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E-raamat: Predictive Mind [Oxford Scholarship Online e-raamatud]

(Monash University)
  • Formaat: 286 pages
  • Ilmumisaeg: 28-Nov-2013
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-13: 9780199682737
  • Oxford Scholarship Online e-raamatud
  • Raamatu hind pole hetkel teada
  • Formaat: 286 pages
  • Ilmumisaeg: 28-Nov-2013
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-13: 9780199682737
A new theory is taking hold in neuroscience. It is the theory that the brain is essentially a hypothesis-testing mechanism, one that attempts to minimise the error of its predictions about the sensory input it receives from the world. It is an attractive theory because powerful theoretical arguments support it, and yet it is at heart stunningly simple. Jakob Hohwy explains and explores this theory from the perspective of cognitive science and philosophy. The key argument throughout The Predictive Mind is that the mechanism explains the rich, deep, and multifaceted character of our conscious perception. It also gives a unified account of how perception is sculpted by attention, and how it depends on action. The mind is revealed as having a fragile and indirect relation to the world. Though we are deeply in tune with the world we are also strangely distanced from it.

The first part of the book sets out how the theory enables rich, layered perception. The theory's probabilistic and statistical foundations are explained using examples from empirical research and analogies to different forms of inference. The second part uses the simple mechanism in an explanation of problematic cases of how we manage to represent, and sometimes misrepresent, the world in health as well as in mental illness. The third part looks into the mind, and shows how the theory accounts for attention, conscious unity, introspection, self and the privacy of our mental world.
Preface viii
Introduction 1(12)
The argument
1(2)
Plan
3(2)
Background
5(4)
About this book
9(4)
Part I The Mechanism
1 Perception as causal inference
13(28)
Constraints on perceptual inference
14(1)
Perception and Bayes' rule
15(4)
Perceptual inference and binocular rivalry
19(4)
How do neurons know Bayes?
23(2)
From inference to phenomenology
25(2)
A hierarchy of causal regularities
27(1)
Perceptual variance and invariance
28(3)
Message passing between hierarchical levels
31(1)
Additional constraints on hierarchical inference
32(2)
On Bayes' rule
34(3)
Summary: hierarchical neuronal inferential mechanisms
37(1)
Notes
38(3)
2 Prediction error minimization
41(18)
A statistical illustration
42(4)
Reconceiving the relation to the world
46(2)
Being supervised by the world
48(3)
A deeper perspective
51(2)
Recognition and model inversion
53(2)
Summary: perception in prediction
55(1)
Notes
56(3)
3 Prediction error, context, and precision
59(16)
Context and uncertainty
60(2)
Plugging the leaky dam
62(2)
Expected precisions
64(2)
Precisions and prediction error gain
66(1)
The basic mechanism: matters arising
67(6)
Summary: passive perceivers?
73(1)
Notes
74(1)
4 Action and expected experience
75(26)
Active inference in perception
76(5)
Modelling the agent, and acting
81(3)
Bounding surprise
84(5)
Active inference: matters arising
89(3)
Prediction error minimization: challenges
92(3)
Summary: tooling up for understanding the mind
95(1)
Notes
96(5)
Part II The World
5 Binding is inference
101(16)
The binding problem and causal inference
102(4)
Initial pleas for the Bayesian story
106(4)
From common cause to sensory binding
110(1)
Binding, attention, and precision
111(4)
Summary: binding in error minimization
115(1)
Notes
115(2)
6 Is predicting seeing?
117(23)
Cognitive penetrability: initial moves
118(4)
Cognitive penetrability under mounting uncertainty
122(2)
Making room for cognitive impenetrability
124(5)
Possible cases of cognitive penetrability
129(8)
Summary: a balanced notion of cognitive penetrability
137(1)
Notes
138(2)
7 Precarious prediction
140(32)
Trading off perception and misperception
141(2)
Accuracy and noise
143(2)
Precisions, sampling, and prior belief
145(2)
Reality testing
147(5)
The courtroom of perception
152(4)
Mental illness and prediction error
156(1)
Delusions and expected precisions
157(4)
Autism and expected precisions
161(4)
Balancing passive and active inference
165(3)
Summary: prediction error failures in illness and health
168(1)
Notes
169(3)
8 Surprise and misrepresentation
172(19)
Misperception as failure of prediction error minimization
174(5)
Misperception and rule-following
179(2)
Hierarchical modes of presentation
181(4)
In the Bayesian room
185(2)
Summary: a mechanism for representation
187(1)
Notes
188(3)
Part III The Mind
9 Precision, attention, and consciousness
191(16)
From mental searchlight to precision expectations
192(2)
Learning patterns of noise and uncertainty
194(1)
Patterns of expected precisions in attention
195(2)
Volitional attention as active inference
197(2)
Inattentional blindness as low gain and prior
199(1)
Endogenous and exogenous attention
200(1)
Attention and conscious perception
201(4)
Summary: statistical aspects of attention and consciousness
205(1)
Notes
206(1)
10 Perceptual unity in action
207(17)
From causal inference to consciousness?
207(2)
Perceptual unity
209(2)
Unity, and ignition of the global neuronal workspace
211(3)
Ignition, active inference, and unity
214(5)
Action-based unity and indirectness
219(2)
Summary: unity and causal seclusion
221(1)
Notes
221(3)
11 The fragile mirror of nature
224(18)
Truth trackers or just a penchant for error minimization?
224(3)
Is perception indirect?
227(3)
The Bayesian body
230(7)
Fragility, internality, and situatedness
237(3)
Summary: a disconcerting and comforting perceptual relation?
240(1)
Notes
241(1)
12 Into the predictive mind
242(16)
Emotions and bodily sensations
242(3)
Introspection is inference on mental causes
245(4)
The private mind in interaction
249(5)
The self as a sensory trajectory
254(2)
Summary: the probabilistic and causal mind
256(1)
Notes
257(1)
Concluding remarks: The mind in prediction
258(2)
Acknowledgements 260(1)
References 261(16)
Index 277
Jakob Hohwy is a philosopher engaged in both conceptual and experimental research. He works on problems in philosophy of mind about perception, neuroscience, and mental illness. At the same time, he collaborates with neuroscientists and psychiatrists, conducting experiments that put philosophical ideas to the test and that bring philosophical concerns into the lab. Hohwy completed his PhD at the Australian National University, his Masters degree at St Andrews University in Scotland, and his basic philosophy training in Denmark. He has set up the Philosophy and Cognition lab in the Philosophy Department at Monash University in Melbourne.