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Intellectual Property, Antitrust and Cumulative Innovation in the EU and the US [Kõva köide]

  • Formaat: Hardback, 330 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 244x171x22 mm, kaal: 767 g
  • Sari: Hart Studies in Competition Law
  • Ilmumisaeg: 08-Jun-2012
  • Kirjastus: Hart Publishing
  • ISBN-10: 1849463069
  • ISBN-13: 9781849463065
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Intellectual Property, Antitrust and Cumulative Innovation in the EU and the USSuurem pilt
  • Formaat: Hardback, 330 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 244x171x22 mm, kaal: 767 g
  • Sari: Hart Studies in Competition Law
  • Ilmumisaeg: 08-Jun-2012
  • Kirjastus: Hart Publishing
  • ISBN-10: 1849463069
  • ISBN-13: 9781849463065
Teised raamatud teemal:
Püsilink: https://www.kriso.ee/db/9781849463065.html
Märksõnad:
For decades, the debate about the tension between intellectual property (IP) and antitrust law has revolved around the question to what extent antitrust should accept that IP laws may bar competition in order to stimulate innovation. The rise of IP rights in recent years has highlighted the problem that IP may also impede innovation, if research for new technologies or the marketing of new products requires access to protected prior innovation. How this 'cumulative innovation' is actually accounted for under IP and antitrust laws in the EU and the US, and how it could alternatively be dealt with, are the central questions addressed in this unique study. Taking an integrated view of both IP and antitrust rules - in particular, on refusals to deal based on IP - the book assesses policy levers under European and US patent, copyright, and trade secrecy laws, such as the bar for and scope of protection, as well as research exemptions, compulsory licensing regimes, and misuse doctrines. It analyzes what the allocation of tasks is and should be between these IP levers and antitrust rules - in particular, the law on abuse of dominance (Article 102 TFEU) and monopolization (Section 2, Sherman Act). Particular attention is paid to the essential facilities doctrine, including pricing methodologies for access to IP. Many recent decisions and judgments are put into a coherent analytical framework, such as IMS Health, AstraZeneca, GlaxoSmithKline (in the EU), Apple (France), Orange Book Standard (Germany), Trinko, Rambus, NYMEX, eBay (US), Microsoft, and IBM/T3 (both EU and US). Further topics are covered, including IP protection for software, interoperability information, and databases; industry-specific tailoring of IP; antitrust innovation market analysis; and the WTO law on the IP/antitrust interface. (Series: Hart Studies in Competition Law - Vol. 1)

Arvustused

This book is the first comprehensive account of the legal and policy, antitrust and IP, framework in regard to cumulative innovation and, as such, it is a valuable contribution for lawyers, both practising lawyers as well as academics. Last but not least, the comparative element of the research in relation to cumulative innovation contributes to the existing quest for awareness of informed divergence between the two major jurisdictions, the EU and the US. -- Vasiliki Brisimi * Common Market Law Review *

Acknowledgements v
Abbreviations xi
Table of Cases
xiii
Table of Legislation
xxi
1 Introduction
1(7)
1.1 The Previous Focus On Initial Innovation
1(3)
1.2 The Need to Account for Follow-On Innovation
4(1)
1.3 The Regulatory Problem and the Policy Levers
5(1)
1.4 Methodology and Structure
6(2)
2 The Relationship between IP and Antitrust Laws
8(60)
2.1 A First Look: Two Types of IP
9(5)
2.1.1 A Common Dynamic Benefit: Incentives to Create Markets
10(2)
2.1.2 Similar Static Costs: Preventing Competition by Imitation
12(1)
2.1.3 A Different Dynamic Cost: Blocking Follow-On Innovation and Improvements
13(1)
2.2 A Closer Look: The Anti-Competitive Potential of IP Rights
14(10)
2.2.1 IP Laws and the Basic Rights of IP Holders
14(5)
2.2.2 The Anti-Competitive Potential of Conduct Involving IP
19(5)
2.3 Approaches to the Relationship between IP and Antitrust
24(22)
2.3.1 Approach I: Absolute IP Domination
25(1)
2.3.2 Approach II: Inherency and the Specific Subject Matter as Legal(istic) Filters
26(6)
2.3.3 Approach III: Balancing Different Means to Enhance Consumer Welfare
32(14)
2.4 A Positive Economic Analysis of the IP/Antitrust Interface
46(14)
2.4.1 Preventing Competition by Imitation (Reward Mechanism)
47(11)
2.4.2 Other Functions of IP and their Relation to Antitrust
58(2)
2.5 IP or Antitrust? Some Meta Rules
60(5)
2.5.1 Approach I: `Pure' IP Solution
60(1)
2.5.2 Approach II: Antitrust as a Discretionary `Fine-Tuning' Device
61(2)
2.5.3 Approach III: Comparative Cost-Benefit Analysis According to the Competition Problem
63(2)
2.6 Which Antitrust Rules? Some Principles
65(2)
2.7 Conclusion
67(1)
3 The Concepts of Monopolisation and Abuse: What is the Correct Test?
68(28)
3.1 The Tests Used under § 2 Sherman Act and Article 102 TFEU
70(2)
3.2 Obstacles to Cross-Fertilisation?
72(7)
3.2.1 Exploitative Abuses
73(1)
3.2.2 The Elements of § 2 Sherman Act and Article 102 TFEU
74(1)
3.2.3 Leveraging
75(1)
3.2.4 What is to be Protected? Market Structure vs Consumers
76(3)
3.2.5 Enforcement
79(1)
3.3 Analysis of Potential Standards
79(16)
3.3.1 The Relationship between the Standard and Conduct-Specific Rules
80(1)
3.3.2 The Cost-Error Approach as Heuristic
81(4)
3.3.3 The Conduct Element---Suggested Standards
85(10)
3.4 Conclusion
95(1)
4 Refusals to Deal which May Impede Follow-On Innovation
96(40)
4.1 The Traditional Typology of Refusals to Deal
98(11)
4.1.1 Vertical Complementary and Horizontal Refusals to Deal
98(4)
4.1.2 Concerted Refusals to Deal
102(1)
4.1.3 `Naked' vs `Constructive' and Conditional vs Unconditional Refusals
102(1)
4.1.4 Discriminatory Conditions of Supply
103(2)
4.1.5 Termination of Supply
105(1)
4.1.6 Refusal to Deal as an Instrument or as a Corollary of Other Anti-Competitive Conduct
106(3)
4.2 Cumulative Innovation and Bargaining Rules
109(6)
4.2.1 Repercussions of Mandatory Rules on the Incentive to Innovate
111(1)
4.2.2 Cases for IP Reform: Patent Thickets, Holdup, and Royalty Stacking
112(2)
4.2.3 Self-Correction of Innovation Regimes?
114(1)
4.3 A Typology of Refusals to Deal involving IP
115(1)
4.4 Scenario 1: Impeding Research into Follow-On Innovation
116(3)
4.4.1 IP Solutions
116(1)
4.4.2 Antitrust in Innovation Markets?
117(2)
4.5 Scenario 2: Impeding the Marketing of Follow-On Innovation
119(6)
4.5.1 The Potential Case for Antitrust: Foreclosure of Competition by Improved Products
120(1)
4.5.2 Some Conditions of an Antitrust Rule
121(1)
4.5.3 Comparison to Alternative IP Solutions
122(2)
4.5.4 Which Antitrust Solution: Leveraging Test or Essential Facilities Rule?
124(1)
4.6 Scenario 3: Refusal to Give Interoperability Information
125(7)
4.6.1 Gatekeepers on Markets with Network Effects
127(4)
4.6.2 Protection through Trade Secrecy
131(1)
4.7 Scenario 4: Refusal to License IP which Protects a Standard
132(1)
4.8 Scenario 5: Refusal to Supply Products on the Basis of IP
133(2)
4.9 Conclusion
135(1)
5 The Licensing Fee: Determining Liability and the Remedy
136(13)
5.1 The Royalty
138(7)
5.1.1 No Royalty
138(1)
5.1.2 Cost-Based Pricing
139(1)
5.1.3 Same Firm Price Comparison, Market-Based Pricing, and Profit Comparison
140(1)
5.1.4 Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR)
141(1)
5.1.5 Hypothetical Bargaining and Maximum Willingness to Pay
142(1)
5.1.6 At-Least Reasonably Efficient Licensee's Maximum Ability to Pay
143(2)
5.2 The Relationship between Liability and the Remedy Price
145(1)
5.3 Non-Discriminatory Pricing?
146(1)
5.4 The Procedure: Bargaining, Determining the Price, Monitoring, and Enforcement
147(1)
5.5 Conclusion
147(2)
6 An Essential Facilities Test
149(16)
6.1 Condition 1: Harm to Competition
150(10)
6.1.1 Dominant Position
150(7)
6.1.2 No Circumvention or Substitution within a Reasonable Period of Time
157(1)
6.1.3 Elimination or Prevention of Effective Competition on the Adjacent Market
158(2)
6.2 Condition 2: No Ex Ante Investment Defence
160(3)
6.2.1 The Difficulties of Balancing in Innovation Cases
160(2)
6.2.2 Ex Ante Investment
162(1)
6.3 Condition 3: No Ex Post Efficiency Defence
163(1)
6.4 Conclusion
163(2)
7 Cumulative Innovation under US IP and Antitrust Laws
165(40)
7.1 The Initial Innovator's and the Improver's Positions under US IP Laws
165(11)
7.1.1 US Patent Law
166(6)
7.1.2 US Copyright Law
172(3)
7.1.3 US Trade Secret Law
175(1)
7.2 The General `No Duty to Deal' Rule under US Antitrust Law
176(5)
7.2.1 No General Duties to Use and License IP Even Pre-Trinko
176(4)
7.2.2 The Effects of Trinko
180(1)
7.3 Potential Exceptions to the No Duty to Deal Rule
181(15)
7.3.1 Essential Facilities Doctrine
182(5)
7.3.2 Unjustified Change in the Pattern of Dealing
187(2)
7.3.3 Monopoly Leveraging Doctrine
189(4)
7.3.4 Margin Squeeze
193(1)
7.3.5 Discriminatory Refusals to Deal
194(1)
7.3.6 Concerted Refusals to Deal
195(1)
7.4 The Remedy
196(5)
7.4.1 Example 1: Kodak II
196(1)
7.4.2 Example 2: Microsoft
197(2)
7.4.3 Example 3: Rambus
199(2)
7.5 Future Tendencies
201(2)
7.6 Conclusion
203(2)
8 Cumulative Innovation under European IP Laws and EU Competition Law
205(44)
8.1 The Original Innovator's and the Improver's Positions under National IP Laws in the EU
206(11)
8.1.1 German Patent Law
206(6)
8.1.2 German Copyright and Unfair Competition Law
212(5)
8.1.3 German Trade Secret Protection and Conclusion
217(1)
8.2 Limits to Refusals to Supply Based on IP under Article 102 TFEU
217(25)
8.2.1 Essential Facilities Test
219(16)
8.2.2 Margin Squeeze
235(3)
8.2.3 Refusal to Deal as a Complementary Strategy
238(2)
8.2.4 Discriminatory Refusal to Deal Based on IP
240(2)
8.3 The Remedy
242(5)
8.3.1 Substantive Criteria
244(3)
8.3.2 Procedure
247(1)
8.4 Future Tendencies and Conclusion
247(2)
9 Comparison and International Dimension
249(11)
9.1 Differences between the US and EU Approaches
249(2)
9.2 Potential Explanations for the Differences
251(3)
9.2.1 Constitutional Frameworks
251(1)
9.2.2 Beliefs
252(1)
9.2.3 Interests
253(1)
9.3 The International Antitrust Law of IP
254(6)
9.3.1 The Current TRIPS Approach
255(3)
9.3.2 Is Stronger Harmonisation of the Antitrust Law of IP Needed?
258(2)
10 Summary
260(4)
10.1 IP and Antitrust as the Framework for Cumulative Innovation
260(1)
10.2 The Relationship between IP and Antitrust Laws
260(1)
10.3 Monopolisation and Abuse: What is the Correct Test?
261(1)
10.4 Refusals to Deal which May Impede Follow-On Innovation
261(1)
10.5 The Licensing Fee: Determining Liability and the Remedy
261(1)
10.6 An Essential Facilities Test
262(1)
10.7 Cumulative Innovation under US IP and Antitrust Laws
262(1)
10.8 Cumulative Innovation under European IP Laws and EU Competition Law
262(1)
10.9 Comparison and International Dimension
263(1)
Bibliography 264(29)
Index 293
Dr Thorsten Käseberg, a lawyer and economist, was a case-handler at the European Commission's Directorate-General for Competition between 2009 and 2011. He is currently working in the competition policy unit of the German Economics Ministry and was previously a lecturer in the Faculty of Law and Faculty of Economics at the Humboldt University Berlin, and a research assistant at the law firm Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton in Brussels.