"De se statements are emphatic assertions in which speakers make fundamental claims about either themselves or others. In English, they are usually conveyed via "I" statements or third person reflexive pronouns, e.g. "she herself," "he himself." De seattitudes appear often in our day-to-day lives, but they also pose a series of challenging problems for both linguists and philosophers. This interdisciplinary volume teases out what de se attitudes connote linguistically and also what these statements reveal about how humans think about themselves and how they understand the world around them. "--
In English, we use the word "I" to express thoughts that we have about ourselves, and we use the reflexive pronouns "himself" and "herself" to attribute such thoughts to others. Philosophers and linguists call such thoughts, and the statements we use to express them, de se.
De se thoughts and statements, although they appear often in our day-to-day lives, pose a series of challenging problems for both linguists and philosophers. This interdisciplinary volume examines the structure of de se thought, various issues concerning the semantics and pragmatics of our discourse about it, and also what it reveals about how humans think about themselves and the world around them.
Contributors are:
Darren Bradley
Alessandro Capone
Eros Corazza
Wayne A. Davis
Denis Delfitto
Michael Devitt
Igor Douven
Neil Feit
Gaetano Fiorin
James Higginbotham
Yan Huang
Kasia M. Jaszczolt
Michael Nelson
Pietro Perconti
John Perry
Michael G. Titelbaum
