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E-raamat: Origins of Objectivity [Oxford Scholarship Online e-raamatud]

(University of California, Los Angeles)
  • Formaat: 646 pages
  • Ilmumisaeg: 04-Mar-2010
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-13: 9780199581405
  • Oxford Scholarship Online e-raamatud
  • Raamatu hind pole hetkel teada
  • Formaat: 646 pages
  • Ilmumisaeg: 04-Mar-2010
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-13: 9780199581405
Tyler Burge presents a substantial, original study of what it is for individuals to represent the physical world with the most primitive sort of objectivity. By reflecting on the science of perception and related psychological and biological sciences, he gives an account of constitutive conditions for perceiving the physical world, and thus aims to locate origins of representational mind. Origins of Objectivity illuminates several long-standing, central issues in philosophy, and provides a wide-ranging account of relations between human and animal psychologies.
Preface xi
PART I
1. Introduction
3
Individual Representationalism
12
A Different Standpoint
22
2. Terminology: What the Questions Mean
30
Representation
30
Representation-as and Representational Content
34
Representation Failure and Representation As Of
42
Objectivity
46
Particulars, Attributes, Properties, Relations, Kinds
54
Resources and Conditions
56
Constitutive Conditions and Natures
57
Summary
59
3. Anti-Individualism
61
Anti-Individualism: What It Is
61
General Grounds for Anti-Individualism
73
Anti-Individualism Regarding Perception
82
The Shape of Perceptual Psychology
87
Perceptual Psychology Presupposes Anti-Individualism
98
Perceptual Capacities Shared Across Species
101
Individual Representationalism and Perceptual Psychology
103
Perception and Concepts
104
Anti-Individualism and Individual Representationalism
105
PART II
4. Individual Representationalism in the Twentieth Century's First Half
111
Individual Representationalism in Psychology
112
Individual Representationalism in Mainstream Philosophy Before the Mid-Twentieth Century
115
Individual Representationalism in "Continental" Philosophy Before the Mid-Twentieth Century
129
5. Individual Representationalism after Mid-Century: Preliminaries
137
The Demise of Logical Positivism, Behaviorism, and Descriptivism
140
Descriptivism and the Causal Picture of Reference
143
Individual Representationalism and Anti-Individualism: Again
149
6. Neo-Kantian Individual Representationalism: Strawson and Evans
154
Kant
154
Strawson—Two Projects
156
Strawson on Kant
160
Strawson on Solipsism
162
Strawson on Feature Placing
163
Strawson on Particular-Identification in Thought
171
Strawson on Criteria for Representation
176
Postlude: Strawson on Criteria in Identificational Reference
180
Evans on Strawson
181
Evans on Constraints on Objective Reference in Perception
184
Evans on Demonstrative, Perceptual Thought
191
Evans on Conditions for Representing Kinds and Particular Objects
194
Evans on Spatial Representation in Thought
199
Neo-Kantian Individual Representationalism: Summary
208
7. Language Interpretation and Individual Representationalism: Quine and Davidson
211
Quine's Starting Point: The Argument from Default Neutrality
212
Interlude: Evans's Critique of Quine on Referential Indeterminacy
216
Communication and Evidence: Quine's Notion of the Empirical
223
Before Objective Reference: The Pre-Individuative Stage
227
Truth Conditions and Structure
230
The Pre-Individuative Stage: Proximal Stimulation and the Physical Environment
232
Divided Reference: The Supplemental Linguistic Apparatus
235
Quantification
238
Further Elements in Quine's Individuative Apparatus
250
The Basic Assumption
254
Identity and Resemblance
260
Davidson on Conditions for Objective Empirical Representation
264
Davidson's Two Arguments
267
Davidson on Belief
276
Language-Centered Individual Representationalism: Summary
281
A Retrospective on Individual Representationalism
283
PART III
8. Biological and Methodological Backgrounds
291
Deflationary Conceptions of Representation; Biological Function and Representational Function
292
Representational Function and Natural Norms
308
The Lower Border of Perception: Sensory Information Registration and Perception
315
Perception and the Environment: The 'Disjunction Problem'
319
Primitive Agency
326
Perceptual Psychology and the Distinction between Sensory Information Registration and Perception
342
Convergence
347
Lightness Constancy
351
Planar Slant from Planar Surface Texture
355
Depth from Convexity of Image Regions
359
9. Origins
367
Perception as the Individual's
369
Perception as Sensory
376
Perception as Representation
379
Perception as Objectification
396
Perception as Objectification as Opposed to Perception as Extraction of Form
416
Phylogenetic Distribution of Perceptual Systems
419
Examples of the Sensory-Registration/Perception Distinction
421
Perception, Representation, Propositional Knowledge
430
10. Origins of Some Representational Categories
437
Perception and Body
437
Body Representation as Originating in Perception
438
Singular Applications in Perception of Bodies
450
General Elements in Perception of Bodies: Conditions for Body Attribution
454
Perception of Body and Attribution of Solidity and Generic Shape
465
Perception and Origins of Mathematical Capacities
471
Estimating Numerosity and Ratios of Aggregates
472
Mathematical Tracking of Indexed Particulars
483
The Two Mathematical Capacities
490
Perception and Origins of Spatial Representation
492
Beaconing
498
Path Integration
499
Landmark Use
507
Map Use
509
Spatial Representation in Navigation by Jumping Spiders and Other Arthropods
514
Perception and Origins of Temporal Representation
518
Association, Computation, Representation
529
11. Glimpses Forward
532
The Epistemic Status of Constitutive Principles Governing Perception
532
The Upper Border of the Perceptual: Perception and Propositional Attitudes
537
Propositional Attitudes, Individual Representationalism, and Conceptualization of Perception
544
Origins, Levels, and Types of Objectivity
547
Bibliography 552
Author Index 583
Subject Index 591
Tyler Burge is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Los Angeles. He is the author of Truth, Thought, Reason: Essays on Frege (OUP, 2005) and Foundations of Mind (OUP, 2007).