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E-raamat: State Aid and the European Economic Constitution [Hart e-raamatud]

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Recent years have seen the rise of EU State aid law as a crucial component of the European economic constitution. To date, however, the literature has neglected the contribution of this area of EU law to the internal market. This book fills the gap in understanding the economic constitution by exploring the significance of State aid law in addressing questions that go to the core of the internal market project. It does so by examining the case law relating to three different activities that Member States engage in: market participation, market regulation, and funding for Services of General Economic Interest. Each of these areas offers insights into fundamental questions surrounding the economic constitution, such as the separation between the State and the market, the scope for Member States to engage in regulatory competition, and the tension between market and non-market concerns. (Series: Hart Studies in Competition Law - Vol. 2)
Acknowledgements vii
Table of Cases
xi
Table of Legislation
xix
1 Introduction
1(10)
PART I
2 The Constitutional Framework
11(20)
1 The Concept of a European Economic Constitution
11(6)
A Ordo-liberalism and the European Economic Constitution
13(2)
B The Continuing Relevance of the Concept of Economic Constitution
15(2)
2 The Economic Orientation of the Internal Market Case Law
17(6)
A The Role of Economic Liberalism
18(2)
B The Balance between Internal Market and Social Rights
20(3)
3 The Limits of Constitutional Adjudication
23(7)
A National Identity and the Social Market Economy in the Court
24(3)
B Varieties of Capitalism and Market Integration
27(3)
4 Conclusion
30(1)
3 The Distinctive Nature of State Aid Law
31(28)
1 Family Resemblances
32(11)
A State Aid and Antitrust
32(6)
B State Aid and Free Movement
38(2)
C Competition Between States
40(3)
2 Centralisation and its Rationale
43(7)
A Direct Effect, Centralised and Decentralised Enforcement
44(4)
B Administrative Rule-Making
48(2)
3 Discretion
50(4)
A Economic and Non-Economic Considerations
50(2)
B Discretion and the European Interest
52(2)
4 Conclusion
54(5)
PART II
4 The State as Market Participant
59(29)
1 State Attribution
59(4)
2 The Market Operator Principle and its Ramifications
63(23)
A Questioning the Market Operator Principle
66(1)
B From Neutrality to Substantive Equality
67(14)
C The Limits of the Market Paradigm
81(4)
D Legal Certainty
85(1)
3 Conclusion
86(2)
5 The State as Regulator
88(31)
1 The Market Participant-Regulator Boundary
88(7)
2 Selectivity
95(15)
A Competitors and Comparators
97(4)
B The Relevance of Objectives
101(4)
C Regulatory Justifications for Unequal Treatment
105(3)
D Towards a `Rule of Reason' in State Aid Law?
108(2)
3 The Use of Public Resources
110(5)
4 Conclusion
115(4)
PART III
6 State Aid and Self-Government
119(16)
1 The Geographic Dimension of Selectivity
120(8)
A The Relevant Economic Space
124(2)
B The Constitutional Dimension
126(2)
2 The Shifting Scope of Tax Competition
128(5)
3 Conclusion
133(2)
7 Funding Public Services
135(31)
1 Services of General Economic Interest
136(4)
2 Compensation for Public Service Obligations
140(12)
A The `State Aid' and `Compensation' Approaches
140(3)
B Altmark and Beyond
143(1)
C A Retreat from Altmark?
144(5)
D The Commission Packages
149(3)
3 Defining SGEIs
152(10)
A State Aid and the Constitutional Relevance of Solidarity
155(2)
B Evaluating Compensation
157(5)
4 Beyond the Market Participant-Regulator Dichotomy
162(2)
5 Conclusion
164(2)
8 Conclusion
166(5)
Bibliography 171(12)
Index 183
Francesco de Cecco is a Lecturer in Law at Newcastle University.