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E-raamat: Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Mediation Models and Dynamic Approaches [Taylor & Francis e-raamat]

(Victoria University, Australia), (Victoria University, Australia)
  • Formaat: 176 pages, 16 Tables, black and white; 5 Line drawings, black and white; 5 Illustrations, black and white
  • Sari: Routledge Studies in Corporate Governance
  • Ilmumisaeg: 25-Jan-2022
  • Kirjastus: Routledge
  • ISBN-13: 9781003255741
  • Taylor & Francis e-raamat
  • Hind: 161,57 €*
  • * hind, mis tagab piiramatu üheaegsete kasutajate arvuga ligipääsu piiramatuks ajaks
  • Tavahind: 230,81 €
  • Säästad 30%
  • Formaat: 176 pages, 16 Tables, black and white; 5 Line drawings, black and white; 5 Illustrations, black and white
  • Sari: Routledge Studies in Corporate Governance
  • Ilmumisaeg: 25-Jan-2022
  • Kirjastus: Routledge
  • ISBN-13: 9781003255741
"The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance has been studied extensively in corporate finance and corporate governance literature. Nevertheless, the mediation (path) analysis to examine the issue can be adopted as a new approach toexplain why and how ownership structure is related to firm performance and vice versa. This approach calls for full recognition of the roles of agency costs and corporate risk-taking as essential mediating variables in the bi-directional and mediated relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Based on agency theory, corporate risk management theory, and accounting for the dynamic endogeneity in the ownership-performance relationship, this book develops two-mediator mediation models, including recursive and non-recursive mediation models, to investigate the ownership structure-firm performance relationship. It is demonstrated that agency costs and corporate risk-taking are the 'missing links' in the ownership structure-firm performancerelationship. Hence, this book brings into attention the mediation and dynamic approach to this issue and enhances the knowledge of the mechanisms for improving firm's financial performance. This book will be of interest to corporate finance, management,and economics researchers and policy makers. Post-graduate research students in corporate governance and corporate finance will also find this book beneficial to the application of econometrics into multi-dimensional and complex issues"--

Based on the agency theory, corporate risk management theory and accounting for the dynamic endogeneity in the ownership–performance relationship, this book develops two-mediator mediation models, including recursive and non-recursive mediation models, to investigate the ownership structure–firm performance relationship.

List of Figures
xi
List of Tables
xii
List of Appendices
xiii
Book Summary 1(3)
1 Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: An Introduction
4(20)
1.1 Background of the Research
4(3)
1.2 Research Problems and Motivation for Further Study
7(2)
1.3 The Vietnamese Context
9(6)
1.3.1 Privatisation of the State-Owned Enterprises
9(2)
1.3.2 Patterns of Ownership Structure of Listed Firms
11(2)
1.3.3 Potential Agency and Corporate Risk-Taking Problems in Relation to Firm Performance
13(2)
1.4 Objectives of the Study and Research Questions
15(2)
1.5 Research Design, Methodology and Data
17(1)
1.6 Contributions of the Study
18(1)
1.7 Structure of the Book
19(5)
Notes
20(1)
References
21(3)
2 The Ownership Structure and Firm Performance Relationship: A Literature Review
24(20)
2.1 Mediation Mechanisms and the Methods of Testing Two-Mediator Mediation Models
24(4)
2.1.1 Single-Mediator Mediation Model
24(1)
2.1.2 Two-Mediator Mediation Model
25(3)
2.2 Ownership Structure, Agency Costs and Firm Performance
28(2)
2.3 Ownership Structure, Corporate Risk-Taking and Firm Performance
30(2)
2.4 Interrelationship between Ownership Structure and Firm Performance
32(2)
2.5 Total Effect of Ownership Structure on Firm Performance
34(5)
2.5.1 Government Ownership and Firm Performance
34(2)
2.5.2 Insider Ownership and Firm Performance
36(2)
2.5.3 Foreign Ownership and Firm Performance
38(1)
2.6 Literature on Vietnam
39(1)
2.7 Summary and Conclusions
40(4)
References
40(4)
3 Equity Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Theoretical Framework and Empirical Models
44(30)
3.1 Theoretical Framework
44(11)
3.1.1 Theoretical Foundation
44(1)
3.1.1.1 Agency Theory
44(4)
3.1.1.2 Corporate Risk Management Theory
48(1)
3.1.1.3 Endogeneity Problem in Corporate Governance-Firm Performance Relationship
48(2)
3.1.2 Development of Theoretical Framework for This Study
50(1)
3.1.2.1 Research Approach
50(1)
3.1.2.2 Conceptual Framework
51(2)
3.1.2.3 Theoretical Models of This Study
53(2)
3.2 Empirical Models
55(13)
3.2.1 Variable Measurement
55(1)
3.2.1.1 Predictor Variables
55(1)
3.2.1.2 Mediating Variables
56(2)
3.2.1.3 Outcome Variables
58(1)
3.2.1.4 Control Variables
59(1)
3.2.2 Recursive Model
60(6)
3.2.3 Non-Recursive Model
66(2)
3.3 Summary and Conclusions
68(6)
Notes
69(1)
References
69(5)
4 Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Data and Estimation Methods
74(19)
4.1 Panel Data Selection
74(1)
4.2 Sample
74(3)
4.2.1 Data Sources
74(1)
4.2.2 Sample Collection and Data Cleansing Procedures
75(2)
4.3 Description of Data
77(4)
4.3.1 Summary Statistics
77(2)
4.3.2 Pairwise Correlations
79(2)
4.4 Estimation Methods
81(9)
4.4.1 Causal-Steps Approach
82(1)
4.4.1.1 Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) Estimation for Dynamic Panel Data
82(2)
4.4.1.2 Fixed-Effects (EE) Regression with Driscoll-Kraay Standard Errors
84(2)
4.4.2 Product-of-Coefficients Approach
86(1)
4.4.2.1 Full-Information Maximum Likelihood (ML) Estimation
86(3)
4.4.2.2 The Sobel Test
89(1)
4.5 Summary and Conclusions
90(3)
Notes
90(1)
References
90(3)
5 The Recursive Model and The Non-Recursive Model: Empirical Estimations and Analysis
93(42)
5.1 Results for Recursive Model
93(22)
5.1.1 Total Effect of Ownership Structure on Firm Performance
93(1)
5.1.1.1 Treatment of Variables in GMM Estimation
93(1)
5.1.1.2 Empirical Results
94(2)
5.1.2 Direct Effect of Ownership Structure on Agency Costs
96(1)
5.1.2.1 Diagnostic Tests
96(1)
5.1.2.2 Empirical Results
97(2)
5.1.3 Direct Effect of Ownership Structure on Corporate Risk-Taking
99(1)
5.1.3.1 Diagnostic Tests
99(1)
5.1.3.2 Empirical Results
100(1)
5.1.4 Direct Effects of Ownership Structure, Agency Costs and Corporate Risk-Taking on Firm Performance
101(1)
5.1.4.1 Treatment of Variables in GMM Estimation
102(1)
5.1.4.2 Empirical Results
102(3)
5.1.5 Robustness Tests of Recursive Model
105(1)
5.1.5.1 Replacing and Removing Insignificant Control Variables in Equations 3.9 and 3.12
105(1)
5.1.5.2 Using an Alternative Measure of Agency Costs in Equation 3.10
106(1)
5.1.5.3 Replacing and Removing Financial Leverage in Equation 3.11
107(1)
5.1.6 What if Agency Costs and Corporate Risk-Taking are Endogenous Covariates?
108(1)
5.1.6.1 ML Estimation as Solution
108(3)
5.1.6.2 Recursive Model with Correlated Disturbances
111(4)
5.2 Results for Non-Recursive Model
115(16)
5.2.1 Diagnostic Issues
116(1)
5.2.2 Empirical Results
117(1)
5.2.2.1 Direct Effect of Ownership Structure on Agency Costs and Corporate Risk-Taking (Equations 3.13 and 3.14)
117(3)
5.2.2.2 Direct Effect of Ownership Structure, Agency Costs and Corporate Risk-Taking on Firm Performance (Equations 3.15--3.16)
120(1)
5.2.2.3 Feedback Effects of Firm Performance on Ownership Structure (Equations 3.17--3.19)
120(1)
5.2.3 Robustness Tests of Non-Recursive Model
121(1)
5.2.3.1 Dropping One Measure of Firm Performance
122(3)
5.2.3.2 Using an Alternative Measure of Agency Costs
125(1)
5.2.3.3 Using an Alternative Measure of Firm Performance
125(1)
5.2.3.4 Using an Alternative Measure of Financial Leverage
126(1)
5.2.4 Decomposition of Effects of Ownership Structure on Firm Performance
126(1)
5.2.4.1 Results for the Sobel Test
127(3)
5.2.4.2 Bootstrapped Standard Errors of the Total Effects of Ownership Structure
130(1)
5.3 Summary and Conclusions
131(4)
Notes
133(1)
References
133(2)
6 Discussion of Implications: Ownership Structure, Agency Cost, Corporate Risk-Taking and Firm Performance
135(18)
6.1 Agency Costs in the Relationship between Ownership Structure and Firm Performance
135(5)
6.2 Corporate Risk-Taking in the Relationship between Ownership Structure and Firm Performance
140(2)
6.3 Non-Contemporaneous Feedback Effect of Firm Performance on Ownership Structure
142(3)
6.4 Total Effect of Ownership Structure on Firm Performance
145(4)
6.4.1 Government Ownership-Firm Performance
145(1)
6.4.2 Insider Ownership-Firm Performance
146(2)
6.4.3 Foreign Ownership and Firm Performance
148(1)
6.5 Summary and Conclusions
149(4)
References
149(4)
7 Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Summary and Conclusions
153(13)
7.1 Summary of Research Problems and Research Questions
153(1)
7.2 Summary of Findings Concerning Research Questions
154(3)
7.3 Key Contributions of the Study
157(4)
7.3.1 Theoretical and Methodological Contributions
157(2)
7.3.2 Practical and Policy Contributions
159(2)
7.4 Limitations and Recommendations for Further Research
161(2)
7.5 Conclusions
163(3)
Notes
163(1)
References
163(3)
Appendices 166(7)
Index 173
Dr. Hoang N. Pham is a research associate at Decision Sciences and Modelling Program at Victoria University, Australia.

Prof. Sardar M. N. Islam is a professor at the Institute of Sustainable Industries and Liveable Cities at Victoria University, Australia.