List of figures |
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x | |
List of tables |
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xi | |
List of boxes |
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xiii | |
Preface |
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xv | |
Acknowledgements |
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xix | |
Abbreviations |
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xxi | |
Main notation |
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xxiv | |
Part I Theory |
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1 | (100) |
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3 | (36) |
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3 | (1) |
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1.1 The concept of social welfare |
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4 | (5) |
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1.2 The welfare assumptions behind GDP and NNP |
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9 | (4) |
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1.3 Individual and social welfare |
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13 | (4) |
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1.4 Determinants of individual welfare: goods |
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17 | (1) |
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1.5 Determinants of social welfare: individual utilities |
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18 | (7) |
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1.6 Sen's critique of individualistic SWF |
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25 | (2) |
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1.7 Paternalism and not (only) individualistic Social Welfare Functions |
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27 | (3) |
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30 | (2) |
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32 | (3) |
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35 | (1) |
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36 | (3) |
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2 The two fundamental theorems re-examined |
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39 | (34) |
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39 | (1) |
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2.1 Theorems versus intuitions |
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40 | (3) |
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2.2 The Arrow-Debreu economy |
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43 | (2) |
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2.3 The axiomatic structure |
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45 | (2) |
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2.4 Consumers, producers and government: objectives and constraints |
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47 | (4) |
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2.5 The Walrasian equilibrium |
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51 | (2) |
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2.6 The two theorems without ideology |
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53 | (3) |
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2.7 The informative structure: Stiglitz's critique |
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56 | (2) |
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2.8 Critical analysis of the second theorem |
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58 | (4) |
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2.9 The government rediscovered in second-best economies |
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62 | (3) |
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65 | (2) |
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67 | (2) |
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Appendix 2.1: Policies based on the Second Theorem: Lump-sum transfers |
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69 | (4) |
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3 Shadow prices and the social planner |
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73 | (28) |
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73 | (1) |
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74 | (3) |
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3.2 A model for project and policy evaluation |
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77 | (5) |
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3.3 A second-best economy in the DS frame |
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82 | (3) |
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3.4 Policy reforms and shadow prices |
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85 | (4) |
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3.5 Multi-government setting |
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89 | (5) |
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3.6 Why use shadow prices? |
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94 | (1) |
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95 | (1) |
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96 | (1) |
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Appendix 3.1: Some results from Dreze and Stern (1987) |
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97 | (4) |
Part II Empirics |
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101 | (162) |
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4 The social cost of goods |
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103 | (49) |
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103 | (2) |
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4.1 Observed prices and financial analysis |
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105 | (3) |
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4.2 Accounting prices and economic analysis |
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108 | (7) |
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4.3 Empirical approaches for guessing accounting prices |
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115 | (2) |
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4.4 The border price rule for tradable goods |
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117 | (3) |
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4.5 The Standard Conversion Factor |
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120 | (1) |
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4.6 The long-run marginal cost |
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121 | (2) |
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123 | (14) |
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137 | (2) |
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139 | (1) |
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Appendix 4.1: Financial analysis |
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140 | (4) |
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Appendix 4.2: An example offinancial and economic analysis |
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144 | (8) |
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5 The social cost of labour |
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152 | (21) |
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152 | (1) |
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5.1 Earlier literature on the social opportunity cost of labour |
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153 | (5) |
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5.2 A conceptual model for the social cost of labour |
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158 | (2) |
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5.3 The shadow wage rate and labour market conditions |
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160 | (6) |
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5.4 Empirical estimation of shadow prices for EU regions |
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166 | (3) |
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169 | (1) |
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170 | (3) |
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6 The social cost of capital |
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173 | (26) |
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173 | (1) |
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6.1 Rationale for discounting |
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173 | (2) |
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6.2 Estimating the social discount rate |
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175 | (6) |
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6.3 The social discount rate as a function of time |
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181 | (4) |
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6.4 Empirical estimates of the social discount rate |
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185 | (7) |
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6.5 The opportunity cost of public funds |
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192 | (2) |
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194 | (1) |
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195 | (4) |
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7 Welfare weights and distributional impacts |
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199 | (23) |
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199 | (1) |
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7.1 Why are equity considerations needed in CBA? |
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200 | (2) |
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7.2 Deriving welfare weights |
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202 | (2) |
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7.3 Estimation of distributional weights |
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204 | (3) |
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7.4 The distributional characteristic of goods |
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207 | (3) |
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7.5 Group and regional welfare weights |
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210 | (3) |
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7.6 Basic needs and social affordability |
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213 | (4) |
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217 | (2) |
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219 | (3) |
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222 | (41) |
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222 | (1) |
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8.1 Rationale of the risk assessment |
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223 | (1) |
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8.2 Definitions and concepts |
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224 | (2) |
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8.3 Historical background: the World Bank model |
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226 | (1) |
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227 | (6) |
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233 | (6) |
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239 | (5) |
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244 | (2) |
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246 | (2) |
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Appendix 8.1: Distributions of probabilities |
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248 | (5) |
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Appendix 8.2: Monte Carlo method |
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253 | (4) |
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Appendix 8.3: Generating correlated random numbers |
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257 | (6) |
Part III Practice |
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263 | (112) |
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9 International evaluation practices |
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265 | (26) |
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265 | (1) |
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9.1 National traditions and operative guidelines |
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265 | (11) |
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9.2 Evaluation practice in the EC regional policy |
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276 | (3) |
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9.3 Multilateral development banks |
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279 | (7) |
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286 | (2) |
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288 | (3) |
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10 Project returns observed |
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291 | (27) |
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291 | (1) |
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10.1 Conceptual framework of the analysis |
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292 | (5) |
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10.2 Empirical methodology |
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297 | (5) |
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10.3 Comparisons between financial and economic rates of return |
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302 | (4) |
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10.4 Comparison between ex-ante and ex-post economic rates of return |
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306 | (2) |
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10.5 Inter-sector comparisons |
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308 | (5) |
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313 | (2) |
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315 | (1) |
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10.8 Summary of Chapter 10 |
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315 | (3) |
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11 Ex-post project evaluation: ten case studies |
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318 | (31) |
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318 | (1) |
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11.1 Timing and scope of CBA |
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319 | (1) |
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11.2 Performing ex-post CBA |
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320 | (18) |
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11.3 International practice of ex-post CBA |
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338 | (3) |
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11.4 CBA and the decision-making process |
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341 | (2) |
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343 | (1) |
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344 | (1) |
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11.7 Summary of Chapter 11 |
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344 | (5) |
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12 Ex-post policy evaluation: a case study |
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349 | (26) |
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349 | (1) |
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12.1 Theoretical framework and earlier research |
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350 | (4) |
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354 | (3) |
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12.3 Results of the ex-post scenario analysis |
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357 | (6) |
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363 | (2) |
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365 | (1) |
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12.6 Summary of Chapter 12 |
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365 | (2) |
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Appendix 12.1: Time-series behaviour of BT costs and revenues |
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367 | (5) |
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Appendix 12.2: Building up the projections of revenues and costs |
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372 | (3) |
Bibliography |
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375 | (28) |
Index |
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403 | |