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E-raamat: Resilient Space Systems Design: An Introduction [Taylor & Francis e-raamat]

(The Boeing Company, Boeing Space & Launch, California, USA)
  • Formaat: 192 pages, 98 Illustrations, black and white
  • Ilmumisaeg: 30-Sep-2019
  • Kirjastus: CRC Press
  • ISBN-13: 9780429053603
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Resilient Space Systems Design: An IntroductionSuurem pilt
Taylor & Francis e-raamatudRohkem infot Taylor & Francis e-raamatute kohta
Raamatu kodulehekülg: https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9780429053603
Recognized as a "Recommended" title by Choice for their November 2020 issue.

Choice is a publishing unit at the Association of College & Research Libraries (ACR&L), a division of the American Library Association. Choice has been the acknowledged leader in the provision of objective, high-quality evaluations of nonfiction academic writing.

Presenting a fundamental definition of resilience, the book examines the concept of resilience as it relates to space system design.

The book establishes the required definitions, relates its place to existing state-of-the-art systems engineering practices, and explains the process and mathematical tools used to achieve a resilient design. It discusses a variety of potential threats and their impact upon a space system. By providing multiple, real-world examples to illustrate the application of the design methodology, the book covers the necessary techniques and tools, while guiding the reader through the entirety of the process. The book begins with space systems basics to ensure the reader is versed in the functions and components of the system prior to diving into the details of resilience. However, the text does not assume that the reader has an extensive background in the subject matter of resilience.

This book is aimed at engineers and architects in the areas of aerospace, space systems, and space communications.
Preface ix
About the Author xi
Introduction 1(8)
1 The Space System
9(18)
1.1 Space System Components
9(2)
1.2 System Capability
11(2)
1.3 System Architectures
13(3)
1.3.1 Parallel Architectures
13(1)
1.3.2 Series Architectures
14(1)
1.3.3 Hybrid and Other Architectures
15(1)
1.4 Space System Elements
16(11)
1.4.1 The Space Segment
16(1)
1.4.1.1 Satellite Orbits
17(2)
1.4.1.2 Satellite Composition and Size
19(1)
1.4.1.3 Satellite Operating Frequencies
20(1)
1.4.2 The Ground Segment
21(1)
1.4.2.1 Satellite Command and Control
22(1)
1.4.2.2 Satellite Operations
23(1)
1.4.2.3 Mission Planning
23(1)
1.4.2.4 Gateways and Teleports
24(1)
1.4.2.5 Network Operations
25(1)
1.4.3 The User Segment
25(2)
2 Defining and Evaluating Resilience
27(16)
2.1 Resilience Domains, Attributes, Timeline, and Criteria
29(2)
2.2 Valuing Resilience
31(1)
2.3 Prerequisites for Evaluating Resilience
32(2)
2.4 Approaches to Calculating Resilience
34(3)
2.5 Resilience Calculation Parameters
37(2)
2.6 The OSD Taxonomy of Resilience
39(2)
2.7 Other Resilience Nomenclature
41(2)
3 Threats
43(14)
3.1 Categorizing Threats: Adverse Conditions and Hostile Actions
43(4)
3.1.1 Adverse Conditions
44(1)
3.1.2 Hostile Actions
45(2)
3.2 Threat Attributes and Characteristics
47(8)
3.2.1 Threat Types
47(1)
3.2.1.1 Physical or Kinetic Threats
47(1)
3.2.1.2 Electronic Threats
48(1)
3.2.1.3 Optical Threats
49(1)
3.2.1.4 Cyber Threats
50(1)
3.2.2 Threat Severity
50(2)
3.2.3 Threat Target(s)
52(1)
3.2.4 Threat Effectiveness
53(1)
3.2.5 Persistent Threats
54(1)
3.2.6 Reversible and Irreversible Effects
54(1)
3.3 Multiple Threats to a System
55(1)
3.4 Evolving or Escalating Threats
55(2)
4 Threat Mitigation
57(16)
4.1 Threat Mitigation Approaches
58(3)
4.2 Threat Mitigation Options for Space Systems
61(12)
4.2.1 Mitigating Electronic Threats: Radio Frequency (RF) Signal Interference and Jamming
61(2)
4.2.1.1 Spatial Isolation
63(1)
4.2.1.2 Receive Frequency Selectivity (Filtering)
64(2)
4.2.1.3 Spread Spectrum Waveforms and Digital Signal Processing
66(1)
4.2.2 Mitigating Physical (or Kinetic) Threats
67(1)
4.2.2.1 Ground Stations and Terrestrial Networks
67(2)
4.2.2.2 Mission Planning Element
69(1)
4.2.2.3 Space Segment
69(1)
4.2.3 Mitigating Optical Threats
70(1)
4.2.4 Mitigating Cyber Threats
71(2)
5 Modeling and Calculating Resilience
73(24)
5.1 Modeling Resilience
73(6)
5.1.1 Individual Threats
77(1)
5.1.2 Multiple Coordinated Threats -- Cumulative Impact
77(1)
5.1.3 Probability-Weighted Resilience
78(1)
5.1.4 Superposition of Threats
78(1)
5.2 Determining the Resilience Coefficient Values
79(1)
5.3 Modeling Resilience Attributes
80(13)
5.3.1 Avoidance
80(4)
5.3.2 Robustness
84(2)
5.3.3 Recovery
86(6)
5.3.4 Reconstitution
92(1)
5.4 System Availability and Resilience
93(4)
6 Designing for Resilience
97(30)
6.1 Establishing Requirements
97(1)
6.2 Incorporating Resilience Engineering into the System Design Process
98(21)
6.2.1 Architectural Trades
99(1)
6.2.2 Elemental Protection
100(1)
6.2.3 Distribution of System Capability
101(1)
6.2.3.1 Limits of Distribution
102(2)
6.2.4 Methods of Distributing System Capability
104(6)
6.2.4.1 Uniform versus Non-Uniform (Mixed) Architectures
110(3)
6.2.5 The Relationship Between Elemental Protection and Distribution
113(3)
6.2.6 Cost versus Resilience Trades as Function of Distribution
116(2)
6.2.7 Diversifying Distributed Architectures
118(1)
6.2.8 Disaggregating a System Architecture
118(1)
6.3 Evaluating Resilience for Multiple Missions and Threats
119(4)
6.3.1 Systems Supporting Multiple Services or Missions
119(2)
6.3.2 Comparing Architectures Across Multiple Threats
121(1)
6.3.3 Sequential or Recurring Threats
122(1)
6.4 Including Threat Effectiveness
123(1)
6.5 Other Statistically Relevant Considerations of Resilience Calculations
124(1)
6.6 Resilience Design and Analysis Tools
125(2)
7 Applying Resilient Design Techniques
127(34)
7.1 Creating a Resilient Space Architecture
127(4)
7.1.1 Multilayered Architectures
128(3)
7.2 Increasing Resilience Through Distribution
131(5)
7.3 Increasing Resilience Through Diversification
136(3)
7.4 Increasing Resilience Through Responsive Recovery and Diversification
139(2)
7.5 Designing for Resilience to Multiple Threats
141(4)
7.6 Designing for Resilience and Cost in a Multi-Threat Environment
145(7)
7.6.1 Design #1 Resilience Calculation
147(2)
7.6.2 Design #2 Resilience Calculation
149(1)
7.6.3 Design #3 Resilience Calculation
149(3)
7.7 Multiple Threats and Multiple Mitigations Example
152(9)
8 The Future of Resilient Space System Design
161(14)
8.1 The Cost of Satellite Capability on Orbit
162(4)
8.1.1 Launch Costs
162(2)
8.1.2 Increasing the Capability Density and Affordability per Satellite
164(2)
8.1.3 Cost of Increased Ground Complexity
166(1)
8.2 Space and Ground Segment Flexibility
166(2)
8.3 The Impact of Increased Congestion
168(2)
8.4 Autonomy and Cognitive Systems
170(1)
8.5 Extension of the Terrestrial Network
171(1)
8.6 On-orbit Servicing
172(3)
References 175(2)
Index 177
Ron Burch is the Director of Advanced Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM) for the Boeing Companys Space & Launch division. He has over 35 years of satellite systems design and development experience at the Boeing Company and Hughes Aircraft Company. He is an acknowledged subject matter expert in the emerging discipline of space system resilience and has spoken internationally on the subject. His roles have included RF and digital subsystem and payload design, systems engineering, space technology development, and leadership positions including program management. He received a Bachelors degree in electrical engineering (BSEE) from California State University, Fresno, and a Masters degree (MSEE) from the California Institute of Technology (Caltech) with an emphasis in communications science. He has published multiple technical papers and is named on two U.S. patents.
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