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xi | |
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xii | |
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xiii | |
Book Summary |
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1 | (3) |
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1 Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: An Introduction |
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4 | (20) |
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1.1 Background of the Research |
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4 | (3) |
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1.2 Research Problems and Motivation for Further Study |
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7 | (2) |
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1.3 The Vietnamese Context |
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9 | (6) |
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1.3.1 Privatisation of the State-Owned Enterprises |
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9 | (2) |
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1.3.2 Patterns of Ownership Structure of Listed Firms |
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11 | (2) |
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1.3.3 Potential Agency and Corporate Risk-Taking Problems in Relation to Firm Performance |
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13 | (2) |
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1.4 Objectives of the Study and Research Questions |
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15 | (2) |
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1.5 Research Design, Methodology and Data |
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17 | (1) |
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1.6 Contributions of the Study |
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18 | (1) |
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1.7 Structure of the Book |
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19 | (5) |
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20 | (1) |
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21 | (3) |
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2 The Ownership Structure and Firm Performance Relationship: A Literature Review |
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24 | (20) |
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2.1 Mediation Mechanisms and the Methods of Testing Two-Mediator Mediation Models |
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24 | (4) |
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2.1.1 Single-Mediator Mediation Model |
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24 | (1) |
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2.1.2 Two-Mediator Mediation Model |
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25 | (3) |
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2.2 Ownership Structure, Agency Costs and Firm Performance |
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28 | (2) |
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2.3 Ownership Structure, Corporate Risk-Taking and Firm Performance |
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30 | (2) |
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2.4 Interrelationship between Ownership Structure and Firm Performance |
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32 | (2) |
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2.5 Total Effect of Ownership Structure on Firm Performance |
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34 | (5) |
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2.5.1 Government Ownership and Firm Performance |
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34 | (2) |
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2.5.2 Insider Ownership and Firm Performance |
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36 | (2) |
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2.5.3 Foreign Ownership and Firm Performance |
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38 | (1) |
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2.6 Literature on Vietnam |
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39 | (1) |
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2.7 Summary and Conclusions |
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40 | (4) |
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40 | (4) |
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3 Equity Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Theoretical Framework and Empirical Models |
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44 | (30) |
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3.1 Theoretical Framework |
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44 | (11) |
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3.1.1 Theoretical Foundation |
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44 | (1) |
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44 | (4) |
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3.1.1.2 Corporate Risk Management Theory |
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48 | (1) |
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3.1.1.3 Endogeneity Problem in Corporate Governance-Firm Performance Relationship |
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48 | (2) |
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3.1.2 Development of Theoretical Framework for This Study |
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50 | (1) |
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3.1.2.1 Research Approach |
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50 | (1) |
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3.1.2.2 Conceptual Framework |
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51 | (2) |
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3.1.2.3 Theoretical Models of This Study |
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53 | (2) |
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55 | (13) |
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3.2.1 Variable Measurement |
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55 | (1) |
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3.2.1.1 Predictor Variables |
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55 | (1) |
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3.2.1.2 Mediating Variables |
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56 | (2) |
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3.2.1.3 Outcome Variables |
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58 | (1) |
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3.2.1.4 Control Variables |
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59 | (1) |
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60 | (6) |
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3.2.3 Non-Recursive Model |
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66 | (2) |
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3.3 Summary and Conclusions |
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68 | (6) |
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69 | (1) |
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69 | (5) |
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4 Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Data and Estimation Methods |
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74 | (19) |
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74 | (1) |
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74 | (3) |
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74 | (1) |
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4.2.2 Sample Collection and Data Cleansing Procedures |
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75 | (2) |
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77 | (4) |
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77 | (2) |
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4.3.2 Pairwise Correlations |
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79 | (2) |
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81 | (9) |
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4.4.1 Causal-Steps Approach |
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82 | (1) |
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4.4.1.1 Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) Estimation for Dynamic Panel Data |
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82 | (2) |
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4.4.1.2 Fixed-Effects (EE) Regression with Driscoll-Kraay Standard Errors |
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84 | (2) |
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4.4.2 Product-of-Coefficients Approach |
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86 | (1) |
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4.4.2.1 Full-Information Maximum Likelihood (ML) Estimation |
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86 | (3) |
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89 | (1) |
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4.5 Summary and Conclusions |
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90 | (3) |
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90 | (1) |
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90 | (3) |
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5 The Recursive Model and The Non-Recursive Model: Empirical Estimations and Analysis |
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93 | (42) |
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5.1 Results for Recursive Model |
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93 | (22) |
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5.1.1 Total Effect of Ownership Structure on Firm Performance |
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93 | (1) |
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5.1.1.1 Treatment of Variables in GMM Estimation |
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93 | (1) |
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5.1.1.2 Empirical Results |
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94 | (2) |
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5.1.2 Direct Effect of Ownership Structure on Agency Costs |
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96 | (1) |
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96 | (1) |
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5.1.2.2 Empirical Results |
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97 | (2) |
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5.1.3 Direct Effect of Ownership Structure on Corporate Risk-Taking |
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99 | (1) |
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99 | (1) |
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5.1.3.2 Empirical Results |
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100 | (1) |
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5.1.4 Direct Effects of Ownership Structure, Agency Costs and Corporate Risk-Taking on Firm Performance |
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101 | (1) |
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5.1.4.1 Treatment of Variables in GMM Estimation |
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102 | (1) |
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5.1.4.2 Empirical Results |
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102 | (3) |
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5.1.5 Robustness Tests of Recursive Model |
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105 | (1) |
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5.1.5.1 Replacing and Removing Insignificant Control Variables in Equations 3.9 and 3.12 |
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105 | (1) |
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5.1.5.2 Using an Alternative Measure of Agency Costs in Equation 3.10 |
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106 | (1) |
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5.1.5.3 Replacing and Removing Financial Leverage in Equation 3.11 |
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107 | (1) |
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5.1.6 What if Agency Costs and Corporate Risk-Taking are Endogenous Covariates? |
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108 | (1) |
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5.1.6.1 ML Estimation as Solution |
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108 | (3) |
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5.1.6.2 Recursive Model with Correlated Disturbances |
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111 | (4) |
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5.2 Results for Non-Recursive Model |
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115 | (16) |
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116 | (1) |
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117 | (1) |
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5.2.2.1 Direct Effect of Ownership Structure on Agency Costs and Corporate Risk-Taking (Equations 3.13 and 3.14) |
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117 | (3) |
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5.2.2.2 Direct Effect of Ownership Structure, Agency Costs and Corporate Risk-Taking on Firm Performance (Equations 3.15--3.16) |
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120 | (1) |
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5.2.2.3 Feedback Effects of Firm Performance on Ownership Structure (Equations 3.17--3.19) |
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120 | (1) |
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5.2.3 Robustness Tests of Non-Recursive Model |
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121 | (1) |
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5.2.3.1 Dropping One Measure of Firm Performance |
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122 | (3) |
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5.2.3.2 Using an Alternative Measure of Agency Costs |
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125 | (1) |
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5.2.3.3 Using an Alternative Measure of Firm Performance |
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125 | (1) |
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5.2.3.4 Using an Alternative Measure of Financial Leverage |
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126 | (1) |
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5.2.4 Decomposition of Effects of Ownership Structure on Firm Performance |
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126 | (1) |
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5.2.4.1 Results for the Sobel Test |
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127 | (3) |
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5.2.4.2 Bootstrapped Standard Errors of the Total Effects of Ownership Structure |
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130 | (1) |
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5.3 Summary and Conclusions |
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131 | (4) |
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133 | (1) |
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133 | (2) |
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6 Discussion of Implications: Ownership Structure, Agency Cost, Corporate Risk-Taking and Firm Performance |
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135 | (18) |
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6.1 Agency Costs in the Relationship between Ownership Structure and Firm Performance |
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135 | (5) |
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6.2 Corporate Risk-Taking in the Relationship between Ownership Structure and Firm Performance |
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140 | (2) |
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6.3 Non-Contemporaneous Feedback Effect of Firm Performance on Ownership Structure |
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142 | (3) |
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6.4 Total Effect of Ownership Structure on Firm Performance |
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145 | (4) |
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6.4.1 Government Ownership-Firm Performance |
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145 | (1) |
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6.4.2 Insider Ownership-Firm Performance |
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146 | (2) |
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6.4.3 Foreign Ownership and Firm Performance |
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148 | (1) |
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6.5 Summary and Conclusions |
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149 | (4) |
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149 | (4) |
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7 Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Summary and Conclusions |
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153 | (13) |
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7.1 Summary of Research Problems and Research Questions |
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153 | (1) |
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7.2 Summary of Findings Concerning Research Questions |
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154 | (3) |
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7.3 Key Contributions of the Study |
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157 | (4) |
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7.3.1 Theoretical and Methodological Contributions |
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157 | (2) |
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7.3.2 Practical and Policy Contributions |
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159 | (2) |
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7.4 Limitations and Recommendations for Further Research |
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161 | (2) |
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163 | (3) |
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163 | (1) |
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163 | (3) |
Appendices |
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166 | (7) |
Index |
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173 | |