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Applied Welfare Economics: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Projects and Policies [Kõva köide]

(University of Milan, Italy)
  • Formaat: Hardback, 412 pages, kõrgus x laius: 234x156 mm, kaal: 748 g, 37 Tables, black and white; 19 Line drawings, black and white; 19 Illustrations, black and white
  • Sari: Routledge Advanced Texts in Economics and Finance
  • Ilmumisaeg: 18-Feb-2014
  • Kirjastus: Routledge
  • ISBN-10: 041585833X
  • ISBN-13: 9780415858335
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  • Formaat: Hardback, 412 pages, kõrgus x laius: 234x156 mm, kaal: 748 g, 37 Tables, black and white; 19 Line drawings, black and white; 19 Illustrations, black and white
  • Sari: Routledge Advanced Texts in Economics and Finance
  • Ilmumisaeg: 18-Feb-2014
  • Kirjastus: Routledge
  • ISBN-10: 041585833X
  • ISBN-13: 9780415858335
This text offers a mixture of theory and practice of social cost-benefit analysis--for students with a background in economics at an intermediate level as well as professionals seeking the intellectual underpinnings of their activities, and a serious general readership. Coverage encompasses the role of government and social welfare functions; two fundamental welfare theorems reexamined in light of limited usefulness for evaluating policies and projects; shadow prices; the social cost of goods, labor, and capital; and international evaluation practices, among other topics. Annotation ©2014 Ringgold, Inc., Portland, OR (protoview.com)

What is the effect of a new infrastructure on the well-being of a local community? Is a tax reform desirable? Does the privatization of a telecommunication provider increase social welfare? To answer these questions governments and their policy advisors should have in mind an operative definition of social welfare, and cannot rely on simple official statistics, such as GDP. The price we observe are often misleading as welfare signals, and costs and benefits for the society should be based on ‘shadow prices’, revealing the social opportunity costs of goods and of changes of the world. This book explains how to apply these welfare economics ideas to the real world.

After a theoretical discussion of the concept of social welfare, a critical analysis of the traditional doctrine of welfare economics embodied in the Two Fundamental Theorems, and a presentation of social cost-benefit analysis, the book introduce the readers to an applied framework. This includes the empirical estimation of shadow prices of goods, of the social cost of labour and capital, the assessment of risk. This book also includes the state of the art of international experience with CBA, including ex-post evaluation of major projects, economic rates of return in different sectors, and a case study on privatisation, is presented.

This book offers a unique and original blend of theory, empirics and experience. The theoretical discussion clarifies why shadow prices are not virtual market equilibrium prices, as they arise as the solution of a planning problem, often with governments and economic agents constrained in their information and powers. The empirical chapters show how to compute proxies of the shadow prices in simple ways. The experience chapters draw from first hand research, gained by the Author and his collaborators over many years of advisory work for the European Commission and other international and national institutions.

List of figures x
List of tables xi
List of boxes xiii
Preface xv
Acknowledgements xix
Abbreviations xxi
Main notation xxiv
Part I Theory 1(100)
1 On social welfare
3(36)
Overview
3(1)
1.1 The concept of social welfare
4(5)
1.2 The welfare assumptions behind GDP and NNP
9(4)
1.3 Individual and social welfare
13(4)
1.4 Determinants of individual welfare: goods
17(1)
1.5 Determinants of social welfare: individual utilities
18(7)
1.6 Sen's critique of individualistic SWF
25(2)
1.7 Paternalism and not (only) individualistic Social Welfare Functions
27(3)
1.8 Happiness economics
30(2)
1.9 'Positive' analysis
32(3)
1.10 Further reading
35(1)
1.11 Summary of
Chapter 1
36(3)
2 The two fundamental theorems re-examined
39(34)
Overview
39(1)
2.1 Theorems versus intuitions
40(3)
2.2 The Arrow-Debreu economy
43(2)
2.3 The axiomatic structure
45(2)
2.4 Consumers, producers and government: objectives and constraints
47(4)
2.5 The Walrasian equilibrium
51(2)
2.6 The two theorems without ideology
53(3)
2.7 The informative structure: Stiglitz's critique
56(2)
2.8 Critical analysis of the second theorem
58(4)
2.9 The government rediscovered in second-best economies
62(3)
2.10 Further reading
65(2)
2.11 Summary of
Chapter 2
67(2)
Appendix 2.1: Policies based on the Second Theorem: Lump-sum transfers
69(4)
3 Shadow prices and the social planner
73(28)
Overview
73(1)
3.1 Introductory remarks
74(3)
3.2 A model for project and policy evaluation
77(5)
3.3 A second-best economy in the DS frame
82(3)
3.4 Policy reforms and shadow prices
85(4)
3.5 Multi-government setting
89(5)
3.6 Why use shadow prices?
94(1)
3.7 Further reading
95(1)
3.8 Summary of
Chapter 3
96(1)
Appendix 3.1: Some results from Dreze and Stern (1987)
97(4)
Part II Empirics 101(162)
4 The social cost of goods
103(49)
Overview
103(2)
4.1 Observed prices and financial analysis
105(3)
4.2 Accounting prices and economic analysis
108(7)
4.3 Empirical approaches for guessing accounting prices
115(2)
4.4 The border price rule for tradable goods
117(3)
4.5 The Standard Conversion Factor
120(1)
4.6 The long-run marginal cost
121(2)
4.7 Willingness-to-pay
123(14)
4.8 Further reading
137(2)
4.9 Summary of
Chapter 4
139(1)
Appendix 4.1: Financial analysis
140(4)
Appendix 4.2: An example offinancial and economic analysis
144(8)
5 The social cost of labour
152(21)
Overview
152(1)
5.1 Earlier literature on the social opportunity cost of labour
153(5)
5.2 A conceptual model for the social cost of labour
158(2)
5.3 The shadow wage rate and labour market conditions
160(6)
5.4 Empirical estimation of shadow prices for EU regions
166(3)
5.5 Further reading
169(1)
5.6 Summary of
Chapter 5
170(3)
6 The social cost of capital
173(26)
Overview
173(1)
6.1 Rationale for discounting
173(2)
6.2 Estimating the social discount rate
175(6)
6.3 The social discount rate as a function of time
181(4)
6.4 Empirical estimates of the social discount rate
185(7)
6.5 The opportunity cost of public funds
192(2)
6.6 Further reading
194(1)
6.7 Summary of
Chapter 6
195(4)
7 Welfare weights and distributional impacts
199(23)
Overview
199(1)
7.1 Why are equity considerations needed in CBA?
200(2)
7.2 Deriving welfare weights
202(2)
7.3 Estimation of distributional weights
204(3)
7.4 The distributional characteristic of goods
207(3)
7.5 Group and regional welfare weights
210(3)
7.6 Basic needs and social affordability
213(4)
7.7 Further reading
217(2)
7.8 Summary of
Chapter 7
219(3)
8 Risk assessment
222(41)
Overview
222(1)
8.1 Rationale of the risk assessment
223(1)
8.2 Definitions and concepts
224(2)
8.3 Historical background: the World Bank model
226(1)
8.4 Sensitivity analysis
227(6)
8.5 Probability analysis
233(6)
8.6 Risk analysis
239(5)
8.7 Further reading
244(2)
8.8 Summary of
Chapter 8
246(2)
Appendix 8.1: Distributions of probabilities
248(5)
Appendix 8.2: Monte Carlo method
253(4)
Appendix 8.3: Generating correlated random numbers
257(6)
Part III Practice 263(112)
9 International evaluation practices
265(26)
Overview
265(1)
9.1 National traditions and operative guidelines
265(11)
9.2 Evaluation practice in the EC regional policy
276(3)
9.3 Multilateral development banks
279(7)
9.4 Further reading
286(2)
9.5 Summary of
Chapter 9
288(3)
10 Project returns observed
291(27)
Overview
291(1)
10.1 Conceptual framework of the analysis
292(5)
10.2 Empirical methodology
297(5)
10.3 Comparisons between financial and economic rates of return
302(4)
10.4 Comparison between ex-ante and ex-post economic rates of return
306(2)
10.5 Inter-sector comparisons
308(5)
10.6 Conclusions
313(2)
10.7 Further reading
315(1)
10.8 Summary of
Chapter 10
315(3)
11 Ex-post project evaluation: ten case studies
318(31)
Overview
318(1)
11.1 Timing and scope of CBA
319(1)
11.2 Performing ex-post CBA
320(18)
11.3 International practice of ex-post CBA
338(3)
11.4 CBA and the decision-making process
341(2)
11.5 CBA and incentives
343(1)
11.6 Further reading
344(1)
11.7 Summary of
Chapter 11
344(5)
12 Ex-post policy evaluation: a case study
349(26)
Overview
349(1)
12.1 Theoretical framework and earlier research
350(4)
12.2 Methodology
354(3)
12.3 Results of the ex-post scenario analysis
357(6)
12.4 Conclusions
363(2)
12.5 Further reading
365(1)
12.6 Summary of
Chapter 12
365(2)
Appendix 12.1: Time-series behaviour of BT costs and revenues
367(5)
Appendix 12.2: Building up the projections of revenues and costs
372(3)
Bibliography 375(28)
Index 403
Massimo Florio is Professor of Public Economics and Jean Monnet Chair Ad personam of EU Industrial Policy at the University of Milan, Italy