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E-raamat: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining [World Scientific e-raamat]

(The Pennsylvania State Univ, Usa)
  • Formaat: 230 pages
  • Ilmumisaeg: 06-May-2013
  • Kirjastus: World Scientific Publishing Co Pte Ltd
  • ISBN-13: 9789814447577
Teised raamatud teemal:
  • World Scientific e-raamat
  • Hind: 95,17 €*
  • * hind, mis tagab piiramatu üheaegsete kasutajate arvuga ligipääsu piiramatuks ajaks
  • Formaat: 230 pages
  • Ilmumisaeg: 06-May-2013
  • Kirjastus: World Scientific Publishing Co Pte Ltd
  • ISBN-13: 9789814447577
Teised raamatud teemal:
When Chatterjee (Pennsylvania State U.) was asked by colleagues what he had been working on, he prepared a conference presentation summarizing his recent paper, primarily in bargaining. With some revision, that presentation has become the introduction to this collection of the papers it discusses. Among the topics are bargaining and search with incomplete information about outside options, Rubenstein auctions: on competing for bargaining partners, a non-cooperative theory of coalitional bargaining, pre-election coalitions and post-election bargaining, incentive compatibility in bargaining under uncertainty. The reproduced papers retain the page numbers from their original publication. They are not indexed. Annotation ©2013 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)

Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market — Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining consists of selected research in bargaining carried out by Kalyan Chatterjee by himself and with various co-authors. Chatterjee has been one of the earliest researchers to work on noncooperative bargaining theory and has contributed to bilateral bargaining with parties having private information as well as multilateral coalition formation models. Some of his work in each of these areas finds place here.The main theme of this collection of papers is the nature of negotiations when participants have alternatives to continue negotiating, either by beginning negotiations with a different partner or set of partners or by engaging in time-consuming search for such partners. Chapters in this book include: a noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining and features a laboratory experiment relevant to this theory as well as an extension to political negotiations, search for alternative partners, the effect of markets and bargaining on incentives of players to invest in the partnership and related papers on incentive compatibility, arbitration and a dynamic model of negotiation. The book also includes a new introduction that puts these papers in the context of the broader literature in the field.
Preface vii
Acknowledgments ix
1 Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining: An Introduction
1(14)
2 Bargaining and Search with Incomplete Information about Outside Options
15(36)
3 Rubinstein Auctions: On Competition for Bargaining Partners
51(28)
4 Bargaining, Competition and Efficient Investment
79(18)
5 A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
97(16)
6 How Communication Links Influence Coalition Bargaining: A Laboratory Investigation
113(16)
7 Pre-electoral Coalitions and Post-election Bargaining
129(54)
8 Comparison of Arbitration Procedures: Models with Complete and Incomplete Information
183(10)
9 Incentive Compatibility in Bargaining Under Uncertainty
193(10)
10 Bargaining under Two-Sided Incomplete Information: The Unrestricted Offers Case
203