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Algorithmic Decision Theory: 7th International Conference, ADT 2021, Toulouse, France, November 35, 2021, Proceedings 1st ed. 2021 [Pehme köide]

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  • Formaat: Paperback / softback, 441 pages, kõrgus x laius: 235x155 mm, kaal: 706 g, 32 Illustrations, black and white; XIX, 441 p. 32 illus., 1 Paperback / softback
  • Sari: Lecture Notes in Computer Science 13023
  • Ilmumisaeg: 07-Oct-2021
  • Kirjastus: Springer Nature Switzerland AG
  • ISBN-10: 3030877558
  • ISBN-13: 9783030877552
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  • Formaat: Paperback / softback, 441 pages, kõrgus x laius: 235x155 mm, kaal: 706 g, 32 Illustrations, black and white; XIX, 441 p. 32 illus., 1 Paperback / softback
  • Sari: Lecture Notes in Computer Science 13023
  • Ilmumisaeg: 07-Oct-2021
  • Kirjastus: Springer Nature Switzerland AG
  • ISBN-10: 3030877558
  • ISBN-13: 9783030877552
This book constitutes the conference proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory, ADT 2021, held in Toulouse, France, in November 2021.  The 27 full papers presented were carefully selected from 58 submissions. The papers focus on algorithmic decision theory broadly defined, seeking to bring together researchers and practitioners coming from diverse areas of computer science, economics and operations research in order to improve the theory and practice of modern decision support.
Computational Social Choice and Preference Modelling.- Aggregating
Preferences Represented by Conditional Preference Networks.- Measuring Nearly
Single-peakedness of an Electorate: Some New Insights.- Preference
Aggregation in the Generalised Unavailable Candidate Model.- Simultaneous
Elicitation of Scoring Rule and Agent Preferences for Robust Winner
Determination.- Preference Elicitation.- Incremental elicitation of
preferences: optimist or pessimist?.- Probabilistic Lexicographic Preference
Trees.- Incremental Preference Elicitation with Bipolar Choquet Integrals.-
Preference Aggregation and Voting.- In the Beginning There Were n Agents:
Founding and Amending a Constitution.- Unveiling the Truth in Liquid
Democracy with Misinformed Voters.- Computing Kemeny Rankings From
d-Euclidean Preferences.- Iterative Deliberation via Metric
Aggregation.-Manipulation in Voting.- Obvious Manipulability of Voting
Rules.- Manipulation in Communication Structures of Graph-Restricted Weighted
Voting Games.- Strategic Voting in Negotiating Teams.- The Nonmanipulative
Vote-Deficits of Voting Rules.- Fair Division and Resource Allocation.-
Allocating Indivisible Items with Minimum Dissatisfaction on Preference
Graphs.- On Fairness via Picking Sequences in Allocation of Indivisible
Goods.- On Reachable Assignments in Cycles.- Minimizing and balancing envy
among agents using Ordered Weighted Average.- Algorithmic Decision Theory.-
Interactive Optimization of Submodular Functions under Matroid Constraints.-
Necessary and possible interaction in a 2-maxitive Sugeno integral model.-
Coalition Formation.- Democratic Forking: Choosing Sides with Social Choice.-
Hedonic Diversity Games Revisited.- Stable Matchings.- Multi-agent
Reinforcement Learning for Decentralized Stable Matching.- Lazy Gale-Shapley
for Many-to-One Matching with Partial Information.- Participatory Budgeting.-
Participatory Funding Coordination: Model, Axioms and Rules.- Complexity of
Manipulative Interference in Participatory Budgeting.