| Acknowledgments |
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xii | |
| Introduction |
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1 | (12) |
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§1 Three basic dichotomies |
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1 | (2) |
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§2 The trickiest antitrust problem |
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3 | (2) |
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§3 Further reasons to love predation |
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5 | (3) |
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8 | (1) |
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§5 Treasures in the attic |
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9 | (2) |
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11 | (2) |
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1 The economics of predatory pricing |
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13 | (36) |
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§1 Classic and modern definitions of predatory pricing |
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13 | (6) |
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19 | (3) |
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§3 The Chicago critique of the basic story |
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22 | (3) |
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§4 It's a brand new game: predation as strategic paradox |
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25 | (3) |
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§5 The Stanford connection |
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28 | (7) |
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§6 Madamina, il catalogo e questo |
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35 | (7) |
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§7 Assessing the Bayesian approach to predation |
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42 | (7) |
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2 The two freedoms and British common law |
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49 | (32) |
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49 | (1) |
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§2 The monopoly problem in British common law |
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50 | (4) |
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§3 The classical view of competition |
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54 | (4) |
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§4 Competition in the late nineteenth-century British economy |
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58 | (2) |
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§5 The dawn of predatory pricing: the Mogul case |
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60 | (2) |
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§6 The Mogul decisions: is predation "a matter contrary to law"? |
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62 | (4) |
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§7 The new reasonableness test: the Nordenfelt case |
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66 | (3) |
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§8 The legacy of Mogul and Nordenfelt |
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69 | (4) |
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§9 Restraints of trade in American common law |
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73 | (8) |
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3 American economists and destructive competition |
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81 | (22) |
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§1 Monopoly as the inevitable outcome of competition |
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81 | (2) |
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§2 "Let us have peace": the combination way-out |
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83 | (3) |
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§3 From destructive competition to predatory pricing |
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86 | (2) |
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§4 Economic power and the curse of bigness |
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88 | (2) |
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§5 Playing the trump card: potential competition |
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90 | (4) |
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94 | (9) |
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4 Predatory pricing in the formative era of antitrust law |
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103 | (32) |
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§1 Constitutionalizing freedom of contract |
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103 | (2) |
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§2 The two views in action: the Sherman Act's Congressional debate |
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105 | (4) |
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§3 Transcending common law: monopolizing and third-party actionability |
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109 | (1) |
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§4 The economists' reaction to the Sherman Act |
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110 | (2) |
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§5 Common law, literalism and reasonableness |
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112 | (8) |
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§6 The predatory side of the 1911 cases |
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120 | (5) |
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§7 The economists' reasonable dissent |
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125 | (2) |
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§8 The Clayton and FTC Acts |
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127 | (3) |
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§9 Predatory pricing in the formative era: an assessment |
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130 | (5) |
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5 Predatory pricing in the structuralist era |
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135 | (41) |
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§1 The decades of neglect (1918-35) |
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135 | (3) |
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§2 Competition strikes back: the end of associationalism |
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138 | (2) |
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§3 The structuralist paradigm |
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140 | (2) |
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142 | (3) |
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§5 Extreme structuralism versus workable competition |
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145 | (4) |
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149 | (7) |
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§7 The return of Old Sherman |
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156 | (4) |
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160 | (3) |
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§9 Intent to exclude intent |
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163 | (3) |
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§10 The worst antitrust decision ever? |
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166 | (3) |
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§11 Conclusion: the divorce between antitrust and microeconomics |
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169 | (7) |
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6 The Chicago School and the irrelevance of predation |
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176 | (34) |
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§1 The dissolution proposals |
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176 | (3) |
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179 | (2) |
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181 | (6) |
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§4 Listen to McGee: predation doesn't exist! |
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187 | (4) |
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§5 Chicago's peculiar methodology |
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191 | (2) |
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193 | (9) |
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§7 Conclusion: a new Chicago story |
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202 | (8) |
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7 Harvard rules: Areeda and Turner's solution |
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210 | (35) |
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§1 Two reactions to McGee |
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210 | (1) |
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§2 Strategic predation without game theory |
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211 | (4) |
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§3 From the "wilds of economic theory"... |
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215 | (2) |
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§4 ... to a "meaningful and workable" rule |
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217 | (3) |
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220 | (3) |
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§6 The courts' reaction to the ATR |
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223 | (3) |
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§7 The economists' reaction to the ATR |
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226 | (9) |
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§8 The post-ATR debate in courts |
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235 | (2) |
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§9 Conclusion: lessons from the ATR saga |
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237 | (8) |
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8 The demise of predatory pricing as an antitrust violation |
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245 | (33) |
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§1 Mr. Justice goes to Chicago |
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245 | (3) |
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§2 Predatory pricing case law meets Chicago antitrust |
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248 | (5) |
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§3 Predatory pricing's last cigarette |
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253 | (2) |
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§4 The Brooke test - Chicago creed or apostasy? |
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255 | (4) |
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§5 Administrability is key |
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259 | (4) |
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§6 Price theory no more: a game-theoretic alternative to Brooke |
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263 | (5) |
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§7 "An almost interminable series of special cases" |
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268 | (3) |
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§8 Conclusion: Daubert nails in the Post-Chicago coffin |
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271 | (7) |
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278 | (11) |
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§1 Star Wars without Darth Vader |
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278 | (2) |
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§2 It's the ideology, stupid! |
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280 | (4) |
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§3 Games judges don't play |
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284 | (1) |
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285 | (4) |
| List of cases |
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289 | (3) |
| References |
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292 | (13) |
| Index |
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305 | |