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E-raamat: Statistical Evidence: A Likelihood Paradigm [Taylor & Francis e-raamat]

(Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland, USA)
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Teised raamatud teemal:
For generations of students schooled in the statistical theories of Fisher and Neyman-Pearson, Royall (biostatistics, Johns Hopkins U.) delivers an alternative likelihood paradigm focusing on what he deems the neglected Law of Likelihood. After weighing their assets and weaknesses, he persuasively dares question what most were taught as gospels of the scientific method: What is wrong with one-sided tests? Why not use the most powerful test? Must the significance level be predetermined? Is the strength of the evidence limited by the researcher's expectations? Includes exercises in this "new" statistics. Annotation c. by Book News, Inc., Portland, Or.

Interpreting statistical data as evidence, Statistical Evidence: A Likelihood Paradigm focuses on the law of likelihood, fundamental to solving many of the problems associated with interpreting data in this way. Statistics has long neglected this principle, resulting in a seriously defective methodology. This book redresses the balance, explaining why science has clung to a defective methodology despite its well-known defects. After examining the strengths and weaknesses of the work of Neyman and Pearson and the Fisher paradigm, the author proposes an alternative paradigm which provides, in the law of likelihood, the explicit concept of evidence missing from the other paradigms. At the same time, this new paradigm retains the elements of objective measurement and control of the frequency of misleading results, features which made the old paradigms so important to science. The likelihood paradigm leads to statistical methods that have a compelling rationale and an elegant simplicity, no longer forcing the reader to choose between frequentist and Bayesian statistics.
Preface xi
1 The first principle
1(34)
1.1 Introduction
1(1)
1.2 The law of likelihood
1(2)
1.3 Three questions
3(2)
1.4 Towards verification
5(3)
1.5 Relativity of evidence
8(3)
1.6 Strength of evidence
11(2)
1.7 Counterexamples
13(3)
1.8 Testing simple hypotheses
16(1)
1.9 Composite hypotheses
17(3)
1.10 Another counterexample
20(2)
1.11 Irrelevance of the sample space
22(2)
1.12 The likelihood principle
24(4)
1.13 Evidence and uncertainty
28(3)
1.14 Summary
31(1)
Exercises
31(4)
2 Neyman-Pearson theory
35(26)
2.1 Introduction
35(1)
2.2 Neyman-Pearson statistical theory
35(6)
2.3 Evidential interpretation of the results of Neyman-Pearson decision procedures
41(9)
2.4 Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing in planning experiments: choosing the sample size
50(8)
2.5 Summary
58(1)
Exercises
58(3)
3 Fisherian theory
61(22)
3.1 Introduction
61(1)
3.2 A method for measuring statistical evidence: the test of significance
61(4)
3.3 The rationale for significance tests
65(3)
3.4 Troubles with p-values
68(3)
3.5 Rejection trials
71(5)
3.6 A sample of interpretations
76(1)
3.7 The illogic of rejection trials
77(1)
3.8 Confidence sets from rejection trials
78(1)
3.9 Alternative hypotheses in science
79(2)
3.10 Summary
81(1)
Exercises
81(2)
4 Paradigms for statistics
83(26)
4.1 Introduction
83(1)
4.2 Three paradigms
83(5)
4.3 An alternative paradigm
88(2)
4.4 Probabilities of weak and misleading evidence: normal distribution mean
90(4)
4.5 Understanding the likelihood paradigm
94(3)
4.6 Evidence about a probability: planning a clinical trial and interpreting the results
97(10)
4.7 Summary
107(1)
Exercise
108(1)
5 Resolving the paradoxes from the old paradigms
109(14)
5.1 Introduction
109(1)
5.2 Why is a power of only 0.80 OK?
109(2)
5.3 Peeking at data: repeated tests
111(2)
5.4 Testing more than one hypothesis
113(3)
5.5 What is wrong with one-sided tests?
116(1)
5.6 Why not use the most powerful test?
117(2)
5.7 Must the significance level be predetermined? And is the strength of evidence limited by the researcher's expectations?
119(2)
5.8 Summary
121(1)
Exercises
121(2)
6 Looking at likelihoods
123(28)
6.1 Introduction
123(1)
6.2 Evidence about hazard rates in two factories
124(2)
6.3 Evidence about an odds ratio
126(3)
6.4 A standardized mortality ratio
129(1)
6.5 Evidence about a finite population total
130(4)
6.6 Determinants of plans to attend college
134(3)
6.7 Evidence about probabilities in a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 table
137(4)
6.8 Evidence from a community intervention study of hypertension
141(2)
6.9 Effects of sugars on growth of pea sections: analysis of variance
143(6)
6.10 Summary
149(2)
7 Nuisance parameters
151(16)
7.1 Introduction
151(1)
7.2 Orthogonal parameters
152(2)
7.3 Marginal likelihoods
154(1)
7.4 Conditional likelihoods
155(3)
7.5 Estimated likelihoods
158(1)
7.6 Profile likelihoods
158(1)
7.7 Synthetic conditional likelihoods
159(2)
7.8 Summary
161(1)
Exercises
161(6)
8 Bayesian statistical inference
167(10)
8.1 Introduction
167(1)
8.2 Bayesian statistical models
167(2)
8.3 Subjectivity in Bayesian models
169(2)
8.4 The trouble with Bayesian statistics
171(1)
8.5 Are likelihood methods Bayesian?
172(1)
8.6 Objective Bayesian inference
173(1)
8.7 Bayesian integrated likelihoods
174(1)
8.8 Summary
175(1)
Exercises
176(1)
Appendix: The paradox of the ravens 177(4)
References 181(8)
Index 189


Richard Royall