| Acknowledgements |
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| Abbreviations |
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xiii | |
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xxi | |
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1 | (7) |
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1.1 The Previous Focus On Initial Innovation |
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1 | (3) |
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1.2 The Need to Account for Follow-On Innovation |
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4 | (1) |
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1.3 The Regulatory Problem and the Policy Levers |
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5 | (1) |
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1.4 Methodology and Structure |
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6 | (2) |
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2 The Relationship between IP and Antitrust Laws |
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8 | (60) |
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2.1 A First Look: Two Types of IP |
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9 | (5) |
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2.1.1 A Common Dynamic Benefit: Incentives to Create Markets |
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10 | (2) |
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2.1.2 Similar Static Costs: Preventing Competition by Imitation |
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12 | (1) |
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2.1.3 A Different Dynamic Cost: Blocking Follow-On Innovation and Improvements |
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13 | (1) |
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2.2 A Closer Look: The Anti-Competitive Potential of IP Rights |
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14 | (10) |
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2.2.1 IP Laws and the Basic Rights of IP Holders |
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14 | (5) |
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2.2.2 The Anti-Competitive Potential of Conduct Involving IP |
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19 | (5) |
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2.3 Approaches to the Relationship between IP and Antitrust |
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24 | (22) |
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2.3.1 Approach I: Absolute IP Domination |
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25 | (1) |
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2.3.2 Approach II: Inherency and the Specific Subject Matter as Legal(istic) Filters |
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26 | (6) |
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2.3.3 Approach III: Balancing Different Means to Enhance Consumer Welfare |
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32 | (14) |
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2.4 A Positive Economic Analysis of the IP/Antitrust Interface |
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46 | (14) |
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2.4.1 Preventing Competition by Imitation (Reward Mechanism) |
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47 | (11) |
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2.4.2 Other Functions of IP and their Relation to Antitrust |
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58 | (2) |
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2.5 IP or Antitrust? Some Meta Rules |
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60 | (5) |
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2.5.1 Approach I: `Pure' IP Solution |
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60 | (1) |
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2.5.2 Approach II: Antitrust as a Discretionary `Fine-Tuning' Device |
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61 | (2) |
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2.5.3 Approach III: Comparative Cost-Benefit Analysis According to the Competition Problem |
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63 | (2) |
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2.6 Which Antitrust Rules? Some Principles |
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65 | (2) |
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67 | (1) |
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3 The Concepts of Monopolisation and Abuse: What is the Correct Test? |
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68 | (28) |
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3.1 The Tests Used under § 2 Sherman Act and Article 102 TFEU |
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70 | (2) |
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3.2 Obstacles to Cross-Fertilisation? |
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72 | (7) |
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3.2.1 Exploitative Abuses |
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73 | (1) |
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3.2.2 The Elements of § 2 Sherman Act and Article 102 TFEU |
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74 | (1) |
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75 | (1) |
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3.2.4 What is to be Protected? Market Structure vs Consumers |
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76 | (3) |
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79 | (1) |
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3.3 Analysis of Potential Standards |
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79 | (16) |
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3.3.1 The Relationship between the Standard and Conduct-Specific Rules |
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80 | (1) |
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3.3.2 The Cost-Error Approach as Heuristic |
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81 | (4) |
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3.3.3 The Conduct Element---Suggested Standards |
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85 | (10) |
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95 | (1) |
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4 Refusals to Deal which May Impede Follow-On Innovation |
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96 | (40) |
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4.1 The Traditional Typology of Refusals to Deal |
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98 | (11) |
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4.1.1 Vertical Complementary and Horizontal Refusals to Deal |
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98 | (4) |
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4.1.2 Concerted Refusals to Deal |
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102 | (1) |
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4.1.3 `Naked' vs `Constructive' and Conditional vs Unconditional Refusals |
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102 | (1) |
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4.1.4 Discriminatory Conditions of Supply |
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103 | (2) |
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4.1.5 Termination of Supply |
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105 | (1) |
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4.1.6 Refusal to Deal as an Instrument or as a Corollary of Other Anti-Competitive Conduct |
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106 | (3) |
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4.2 Cumulative Innovation and Bargaining Rules |
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109 | (6) |
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4.2.1 Repercussions of Mandatory Rules on the Incentive to Innovate |
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111 | (1) |
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4.2.2 Cases for IP Reform: Patent Thickets, Holdup, and Royalty Stacking |
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112 | (2) |
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4.2.3 Self-Correction of Innovation Regimes? |
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114 | (1) |
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4.3 A Typology of Refusals to Deal involving IP |
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115 | (1) |
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4.4 Scenario 1: Impeding Research into Follow-On Innovation |
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116 | (3) |
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116 | (1) |
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4.4.2 Antitrust in Innovation Markets? |
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117 | (2) |
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4.5 Scenario 2: Impeding the Marketing of Follow-On Innovation |
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119 | (6) |
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4.5.1 The Potential Case for Antitrust: Foreclosure of Competition by Improved Products |
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120 | (1) |
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4.5.2 Some Conditions of an Antitrust Rule |
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121 | (1) |
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4.5.3 Comparison to Alternative IP Solutions |
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122 | (2) |
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4.5.4 Which Antitrust Solution: Leveraging Test or Essential Facilities Rule? |
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124 | (1) |
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4.6 Scenario 3: Refusal to Give Interoperability Information |
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125 | (7) |
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4.6.1 Gatekeepers on Markets with Network Effects |
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127 | (4) |
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4.6.2 Protection through Trade Secrecy |
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131 | (1) |
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4.7 Scenario 4: Refusal to License IP which Protects a Standard |
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132 | (1) |
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4.8 Scenario 5: Refusal to Supply Products on the Basis of IP |
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133 | (2) |
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135 | (1) |
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5 The Licensing Fee: Determining Liability and the Remedy |
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136 | (13) |
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138 | (7) |
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138 | (1) |
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139 | (1) |
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5.1.3 Same Firm Price Comparison, Market-Based Pricing, and Profit Comparison |
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140 | (1) |
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5.1.4 Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) |
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141 | (1) |
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5.1.5 Hypothetical Bargaining and Maximum Willingness to Pay |
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142 | (1) |
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5.1.6 At-Least Reasonably Efficient Licensee's Maximum Ability to Pay |
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143 | (2) |
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5.2 The Relationship between Liability and the Remedy Price |
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145 | (1) |
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5.3 Non-Discriminatory Pricing? |
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146 | (1) |
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5.4 The Procedure: Bargaining, Determining the Price, Monitoring, and Enforcement |
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147 | (1) |
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147 | (2) |
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6 An Essential Facilities Test |
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149 | (16) |
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6.1 Condition 1: Harm to Competition |
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150 | (10) |
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150 | (7) |
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6.1.2 No Circumvention or Substitution within a Reasonable Period of Time |
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157 | (1) |
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6.1.3 Elimination or Prevention of Effective Competition on the Adjacent Market |
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158 | (2) |
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6.2 Condition 2: No Ex Ante Investment Defence |
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160 | (3) |
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6.2.1 The Difficulties of Balancing in Innovation Cases |
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160 | (2) |
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162 | (1) |
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6.3 Condition 3: No Ex Post Efficiency Defence |
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163 | (1) |
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163 | (2) |
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7 Cumulative Innovation under US IP and Antitrust Laws |
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165 | (40) |
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7.1 The Initial Innovator's and the Improver's Positions under US IP Laws |
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165 | (11) |
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166 | (6) |
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172 | (3) |
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7.1.3 US Trade Secret Law |
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175 | (1) |
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7.2 The General `No Duty to Deal' Rule under US Antitrust Law |
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176 | (5) |
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7.2.1 No General Duties to Use and License IP Even Pre-Trinko |
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176 | (4) |
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7.2.2 The Effects of Trinko |
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180 | (1) |
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7.3 Potential Exceptions to the No Duty to Deal Rule |
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181 | (15) |
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7.3.1 Essential Facilities Doctrine |
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182 | (5) |
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7.3.2 Unjustified Change in the Pattern of Dealing |
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187 | (2) |
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7.3.3 Monopoly Leveraging Doctrine |
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189 | (4) |
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193 | (1) |
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7.3.5 Discriminatory Refusals to Deal |
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194 | (1) |
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7.3.6 Concerted Refusals to Deal |
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195 | (1) |
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196 | (5) |
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7.4.1 Example 1: Kodak II |
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196 | (1) |
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7.4.2 Example 2: Microsoft |
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197 | (2) |
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199 | (2) |
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201 | (2) |
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203 | (2) |
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8 Cumulative Innovation under European IP Laws and EU Competition Law |
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205 | (44) |
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8.1 The Original Innovator's and the Improver's Positions under National IP Laws in the EU |
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206 | (11) |
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206 | (6) |
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8.1.2 German Copyright and Unfair Competition Law |
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212 | (5) |
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8.1.3 German Trade Secret Protection and Conclusion |
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217 | (1) |
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8.2 Limits to Refusals to Supply Based on IP under Article 102 TFEU |
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217 | (25) |
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8.2.1 Essential Facilities Test |
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219 | (16) |
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235 | (3) |
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8.2.3 Refusal to Deal as a Complementary Strategy |
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238 | (2) |
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8.2.4 Discriminatory Refusal to Deal Based on IP |
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240 | (2) |
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242 | (5) |
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8.3.1 Substantive Criteria |
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244 | (3) |
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247 | (1) |
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8.4 Future Tendencies and Conclusion |
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247 | (2) |
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9 Comparison and International Dimension |
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249 | (11) |
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9.1 Differences between the US and EU Approaches |
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249 | (2) |
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9.2 Potential Explanations for the Differences |
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251 | (3) |
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9.2.1 Constitutional Frameworks |
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251 | (1) |
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252 | (1) |
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253 | (1) |
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9.3 The International Antitrust Law of IP |
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254 | (6) |
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9.3.1 The Current TRIPS Approach |
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255 | (3) |
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9.3.2 Is Stronger Harmonisation of the Antitrust Law of IP Needed? |
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258 | (2) |
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260 | (4) |
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10.1 IP and Antitrust as the Framework for Cumulative Innovation |
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260 | (1) |
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10.2 The Relationship between IP and Antitrust Laws |
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260 | (1) |
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10.3 Monopolisation and Abuse: What is the Correct Test? |
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261 | (1) |
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10.4 Refusals to Deal which May Impede Follow-On Innovation |
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261 | (1) |
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10.5 The Licensing Fee: Determining Liability and the Remedy |
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261 | (1) |
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10.6 An Essential Facilities Test |
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262 | (1) |
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10.7 Cumulative Innovation under US IP and Antitrust Laws |
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262 | (1) |
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10.8 Cumulative Innovation under European IP Laws and EU Competition Law |
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262 | (1) |
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10.9 Comparison and International Dimension |
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263 | (1) |
| Bibliography |
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264 | (29) |
| Index |
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293 | |