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Origins of Objectivity [Pehme köide]

(University of California, Los Angeles)
  • Formaat: Paperback / softback, 656 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 234x156x34 mm, kaal: 999 g
  • Ilmumisaeg: 04-Mar-2010
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0199581398
  • ISBN-13: 9780199581399
  • Formaat: Paperback / softback, 656 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 234x156x34 mm, kaal: 999 g
  • Ilmumisaeg: 04-Mar-2010
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0199581398
  • ISBN-13: 9780199581399
Tyler Burge presents a substantial, original study of what it is for individuals to represent the physical world with the most primitive sort of objectivity. By reflecting on the science of perception and related psychological and biological sciences, he gives an account of constitutive conditions for perceiving the physical world, and thus aims to locate origins of representational mind. Origins of Objectivity illuminates several long-standing, central issues in philosophy, and provides a wide-ranging account of relations between human and animal psychologies.

Arvustused

penetrating. No serious researcher in these fields can afford not to read Origins. * Robert W. Lurz, Philosophical Psychology *

Preface xi
PART I
Introduction
3(27)
Individual Representationalism
12(10)
A Different Standpoint
22(8)
Terminology: What the Questions Mean
30(31)
Representation
30(4)
Representation-as and Representational Content
34(8)
Representation Failure and Representation as of
42(4)
Objectivity
46(8)
Particulars, Attributes, Properties, Relations, Kinds
54(2)
Resources and Conditions
56(1)
Constitutive Conditions and Natures
57(2)
Summary
59(2)
Anti-Individualism
61(50)
Anti-Individualism: What it is
61(12)
General Grounds for Anti-Individualism
73(9)
Anti-Individualism Regarding Perception
82(5)
The Shape of Perceptual Psychology
87(11)
Perceptual Psychology Presupposes Anti-Individualism
98(3)
Perceptual Capacities Shared Across Species
101(2)
Individual Representationalism and Perceptual Psychology
103(1)
Perception and Concepts
104(1)
Anti-Individualism and Individual Representationalism
105(6)
PART II
Individual Representationalism in the Twentieth Century's First Half
111(26)
Individual Representationalism in Psychology
112(3)
Individual Representationalism in Mainstream Philosophy Before the Mid-Twentieth Century
115(14)
Individual Representationalism in ``Continental'' Philosophy Before the Mid-Twentieth Century
129(8)
Individual Representationalism after Mid-Century: Preliminaries
137(17)
The Demise of Logical Positivism, Behaviorism, and Descriptivism
140(3)
Descriptivism and the Causal Picture of Reference
143(6)
Individual Representationalism and Anti-Individualism: Again
149(5)
Neo-Kantian Individual Representationalism: Strawson and Evans
154(57)
Kant
154(2)
Strawson---Two Projects
156(4)
Strawson on Kant
160(2)
Strawson on Solipsism
162(1)
Strawson on Feature Placing
163(8)
Strawson on Particular-Identification in Thought
171(5)
Strawson on Criteria for Representation
176(4)
Postlude: Strawson on Criteria in Identificational Reference
180(1)
Evans on Strawson
181(3)
Evans on Constraints on Objective Reference in Perception
184(7)
Evans on Demonstrative, Perceptual Thought
191(3)
Evans on Conditions for Representing Kinds and Particular Objects
194(5)
Evans on Spatial Representation in Thought
199(9)
Neo-Kantian Individual Representationalism: Summary
208(3)
Language Interpretation and Individual Representationalism: Quine and Davidson
211(80)
Quine's Starting Point: The Argument from Default Neutrality
212(4)
Interlude: Evans's Critique of Quine on Referential Indeterminacy
216(7)
Communication and Evidence: Quine's Notion of the Empirical
223(4)
Before Objective Reference: The Pre-Individuative Stage
227(3)
Truth Conditions and Structure
230(2)
The Pre-Individuative Stage: Proximal Stimulation and the Physical Environment
232(3)
Divided Reference: The Supplemental Linguistic Apparatus
235(3)
Quantification
238(12)
Further Elements in Quine's Individuative Apparatus
250(4)
The Basic Assumption
254(6)
Identity and Resemblance
260(4)
Davidson on Conditions for Objective Empirical Representation
264(3)
Davidson's Two Arguments
267(9)
Davidson on Belief
276(5)
Language-Centered Individual Representationalism: Summary
281(2)
A Retrospective on Individual Representationalism
283(8)
PART III
Biological and Methodological Backgrounds
291(76)
Deflationary Conceptions of Representation; Biological Function and Representational Function
292(16)
Representational Function and Natural Norms
308(7)
The Lower Border of Perception: Sensory Information Registration and Perception
315(4)
Perception and the Environment: The `Disjunction Problem'
319(7)
Primitive Agency
326(16)
Perceptual Psychology and the Distinction between Sensory Information Registration and Perception
342(25)
Convergence
347(4)
Lightness Constancy
351(4)
Planar Slant from Planar Surface Texture
355(4)
Depth from Convexity of Image Regions
359(8)
Origins
367(70)
Perception as the Individual's
369(7)
Perception as Sensory
376(3)
Perception as Representation
379(17)
Perception as Objectification
396(20)
Perception as Objectification as Opposed to Perception as Extraction of form
416(3)
Phylogenetic Distribution of Perceptual Systems
419(2)
Examples of the Sensory-Registration/Perception Distinction
421(9)
Perception, Representation, Propositional Knowledge
430(7)
Origins of Some Representational Categories
437(95)
Perception and Body
437(34)
Body Representation as Originating in Perception
438(12)
Singular Applications in Perception of Bodies
450(4)
General Elements in Perception of Bodies: Conditions for Body Attribution
454(11)
Perception of Body and Attribution of Solidity and Generic Shape
465(6)
Perception and Origins of Mathematical Capacities
471(21)
Estimating Numerosity and Ratios of Aggregates
472(11)
Mathematical Tracking of Indexed Particulars
483(7)
The Two Mathematical Capacities
490(2)
Perception and Origins of Spatial Representation
492(26)
Beaconing
498(1)
Path Integration
499(8)
Landmark Use
507(2)
Map Use
509(5)
Spatial Representation in Navigation by Jumping Spiders and Other Arthropods
514(4)
Perception and Origins of Temporal Representation
518(11)
Association, Computation, Representation
529(3)
Glimpses Forward
532(20)
The Epistemic Status of Constitutive Principles Governing Perception
532(5)
The Upper Border of the Perceptual: Perception and Propositional Attitudes
537(7)
Propositional Attitudes, Individual Representationalism, and Conceptualization of Perception
544(3)
Origins, Levels, and Types of Objectivity
547(5)
Bibliography 552(31)
Author Index 583(8)
Subject Index 591
Tyler Burge is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Los Angeles. He is the author of Truth, Thought, Reason: Essays on Frege (OUP, 2005) and Foundations of Mind (OUP, 2007).