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E-raamat: War in Spain: Appeasement, Collective Insecurity, and the Failure of European Democracies Against Fascism [Taylor & Francis e-raamat]

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"This work covers the international importance of the War in Spain through the two organizations that marked the multilateral action towards the conflict: The League of Nations and the Non-Intervention Committee. France and the United Kingdom diverted both deliberations as well as decision-making processes and mechanisms from Geneva. Non-intervention was appeasement's specific variable applied to Spain. Despite its name, it meant an intervention, depriving the Spanish government from its own defense while the fascist governments provided massive and regular support to the rebels. The League was damaged in its authority through the violation of its Covenant in Manchuria and Abyssinia. Once the War in Spain began, non-intervention was articulated with the main objective to confine the conflict to the Spanish borders. To this end, the designation of the conflict as a civil war (not a mere nominal nor anecdotal issue) in both London and Geneva was essential. By abandoning the Spanish democracy and foreclosing the collective security system, European democracies were also removing all that stood between their own societies and another world war. The failure of the collective security system that the League was supposed to safeguard, prompted by the impossibility of reconciling the British-led policy of appeasement with active anti-fascism, led to a climate of collective insecurity, during which arose a Second World War. This was precisely the main objective to avoid in the order established in 1919 after the major collective catastrophe on a worldwide scale - soon to be overcome as that"--

This work covers the international importance of the War in Spain through the two organizations that marked the multilateral action towards the conflict: The League of Nations and the Non-Intervention Committee. France and the United Kingdom diverted both deliberations as well as decision-making processes and mechanisms from Geneva.

Non-intervention was appeasement’s specific variable applied to Spain. Despite its name, it meant an intervention, depriving the Spanish government from its own defense while the fascist governments provided massive and regular support to the rebels.

The League was damaged in its authority through the violation of its Covenant in Manchuria and Abyssinia. Once the War in Spain began, non-intervention was articulated with the main objective to confine the conflict to the Spanish borders. To this end, the designation of the conflict as a civil war (not a mere nominal nor anecdotal issue) in both London and Geneva was essential. By abandoning the Spanish democracy and foreclosing the collective security system, European democracies were also removing all that stood between their own societies and another world war.

The failure of the collective security system that the League was supposed to safeguard, prompted by the impossibility of reconciling the British-led policy of appeasement with active anti-fascism, led to a climate of collective insecurity, during which arose a Second World War. This was precisely the main objective to avoid in the order established in 1919 after the major collective catastrophe on a worldwide scale – soon to be overcome as that.

The scholarship herein will prove essential for scholars of twentieth-century Spanish history and international relations.
Introduction And Acknowledgments ix
1 The League of Nations faces the progressive crisis of the interwar period
1(9)
Notes
8(2)
2 The deceiving calm of Lake Leman: Manchuria, Abyssinia, the Rhineland
10(17)
A dangerous precedent
10(4)
Impunity before the aggression and collapse of the system of collective security
14(3)
Mussolini attacks, London tolerates, and Hitler begins his trials of progressive conquest
17(6)
Notes
23(4)
3 The abandonment of the Spanish Republic by the European democracies
27(19)
From the intervention of the Fascist countries to the non-intervention of the democracies
27(5)
From French fears to British prejudices
32(7)
The weakness of the democracies and the abandonment of multilateralism
39(2)
Notes
41(5)
4 The consolidation of the War in Spain
46(51)
The violation of the rules of the international playing field
46(5)
Mexico: legal force and political coherence in the face of the interwar crisis
51(10)
The Rome--Berlin Axis takes shape
61(5)
From the consolidation and violation of non-intervention to Soviet aid
66(4)
The defense of Madrid
70(8)
What Eden and Delbos demanded: the Battle of Guadalajara and the evidence of Italian aggression
78(12)
Notes
90(7)
5 Negrin and the conception of an international war
97(57)
From Nazi--Fascist aggressiveness (Malaga, Guernica, Almeria) to the failure of non-intervention
97(6)
From the British inclination toward Italy in Nyon to the French feint toward Spain
103(10)
President Negrin takes the floor at the Palais des Nations
113(14)
Chile: a manifest enemy for the Spanish Republic in Geneva
127(9)
The impossibility of separating Mussolini from Hitler and Parisfrom London
136(4)
The arrival of Halifax and Bonnet: a double blow to finish off the Republic abroad
140(7)
Notes
147(7)
6 The resistance of Negrin, between Nazi expansionism and appeasing alternatives
154(15)
From the Battle of Ehro to a functional resistance
154(4)
Negrin's Thirteen Points
158(1)
Tensions and discredit in Geneva
159(8)
Notes
167(2)
7 Appeasement/non-intervention/appeasement on the road to a new world war
169(18)
The withdrawal of the International Brigades and the fall of Catalonia
169(2)
The Munich Agreement and the Soviet switch in the road toward a new world war
171(10)
The end of the league of Nations and of the Spanish Republic
181(3)
Notes
184(3)
Conclusions
187(8)
The collapse of collective security and the failure of the league of Nations
187(4)
The failure of the democracies to confront Fascism: between appeasing interests and the farce of non-intervention
191(4)
Subject Index 195
David Jorge (Lugo, Spain, 1987) is Professor at El Colegio de México. With a PhD in History from the Universidad Complutense de Madrid, he has taught at Wesleyan University, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Universidad del Mar-Huatulco, and El Colegio de México.