
2.1.4 Flag
16(2)
2.1.5 Age of ship
18(1)
2.1.6 Discussion
19(1)
2.2 Accident statistics
19(3)
2.3 Maritime activity
22(4)
2.4 Important accidents
26(2)
2.5 Fatalities among seafarers
28(1)
2.6 Oil spills and pollution
28(2)
2.7 Effect of some factors on the risk level
30(3)
References
31(2)
3 Terminology
33(18)
3.1 Introduction
33(1)
3.2 Risk and safety
34(5)
3.2.1 Risk
34(2)
3.2.2 Positive risk
36(1)
3.2.3 Other definitions of risk
36(2)
3.2.4 Safety
38(1)
3.2.5 Perceived risk vs calculated risk
38(1)
3.2.6 Use of risk vs safety
38(1)
3.3 Hazard and accident
39(6)
3.3.1 An introduction to the bow-tie model
39(1)
3.3.2 Hazard
40(2)
3.3.3 Initiating event
42(1)
3.3.4 Accident scenario
43(1)
3.3.5 Causal factor
43(1)
3.3.6 Accident
43(1)
3.3.7 Incident and near miss
44(1)
3.4 Frequency and probability
45(1)
3.4.1 Probability
45(1)
3.4.2 Frequency
46(1)
3.5 Consequence
46(1)
3.6 Safety management
46(1)
3.7 Stakeholder
47(1)
3.8 Risk analysis and risk assessment
47(1)
3.9 Risk control and reduction
48(1)
3.10 Risk acceptance criteria
49(2)
References
49(2)
4 Stakeholders, rules, and regulations
51(44)
4.1 Introduction
51(1)
4.2 International trade and shipping
52(7)
4.2.1 Seaborne transport
52(1)
4.2.2 Shipping markets
53(1)
4.2.3 Ship types and trades
54(1)
4.2.4 Economics of shipping
54(2)
4.2.5 Competitiveness of shipping
56(3)
4.3 The shipping industry system
59(8)
4.3.1 Stakeholders
59(2)
4.3.2 Corporate social responsibility
61(3)
4.3.3 The shipowner
64(2)
4.3.4 The charterer
66(1)
4.4 The maritime safety regime
67(5)
4.4.1 Why safety improvement is difficult
67(2)
4.4.2 Rules and regulations
69(1)
4.4.3 The structure of control
70(1)
4.4.4 International Maritime Organization (IMO)
70(2)
4.5 Ship safety conventions
72(4)
4.5.1 SOLAS
72(1)
4.5.2 UNCLOS
72(1)
4.5.3 International convention onload lines, 1966
73(1)
4.5.4 ST'CW convention
74(1)
4.5.5 MARPOL
75(1)
4.5.6 The ISM Code
75(1)
4.6 International Labour Organization
76(1)
4.7 European Union
77(1)
4.8 Enforcement of safety regulation
78(4)
4.8.1 Flag State Control
78(1)
4.8.2 Delegation of flag State Control
79(1)
4.8.3 The Flag State audit project
79(3)
4.9 Port State Control
82(6)
4.9.1 UNCLOS
82(2)
4.9.2 MOU Port State Control (PSC)
84(4)
4.10 Classification Societies
88(2)
4.11 Civil maritime law
90(5)
References
91(4)
5 Safety management system
95(18)
5.1 Introduction
95(1)
5.2 Prescriptive vs functional rules and regulations
96(1)
5.3 Safety management in a wider perspective
96(2)
5.4 Safety management process
98(5)
5.4.1 Establish the context
99(1)
5.4.2 Risk analysis
99(1)
5.4.3 Risk evaluation
100(1)
5.4.4 Propose measures to reduce risk
100(1)
5.4.5 Decide and implement
100(1)
5.4.6 Monitoring and reporting
101(1)
5.4.7 Consultation and reporting
102(1)
5.5 ISM Code
103(5)
5.5.1 Background
103(1)
5.5.2 The content of the ISM Code
104(4)
5.6 Effect of the ISM Code
108(5)
References
110(3)
6 Risk acceptance
113(20)
6.1 Introduction
113(2)
6.2 Some factors affecting risk acceptance
115(3)
6.2.1 Risk perception
115(1)
6.2.2 Benefits
116(1)
6.2.3 Risk aversion
116(1)
6.2.4 Time since accidents and own experience
117(1)
6.2.5 Time until effects are experienced
117(1)
6.2.6 Lack of understanding of the risk
118(1)
6.3 Decision-making principles
118(1)
6.4 Individual vs societal risk acceptance criteria
119(2)
6.5 ALARP
121(2)
6.5.1 Achieving risk that is ALARP
123(1)
6.6 Other principles for risk acceptance
123(2)
6.7 Qualitative risk acceptance criteria
125(1)
6.8 Acceptance criteria in the maritime industry
126(7)
6.8.1 Criteria for risk to people
126(1)
6.8.1.1 Individual risk
126(1)
6.8.1.2 Societal risk
127(1)
6.8.1.3 Converting injuries to fatalities
127(1)
6.8.1.4 The equivalence principle
128(1)
6.8.2 Environmental criteria
129(1)
6.8.3 Criteria for other consequences
130(1)
References
131(2)
7 Human and organizational factors
133(42)
7.1 Introduction
133(2)
7.2 Human and organizational factors data
135(1)
7.3 Classification of human and organizational factors
136(3)
7.4 Human factors influencing accidents
139(2)
7.5 Fatigue
141(3)
7.6 Physical working environment
144(5)
7.6.1 Thermal climate
144(2)
7.6.2 Noise
146(1)
7.6.3 Vibration
147(2)
7.7 Motion
149(3)
7.8 Vision
152(4)
7.8.1 Lookout
152(1)
7.8.2 Night vision
153(2)
7.8.3 Radar operation and vigilance
155(1)
7.9 Situation awareness
156(5)
7.10 Perception and decision making
161(1)
7.10.1 False hypothesis
161(1)
7.10.2 Habit
161(1)
7.10.3 End-spurt effect
162(1)
7.11 Communication
162(1)
7.12 Bridge Resource Management
163(1)
7.13 Human-machine interface (HMI)
164(5)
7.14 Safety culture and safety climate
169(6)
References
171(4)
8 Risk analysis methods
175(78)
8.1 Introduction
175(1)
8.2 Risk assessment and risk analysis
176(16)
8.2.1 A General Risk Assessment Process
176(1)
8.2.2 Problem definition and system description
177(4)
8.2.3 Work organization and choice of method and data
181(1)
8.2.4 Hazard identification
182(2)
8.2.5 Causal and frequency analysis
184(1)
8.2.6 Consequence analysis
185(2)
8.2.7 Risk presentation
187(1)
8.2.8 Comparison with risk acceptance criteria
188(1)
8.2.9 Identify and evaluate risk reduction measures
188(2)
8.2.10 Reporting
190(1)
8.2.11 Limitations of risk analysis
190(2)
8.3 Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)
192(6)
8.3.1 Introduction
192(1)
8.3.2 Objectives
192(1)
8.3.3 Applications
192(1)
8.3.4 Method description
193(1)
8.3.4.1 Preparations
193(1)
8.3.4.2 Hazard identification
193(1)
8.3.4.3 Causal and frequency analysis
194(1)
8.3.4.4 Consequence analysis
195(1)
8.3.4.5 Result presentation
196(2)
8.4 Safe Job Analysis (SJA)
198(3)
8.4.1 Introduction
198(1)
8.4.2 Objectives
198(1)
8.4.3 Applications
199(1)
8.4.4 Method description
199(1)
8.4.4.1 Preparations
199(1)
8.4.4.2 Hazard identification
199(1)
8.4.4.3 Causal and frequency analysis
200(1)
8.4.4.4 Consequence analysis
200(1)
8.4.4.5 Result presentation
200(1)
8.5 FMECA
201(6)
8.5.1 Introduction
201(1)
8.5.2 Objectives
201(1)
8.5.3 Applications
202(1)
8.5.4 Method description
202(1)
8.5.4.1 Preparations
202(1)
8.5.4.2 Hazard identification
203(1)
8.5.4.3 Causal and frequency analysis
204(1)
8.5.4.4 Consequence analysis
205(1)
8.5.4.5 Result presentation
206(1)
8.6 HAZOP
207(7)
8.6.1 Introduction
207(2)
8.6.2 Objectives
209(1)
8.6.3 Applications
209(1)
8.6.4 Method description
209(1)
8.6.4.1 Preparations
209(1)
8.6.4.2 Hazard identification
210(1)
8.6.4.3 Causal and frequency analysis
211(1)
8.6.4.4 Consequence analysis
211(1)
8.6.4.5 Result presentation
212(2)
8.7 STPA
214(2)
8.7.1 Introduction
214(1)
8.7.2 Method description
214(2)
8.7.3 Comparison with FMECA
216(1)
8.8 Fault tree analysis
216(14)
8.8.1 Constructing fault trees
217(3)
8.8.2 Minimal cut sets
220(2)
8.8.3 Quantification of fault trees
222(8)
8.9 Event tree analysis
230(10)
8.9.1 Principles
230(2)
8.9.2 Constructing event trees
232(1)
8.9.3 Quantification of event trees
233(7)
8.10 Bayesian networks
240(8)
8.10.1 Elements of a BN
240(2)
8.10.2 Constructing a BN
242(1)
8.10.3 Quantification of BN
243(3)
8.10.4 Example
246(2)
8.11 Risk contribution trees
248(1)
8.12 Concluding remarks
249(4)
References
251(2)
9 Measuring risk
253(22)
9.1 Introduction
253(1)
9.2 Risk matrix
253(7)
9.3 Measuring risk to people
260(10)
9.3.1 Societal and individual risk
260(1)
9.3.2 Injury risk
260(2)
9.3.3 Potential Loss of Life (PEL)
262(1)
9.3.4 FN curve
263(2)
9.3.5 Individual Risk (IR)
265(2)
9.3.6 Fatal Accident Rate (FAR)
267(1)
9.3.7 Combining injuries and fatalities
268(2)
9.4 Measuring risk to the environment
270(1)
9.5 Measuring risk to other assets
271(4)
9.5.1 Economic risk
271(1)
9.5.2 Reputation
272(1)
References
272(3)
10 Methods for navigational risk analysis
275(36)
10.1 Introduction
275(1)
10.2 Groundings
276(6)
10.2.1 Early studies of powered groundings
276(2)
10.2.2 Developments of powered grounding models
278(3)
10.2.3 Drift grounding
281(1)
10.3 Allision with fixed offshore installations
282(7)
10.3.1 Powered passing vessels
283(2)
10.3.2 Allision with wind farms
285(1)
10.3.3 Korean study
286(3)
10.4 Ship collision
289(7)
10.4.1 Basic approach
289(1)
10.4.2 Head-on collisions
289(3)
10.4.3 Crossing collision
292(2)
10.4.4 Traffic modeling based on AIS observation
294(2)
10.5 Causation probability
296(8)
10.5.1 Empirical approach
296(1)
10.5.2 Fault tree analysis (FTA)
297(1)
10.5.3 Bayesian Belief Network
298(6)
10.6 Qualitative methods
304(2)
10.7 A final comment
306(5)
References
307(4)
11 Human reliability analysis
311(42)
11.1 Introduction
311(2)
11.2 Human reliability analysis
313(4)
11.2.1 Problem definition
315(1)
11.2.2 Task analysis
315(1)
11.2.3 Human error identification
315(1)
11.2.4 Error modeling
316(1)
11.2.5 Human error probability HEP
317(1)
11.3 The THERP method
317(5)
11.3.1 Human error identification by means of PHEA
317(1)
11.3.2 Error modeling by means of THERP
318(1)
11.3.3 HEP estimation in THERP
319(2)
11.3.4 Data on HEPs and PSFs in THERP
321(1)
11.4 The CREAM method
322(12)
11.4.1 Human error identification by means of CREAM
322(2)
11.4.2 Error modeling by means of CREAM
324(2)
11.4.3 HEP estimation in CREAM
326(1)
11.4.3.1 Basic method
326(4)
11.4.3.2 Extended method
330(4)
11.5 Human error assessment and reduction technique (HEART)
334(3)
11.6 Application of THERP in transport
337(6)
11.6.1 Crew error in aircraft takeoff
337(2)
11.6.2 Human contribution in marine traffic accidents
339(4)
11.7 Application of CREAM in transport
343(4)
11.8 Calibration of an HRA model with accident data
347(6)
References
351(2)
12 Formal safety assessment
353(48)
12.1.1 Introduction
353(1)
12.1.1 Background to FSA
354(1)
12.1.2 Intended use of FSA
354(1)
12.2 FSA approach
355(3)
12.3 Preparatory step
358(5)
12.3.1 Problem definition
358(1)
12.3.2 The generic ship
359(3)
12.3.3 Stakeholders
362(1)
12.4 Step 1: Hazard identification
363(6)
12.4.1 Step 1.1: Identify hazards
364(1)
12.4.2 Step 1.2: Describe structured scenarios
365(1)
12.4.3 Step 1.3: Rank and screen scenarios
366(3)
12.5 Step 2: Risk assessment
369(8)
12.5.1 Step 2.1 Qualitative scenario descriptions
369(1)
12.5.2 Step 2.2 Quantify scenarios
370(2)
12.5.3 Step 2.3 Calculate risk
372(3)
12.5.4 Step 2.4 Sensitivity and uncertainty analyses
375(2)
12.6 Step 3: Establish safety measures
377(5)
12.6.1 RCMandRCO
378(1)
12.6.2 Step 3.1 Areas needing control
379(1)
12.6.3 Step 3.2 Identify risk control measures
380(1)
12.6.4 Step 3.3: Grouping risk control measures
381(1)
12.6.5 Step 3.4: Evaluating the effectiveness of RCMs/RCOs
382(1)
12.7 Step 4: Cost-benefit assessment
382(5)
12.7.1 Step 4.1: Baseline assumptions and conditions
383(1)
12.7.2 Step 4.2: Calculate costs
384(1)
12.7.3 Step 4.3: Calculate benefits
385(1)
12.7.4 Step 4.4: Calculate cost-effectiveness
385(1)
12.7.5 Step 4.5: Evaluating uncertainty
386(1)
12.8 Recommendations for decision-making
387(1)
12.9 Application of the FSA methodology
388(10)
12.9.1 Step 1: Hazard identification
389(1)
12.9.2 Step 2: Risk assessment
389(5)
12.9.3 Step 3: Establish safety measures (risk control options)
394(1)
12.9.4 Step 4: Cost-benefit assessment
395(1)
12.9.5 Step 5: Recommendations for decision-making
396(2)
12.10 Final comments
398(3)
References
399(2)
13 Security
401(26)
13.1 Introduction
401(2)
13.1.1 Threats in the delivery phase
402(1)
13.1.2 Threats to seaborne transport
402(1)
13.1.3 Cyber threats
403(1)
13.2 Improving the security in the cargo supply chain
403(5)
13.2.1 US legislation
403(1)
13.2.2 ISPS Code
404(2)
13.2.3 SOLAS
406(1)
13.2.4 ISM Code
407(1)
13.2.5 Container security
407(1)
13.3 Security onboard
408(2)
13.3.1 Compliance costs for the shipowner
409(1)
13.4 Piracy in history
410(1)
13.4.1 Definition of piracy today
411(1)
13.5 Piracy today
411(5)
13.5.1 Locations of piracy
413(2)
13.5.2 Somali piracy
415(1)
13.6 Combating piracy
416(3)
13.6.1 Combating piracy in Somalia
416(1)
13.6.2 Legal framework
417(1)
13.6.3 Military actions
418(1)
13.6.4 Economic reform
418(1)
13.7 Vessel security against piracy
419(8)
13.7.1 Risk assessment of vessel
420(1)
13.7.2 Operative measures
421(1)
13.7.3 Protection of vessel
421(1)
13.7.4 Cyber security and risk management
422(2)
References
424(3)
14 Accident data
427(40)
14.1 Introduction
427(1)
14.2 Types of data needed in risk analysis
428(2)
14.2.1 Technical data
428(1)
14.2.2 Operational data
428(1)
14.2.3 Environmental data
428(1)
14.2.4 Event data
429(1)
14.2.5 Input to fault trees and event trees
429(1)
14.2.6 Consequence data
429(1)
14.3 Evaluating data sources
430(1)
14.4 Frequency and consequence
431(13)
14.4.1 Shipping statistics yearbook
431(1)
14.4.2 Data from Sea-web
432(6)
14.4.3 Annual overview from EMS A
438(4)
14.4.4 Data from national maritime administrations
442(1)
14.4.4.1 The United Kingdom and Canada
442(2)
14.4.5 Marine Accident Inquiry Agency (MAIA) of Japan
444(1)
14.5 Accident taxonomies
444(5)
14.5.1 Skill-rule-knowledge model
444(1)
14.5.2 SHEL model
445(1)
14.5.3 Swiss Cheese Model (SCM)
445(1)
14.5.4 MSCAT
446(1)
14.5.5 MaRCAT
446(1)
14.5.6 HFACS-Maritime
446(3)
14.6 Causal factor data
449(11)
14.6.1 Port state control findings
449(1)
14.6.2 Data from accident investigations
449(1)
14.6.3 SIRC study
450(5)
14.6.4 Finnish study
455(1)
14.6.5 Powered grounding accidents
456(1)
14.6.5.1 Causal factors
457(2)
14.6.5.2 Track history of vessel
459(1)
14.7 Traffic data
460(7)
References
464(3)
15 Risk reduction measures
467(52)
15.1 Introduction
467(1)
15.2 Barriers and barrier classification
467(8)
15.2.1 What is a barrier?
467(1)
15.2.2 RCMandRCO
468(1)
15.2.3 Classification of barriers
469(1)
15.2.3.1 Classifications based on accident sequence
469(1)
15.2.3.2 Classifications based on type of barrier
470(1)
15.2.3.3 Classification based on function
471(1)
15.2.4 Barrier properties
471(1)
15.2.4.1 Specific
472(1)
15.2.4.2 Functional
472(1)
15.2.4.3 Reliable
472(1)
15.2.4.4 Verifiable
473(1)
15.2.5 Attributes of RCMs from I MO
473(2)
15.3 Identifying risk reduction measures
475(3)
15.4 Evaluating and prioritizing risk reduction measures
478(5)
15.4.1 Effects on risk
478(1)
15.4.2 Reliability
479(1)
15.4.3 Verifiability
480(1)
15.4.4 Independence
480(1)
15.4.5 Where in event chain
481(1)
15.4.6 Duration
481(1)
15.4.7 Cost
482(1)
15.4.8 Summary
482(1)
15.5 Cost-benefit analysis
483(14)
15.5.1 Economic theory
484(1)
15.5.2 Cost optimization
485(3)
15.5.3 CBA in safety management
488(5)
15.5.4 Cost-benefit analysis methodologies
493(2)
15.5.5 Establishing criteria for ICAF
495(2)
15.6 Case study: oil spill prevention measures for tankers
497(7)
15.7 Alternative approaches to selection
504(10)
15.7.1 Ranking of concepts
504(2)
15.7.2 Relative importance ranking
506(5)
15.7.3 Valuation of consequence parameters
511(3)
15.8 Barrier management in operation
514(5)
References
516(3)
16 Emergency preparedness and response
519(48)
16.1 Introduction
519(2)
16.2 Examples of accidents
521(6)
16.2.1 Amoco Cadiz
521(1)
16.2.2 Capitaine Tasman
522(1)
16.2.3 HSCSleipner
523(2)
16.2.4 Costa Concordia
525(2)
16.3 Principles of emergency response
527(1)
16.4 Emergency and life-saving regulations
528(5)
16.4.1 SOLAS
528(3)
16.4.2 ISM Code: emergency preparedness
531(1)
16.4.3 STCW requirements
532(1)
16.5 Emergency preparedness activities and functions
533(6)
16.5.1 Planning
533(3)
16.5.2 Land support
536(1)
16.5.3 Decision support
536(3)
16.6 Human behavior in emergency situations
539(4)
16.6.1 General characterization
539(3)
16.6.2 Emergency behavior
542(1)
16.7 Evacuation risk
543(5)
16.8 Evacuation simulation
548(10)
16.8.1 Crowd behavior
548(1)
16.8.2 Modeling the evacuation process
549(2)
16.8.3 A Simulation case
551(3)
16.8.4 Evacuation from partly capsized vessels
554(2)
16.8.5 Designing for safe evacuation
556(2)
16.9 Pollution emergency planning
558(9)
16.9.1 MARPOL
558(2)
Appendices
560(3)
References
563(4)
17 Risk-based design
567(12)
17.1 Introduction
567(2)
17.2 IMO regulations
569(1)
17.3 Approach to risk-based design
570(3)
17.4 Approval process according to MSC 1455
573(3)
17.5 Probabilistic damage stability
576(3)
References
576(3)
18 Monitoring risk level
579(30)
18.1 Introduction
579(1)
18.2 Monitoring loss numbers
579(3)
18.2.1 Time series of grounding accidents
579(3)
18.3 Analysis of time series
582(2)
18.4 Maritime disasters with many fatalities
584(3)
18.5 Fitting a non-parametric distribution
587(1)
18.6 The lognormal distribution
588(4)
18.6.1 Definitions
588(2)
18.6.2 Fitting a parametric distribution to observed data
590(2)
18.7 Estimating a worst-case scenario
592(7)
18.7.1 A simple approach based on distribution function
592(1)
18.7.2 The extreme value distributions
593(2)
18.7.3 EVT estimation of tanker oil spills
595(4)
18.8 Analysis of competence correlation coefficient
599(3)
18.9 Testing of a distribution lost time accidents
602(1)
18.10 Choosing among alternative training programs
603(2)
18.11 The effect of time control charts
605(4)
References
608(1)
19 Learning from accidents and incidents
609(33)
19.1 Introduction
609(1)
19.2 Regulations
610(2)
19.3 Causes of accidents and near-miss
612(2)
19.4 Accident theories
614(7)
19.4.1 Energy-barrier models
615(1)
19.4.2 Sequential models
615(1)
19.4.3 Epidemiological models
616(2)
19.4.4 Systemic models
618(3)
19.5 STEP
621(2)
19.6 MTO method
623(3)
19.6.1 Flowcharting
625(1)
19.7 Loss Causation Model and M-SCAT
626(7)
19.7.1 Background
626(2)
19.7.2 The basics
628(1)
19.7.3 Taxonomy
629(3)
19.7.4 M-SCAT
632(1)
19.8 Accident investigation process
633(6)
19.8.1 Overview of process
633(1)
19.8.2 Step 1: Initiate the investigation
634(1)
19.8.3 Step 2: Preparations
635(1)
19.8.4 Step 3: Collecting evidence
635(1)
19.8.5 Step 4: Analyzing evidence
636(1)
19.8.6 Step 5: Prepare recommendations
637(1)
19.8.7 Step 6: Prepare report
638(1)
19.9 The accident report
639(1)
19.10 Near-miss investigations
639(2)
19.11 Accident investigation reports
641(1)
MAIB Marine Accident Investigation Branch (UK)
641(1)
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board (USA)
641(1)
Dutch Safety Board about 100 reports
641(1)
Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority- about 100 reports
641(1)
TSB Transportation Safety Board of Canada
642(1)
ATSB Australian Transport Safety Bureau
642(1)
References 642(3)
Index 645
Professor Stein Haugen had been working at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology, in the Department of Marine Technology until 2021. He has extensive experience from industry and recently joined the consultancy company Safetec Nordic. His teaching and research has been in risk assessment and safety management, for the maritime, oil and gas, and process industry. He has extensive international experience, having worked in the UK for two years and in Italy for a year, as a visiting professor.

Professor Svein Kristiansen, PhD, has been teaching ship design and safety management at The Norwegian University of Science and Technology. He has also served as advisor to Sintef Ocean and Safetec Nordic AS and as External Examiner at Strathclyde University. His research interest is risk analysis and human factors. The research on accident analysis was linked to several EU funded programmes. He has been Visiting Scholar at Scripps Institution of Oceanography (UC San Diego) and University of Valencia.
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