Consciousness has long been regarded as the biggest stumbling block for the view that the mind is physical. This volume collects thirteen new papers on this problem by leading philosophers including Torin Alter, Ned Block, David Chalmers, Daniel Dennett, John Hawthorne, Frank Jackson, Janet Levin, Joseph Levine, Martine Nida-Rümelin, Laurence Nemirow, Knut Nordby, David Papineau, and Stephen White.
Contributors
ix
Introduction
3
(12)
Torin Alter
Sven Walter
Part One: Phenomenal Knowledge
What RoboMary Knows
15
(17)
Daniel Dennett
So This Is What It's Like: A Defense of the Ability Hypothesis
32
(20)
Laurence Nemirow
The Knowledge Argument, Diaphanousness, Representationalism
52
(13)
Frank Jackson
Does Representationalism Undermine the Knowledge Argument?
65
(12)
Torin Alter
What Is This Thing You Call Color: Can a Totally Color-Blind Person Know about Color?
77
(10)
Knut Nordby
Part Two: Phenomenal Concepts
What Is a Phenomenal Concept?
87
(24)
Janet Levin
Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts
111
(34)
David Papineau
Phenomenal Concepts and the Materialist Constraint
145
(22)
Joseph Levine
Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap
167
(28)
David J. Chalmers
Direct Reference and Dancing Qualia
195
(15)
John Hawthorne
Property Dualism, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Semantic Premise
210
(39)
Stephen L. White
Max Black's Objection to Mind-Body Identity
249
(58)
Ned Block
Grasping Phenomenal Properties
307
(32)
Martine Nida-Rumelin
Index
339
Torin Alter is Associate Professor at the University of Alabama.
Sven Walter is Assistant Professor at the University of Bielefeld, Germany.
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