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Aristotle on Knowledge and Learning: The Posterior Analytics [Kõva köide]

3.83/5 (12 hinnangut Goodreads-ist)
(Georgetown University)
  • Formaat: Hardback, 288 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 240x162x21 mm, kaal: 560 g
  • Sari: Oxford Aristotle Studies Series
  • Ilmumisaeg: 24-Mar-2016
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 019872490X
  • ISBN-13: 9780198724902
Teised raamatud teemal:
Aristotle on Knowledge and Learning: The Posterior AnalyticsSuurem pilt
  • Formaat: Hardback, 288 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 240x162x21 mm, kaal: 560 g
  • Sari: Oxford Aristotle Studies Series
  • Ilmumisaeg: 24-Mar-2016
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 019872490X
  • ISBN-13: 9780198724902
Teised raamatud teemal:
Püsilink: https://www.kriso.ee/db/9780198724902.html
'All teaching and all intellectual learning come to be from pre-existing knowledge.' So begins Aristotle'sPosterior Analytics, one of the most important, and difficult, works in the history of western philosophy. David Bronstein sheds new light on this challenging text by arguing that it is coherently structured around two themes of enduring philosophical interest: knowledge and learning.

The Posterior Analytics, on Bronstein's reading, is a sustained examination of scientific knowledge: what it is and how it is acquired. Aristotle first discusses two principal forms of scientific knowledge (epist m? andnous). He then provides a compelling account, in reverse order, of the types of learning one needs to undertake in order to acquire them. ThePosterior Analytics thus emerges as an elegantly organized work in which Aristotle describes the mind's ascent from sense-perception of particulars to scientific knowledge of first principles.

Bronstein also highlights Plato's influence on Aristotle's text. For each type of learning Aristotle discusses, Bronstein uncovers an instance of Meno's Paradox (a puzzle from Plato'sMeno according to which inquiry and learning are impossible) and a solution to it. In addition, he argues, against current orthodoxy, that Aristotle is committed to the Socratic Picture of inquiry, according to which one should seek what a thing's essence is before seeking its demonstrable attributes and their causes.

Aristotle on Knowledge and Learning will be of interest to students and scholars of ancient philosophy, epistemology, or philosophy of science.

Arvustused

Aristotle on Knowledge and Learning is a solid achievement. It offers a host of insights into problematic concepts and passages that merit further debate, and a plausible overall account of the work's internal dynamics. For both these reasons, Bronstein's book should become a departure point for future explorations of Aristotle's ever fascinating account of scientific knowledge and its acquisition. * William Wians, Aestimatio *

Acknowledgements xi
Abbreviations of Titles of Aristotle's Works xiii
Introduction
General Introduction
3(8)
1 Meno's Paradox
4(2)
2 The Order of Inquiry
6(1)
3 Nous
7(4)
1 Meno's Paradox and the Prior Knowledge Requirement
11(20)
1 Meno's Three Questions
11(2)
2 Socrates's Dilemma
13(1)
3 Meno's and Socrates's Prior Cognition Requirements
14(1)
4 Aristotle on Learning: the Prior Knowledge Requirement
15(1)
5 Aristotle on Knowledge
16(5)
6 Prior Knowledge of What?
21(1)
7 Prior Cognition and Prior Knowledge in Plato and Aristotle
22(1)
8 Simultaneous Learning in APo 1.1
23(2)
9 Meno's Paradox in APo 1.1
25(2)
Conclusion
27(4)
Part I. Learning by Demonstration
2 Learning by Demonstration
31(12)
1 The Prevailing View
32(1)
2 Textual Evidence
33(2)
3 Scientific Knowledge and Demonstration: APo 1.2
35(4)
4 What is Learning by Demonstration?
39(3)
Conclusion
42(1)
3 Belonging 'In Itself' and Aristotle's Theory of Demonstration
43(8)
1 Belonging 'In Itself' (Kath' Hauto): APo 1.4
43(3)
2 In Itself2: Demonstrable Attributes
46(1)
3 In Itself Accidents: Demonstrable Attributes
47(1)
4 Two Models of Demonstration
48(3)
4 Scientific Knowledge and Demonstration
51(18)
1 Non-Demonstrative Scientific Knowledge (Nous)
51(6)
2 Scientific Knowledge and Explanation
57(1)
3 Episteme, Nous, and Logos
58(1)
4 The Objects of Scientific Knowledge
58(2)
5 Scientific vs. Non-Scientific Knowledge
60(1)
6 The Requirements for Principles of Demonstration
61(2)
7 The Prior Knowledge Requirement for Learning by Demonstration
63(1)
8 Learning by Demonstration, Revisited
64(2)
Conclusion
66(3)
Part II. Learning by Definition
5 Learning by Definition: Introduction
69(5)
1 Some Preliminaries
70(2)
2 Learning by Demonstration and by Definition
72(2)
6 Inquiry in APo 2.1
74(15)
1 The Four Questions of Inquiry
74(2)
2 Inquiry and Scientific Knowledge
76(1)
3 Knowledge in APo 2
77(1)
4 From Non-Scientific to Scientific Knowledge
78(2)
5 The Objects of Inquiry
80(3)
6 The Stages of Inquiry
83(1)
7 Meno's Paradox
84(5)
7 Inquiry in APo 2.2
89(19)
1 Searching for the Middle Term
89(2)
2 Attribute Questions
91(1)
3 The Causal and Definitional Constraints
92(1)
4 Meno's Paradox
93(2)
5 The Causal Constraint for Attributes
95(1)
6 The Definitional Constraint: Introducing Causally Complex Essences
96(3)
7 Attributes and Subjects
99(2)
8 The A Term
101(1)
9 A Missing A Term?
102(1)
10 Definition and Explanation
103(1)
11 Subject-Focused Inquiry
104(2)
12 Essence and Middle Term
106(1)
Conclusion
107(1)
8 The Socratic Picture of the Order of Inquiry
108(23)
1 The Intuitionist Picture
108(4)
2 The Explanationist Picture
112(2)
3 The Socratic Picture
114(6)
4 Three Methodological Passages
120(7)
5 Better Known By Nature and To Us: Explanation, Conviction, and Nous
127(2)
6 An Objection
129(2)
9 Cause, Essence, and Definition
131(13)
1 Causes that are the Same vs. Causes that are Different
132(2)
2 Cause and Essence
134(1)
3 The Two Types of Cause in APo 2.9
135(2)
4 How Essences are Discovered
137(1)
5 APo 2.10: Definition
138(3)
6 Nominal Accounts in APo 2.10
141(2)
Conclusion
143(1)
10 Discovering Causally Complex Essences: APo 2.8
144(26)
1 The Puzzles of APo 2.3-7
144(3)
2 The Argument of APo 2.8, 93a3-15
147(3)
3 The Essence-Revealing Demonstration
150(3)
4 Inquiry, Discovery, and Prior Knowledge
153(3)
5 Knowing Part of the Essence
156(1)
6 Knowing Part of x's Essence without Knowing that x Exists
157(2)
7 First Route to Knowledge: Stages 3 to 4
159(3)
8 First Solution to Meno's Paradox
162(1)
9 Inquiring without an A Term
163(1)
10 Discovering the Essence-Revealing Demonstration: Stages 4 to 5
164(2)
11 The Two Models of Demonstration in APo 2.8
166(1)
12 Second Route to Knowledge, Second Solution to Meno's Paradox
166(3)
Conclusion
169(1)
11 Subject-Kinds and their Existence
170(19)
1 Primary vs. Subordinate Subject-Kinds
171(2)
2 Subject-Kinds vs. Demonstrable Attributes
173(2)
3 Subordinate Subject-Kinds vs. Demonstrable Attributes
175(2)
4 Demonstrating Attributes: Teaching by Demonstration, Part 1
177(5)
5 Teaching vs. Inquiring
182(1)
6 Demonstrating Subordinate Subject-Kinds: Teaching by Demonstration, Part 2
183(2)
7 Discovering the Existence of Subordinate Subject-Kinds
185(2)
8 Discovering the Existence of Primary Subject-Kinds
187(2)
12 Discovering Causally Simple Essences: APo 2.13
189(36)
1 Division, Definition, and Explanation
190(6)
2 Discovering the Essences of Subject-Kinds
196(1)
3 Genus, Differentia, and Division: An Overview
197(2)
4 Objections to Division: APo 2.5 and 6
199(1)
5 The D Attribute Rule
199(5)
6 Division Introduced
204(2)
7 Exhaustive Division
206(1)
8 Correctly Dividing a Genus
207(3)
9 Preliminary Conclusions
210(1)
10 Inquiry, Division, and Meno's Paradox
211(7)
11 Defining by Division: Conclusions
218(1)
12 Discovering the Essences of Primary Subject-Kinds
219(6)
Part III. Learning by Induction
13 The Origin and Aim of APo 2.19
225(23)
1 Opening Moves and Overview
225(3)
2 Motivation
228(1)
3 The Origin and Aim of APo 2.19
229(2)
4 Meno's Paradox
231(4)
5 Perception and Logos
235(1)
6 Perception to Nous
236(1)
7 Experience, Induction, and Inquiry
237(3)
8 The Rout Simile
240(1)
9 Perception and Induction: Preliminaries
241(3)
10 Perception and Induction: Details
244(3)
Conclusion
247(1)
Conclusion 248(1)
Bibliography 249(8)
Index Locorum 257(7)
Index Nominum 264(2)
General Index 266
David Bronstein is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Georgetown University. He was educated in Canada and previously taught at Boston University and the University of Oxford. He is the author of several articles on Aristotle's epistemology and philosophy of science.