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E-raamat: Predatory Pricing in Antitrust Law and Economics: A Historical Perspective [Taylor & Francis e-raamat]

(University of Pisa, Italy)
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"Can a price ever be too low? Can competition ever be ruinous? Questions like these have always accompanied American antitrust law. They testify to the difficulty of antitrust enforcement, of protecting competition without protecting competitors. As the business practice that most directly raises these kinds of questions, predatory pricing is at the core of antitrust debates. The history of its law and economics offers a privileged standpoint for assessing the broader development of antitrust, its past, present and future. In contrast to existing literature, this book adopts the perspective of the history of economic thought to tell this history, covering a period from the late 1880s to present times.The image of a big firm, such as Rockefeller's Standard Oil or Duke's American Tobacco, crushing its small rivals by underselling them is iconic in American antitrust culture. It is no surprise that the most brilliant legal and economic minds of the last 130 years have been engaged in solving the predatory pricing puzzle. The book shows economic theories that build rigorous stories explaining when predatory pricing may be rational, what welfare harm it may cause, and how the law may fight it. Among these narratives, a special place belongs to the Chicago story, according to which predatory pricing is never profitable and every low price is always a good price.Nicola Giocoli is an Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Pisa, Italy. "--

This is a historical analysis of the legal intellectual treatment of predatory pricing in the United States. Over the course of eight chapters, the author discusses of economic models of predatory pricing, 19th-century British common law of restraints on trade, American economists' views about antitrust and destructive competition at the turn of the 20th century, the formative era of American antitrust from the Sherman Act (1890) to the Clayton and FTC Acts (1914), enforcement between World War II and the late 1960s, the Chicago School's reaction to the 1950-60s crisis of predatory pricing law exemplified by the 1967 Utah Pie v. Continental Banking case, the development and judicial adoption of the Areeda and Turner's price/cost rule, and the triumph of the Chicago approach in the courts. Annotation ©2014 Ringgold, Inc., Portland, OR (protoview.com)

Can a price ever be too low? Can competition ever be ruinous? Questions like these have always accompanied American antitrust law. They testify to the difficulty of antitrust enforcement, of protecting competition without protecting competitors.

As the business practice that most directly raises these kinds of questions, predatory pricing is at the core of antitrust debates. The history of its law and economics offers a privileged standpoint for assessing the broader development of antitrust, its past, present and future. In contrast to existing literature, this book adopts the perspective of the history of economic thought to tell this history, covering a period from the late 1880s to present times.

The image of a big firm, such as Rockefeller’s Standard Oil or Duke’s American Tobacco, crushing its small rivals by underselling them is iconic in American antitrust culture. It is no surprise that the most brilliant legal and economic minds of the last 130 years have been engaged in solving the predatory pricing puzzle. The book shows economic theories that build rigorous stories explaining when predatory pricing may be rational, what welfare harm it may cause and how the law may fight it. Among these narratives, a special place belongs to the Chicago story, according to which predatory pricing is never profitable and every low price is always a good price.

Acknowledgments xii
Introduction 1(12)
§1 Three basic dichotomies
1(2)
§2 The trickiest antitrust problem
3(2)
§3 Further reasons to love predation
5(3)
§4 Lessons in persuasion
8(1)
§5 Treasures in the attic
9(2)
§6 Plan of the book
11(2)
1 The economics of predatory pricing
13(36)
§1 Classic and modern definitions of predatory pricing
13(6)
§2 The basic story
19(3)
§3 The Chicago critique of the basic story
22(3)
§4 It's a brand new game: predation as strategic paradox
25(3)
§5 The Stanford connection
28(7)
§6 Madamina, il catalogo e questo
35(7)
§7 Assessing the Bayesian approach to predation
42(7)
2 The two freedoms and British common law
49(32)
§1 The two freedoms
49(1)
§2 The monopoly problem in British common law
50(4)
§3 The classical view of competition
54(4)
§4 Competition in the late nineteenth-century British economy
58(2)
§5 The dawn of predatory pricing: the Mogul case
60(2)
§6 The Mogul decisions: is predation "a matter contrary to law"?
62(4)
§7 The new reasonableness test: the Nordenfelt case
66(3)
§8 The legacy of Mogul and Nordenfelt
69(4)
§9 Restraints of trade in American common law
73(8)
3 American economists and destructive competition
81(22)
§1 Monopoly as the inevitable outcome of competition
81(2)
§2 "Let us have peace": the combination way-out
83(3)
§3 From destructive competition to predatory pricing
86(2)
§4 Economic power and the curse of bigness
88(2)
§5 Playing the trump card: potential competition
90(4)
§6 From Clark to Clarks
94(9)
4 Predatory pricing in the formative era of antitrust law
103(32)
§1 Constitutionalizing freedom of contract
103(2)
§2 The two views in action: the Sherman Act's Congressional debate
105(4)
§3 Transcending common law: monopolizing and third-party actionability
109(1)
§4 The economists' reaction to the Sherman Act
110(2)
§5 Common law, literalism and reasonableness
112(8)
§6 The predatory side of the 1911 cases
120(5)
§7 The economists' reasonable dissent
125(2)
§8 The Clayton and FTC Acts
127(3)
§9 Predatory pricing in the formative era: an assessment
130(5)
5 Predatory pricing in the structuralist era
135(41)
§1 The decades of neglect (1918-35)
135(3)
§2 Competition strikes back: the end of associationalism
138(2)
§3 The structuralist paradigm
140(2)
§4 Mason's SCP manifesto
142(3)
§5 Extreme structuralism versus workable competition
145(4)
§6 A "new" Sherman Act?
149(7)
§7 The return of Old Sherman
156(4)
§8 The horror list
160(3)
§9 Intent to exclude intent
163(3)
§10 The worst antitrust decision ever?
166(3)
§11 Conclusion: the divorce between antitrust and microeconomics
169(7)
6 The Chicago School and the irrelevance of predation
176(34)
§1 The dissolution proposals
176(3)
§2 Chicago to the rescue
179(2)
§3 The two Chicagos
181(6)
§4 Listen to McGee: predation doesn't exist!
187(4)
§5 Chicago's peculiar methodology
191(2)
§6 Three Chicago boys
193(9)
§7 Conclusion: a new Chicago story
202(8)
7 Harvard rules: Areeda and Turner's solution
210(35)
§1 Two reactions to McGee
210(1)
§2 Strategic predation without game theory
211(4)
§3 From the "wilds of economic theory"...
215(2)
§4 ... to a "meaningful and workable" rule
217(3)
§5 A new legal standard
220(3)
§6 The courts' reaction to the ATR
223(3)
§7 The economists' reaction to the ATR
226(9)
§8 The post-ATR debate in courts
235(2)
§9 Conclusion: lessons from the ATR saga
237(8)
8 The demise of predatory pricing as an antitrust violation
245(33)
§1 Mr. Justice goes to Chicago
245(3)
§2 Predatory pricing case law meets Chicago antitrust
248(5)
§3 Predatory pricing's last cigarette
253(2)
§4 The Brooke test - Chicago creed or apostasy?
255(4)
§5 Administrability is key
259(4)
§6 Price theory no more: a game-theoretic alternative to Brooke
263(5)
§7 "An almost interminable series of special cases"
268(3)
§8 Conclusion: Daubert nails in the Post-Chicago coffin
271(7)
Conclusion
278(11)
§1 Star Wars without Darth Vader
278(2)
§2 It's the ideology, stupid!
280(4)
§3 Games judges don't play
284(1)
§4 Chicago rule(s)
285(4)
List of cases 289(3)
References 292(13)
Index 305
Nicola Giocoli is Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Pisa, Italy