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In a Bad State: Responding to State and Local Budget Crises [Kõva köide]

3.81/5 (46 hinnangut Goodreads-ist)
(Professor of Law, Yale Law School)
  • Formaat: Hardback, 248 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 163x242x24 mm, kaal: 476 g, 5 b/w halftones; 1 table
  • Ilmumisaeg: 12-Jul-2023
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press Inc
  • ISBN-10: 0197629156
  • ISBN-13: 9780197629154
Teised raamatud teemal:
In a Bad State: Responding to State and Local Budget CrisesSuurem pilt
  • Formaat: Hardback, 248 pages, kõrgus x laius x paksus: 163x242x24 mm, kaal: 476 g, 5 b/w halftones; 1 table
  • Ilmumisaeg: 12-Jul-2023
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press Inc
  • ISBN-10: 0197629156
  • ISBN-13: 9780197629154
Teised raamatud teemal:
Püsilink: https://www.kriso.ee/db/9780197629154.html
Märksõnad:
An authoritative review of the long history of federal responses to state and local budget crises, from Alexander Hamilton through the COVID-19 pandemic, that reveals what is at stake when a state or city can't pay its debts and provides policy solutions to an intractable American problem.

What should the federal government do if a state like Illinois or a city like Chicago can't pay its debts? From Alexander Hamilton's plan to assume state debts to Congress's efforts to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, many of the most important political disputes in American history have involved federal government responses to state or local fiscal crises.

In a Bad State provides the first comprehensive historical and theoretical analysis of how the federal government has addressed subnational debt crises. Tracing the long history of state and local borrowing, David Schleicher argues that federal officials want to achieve three things when a state or city nears default: prevent macroeconomic distress, encourage lending to states and cities to build infrastructure, and avoid creating incentives for reckless future state budgeting. But whether they demand state austerity, permit state defaults, or provide bailouts-and all have been tried-federal officials can only achieve two of these three goals, at best. Rather than imagining that there is a single easy federal solution, Schleicher suggests some ways the federal government could ameliorate the problem by conditioning federal aid on future state fiscal responsibility, spreading losses across governments and interests, and building resilience against crises into federal spending and tax
policy.

Authoritative and accessible, In a Bad State offers a guide to understanding the pressing fiscal problems that local, state, and federal officials face, and to the policy options they possess for responding to crises.

Arvustused

David Schleicher is the ideal legal scholar of cities. Anyone who is worried about the fiscal future of our states and local governments should read his insightful new book. It is remarkably deep given how much fun it is to read, and it is remarkably fun to read given the seriousness of the topic. * Edward Glaeser, Fred and Eleanor Glimp Professor of Economics and Chairman of the Department of Economics, Harvard University * Faced with mounting Medicaid costs, footloose taxpayers, powerful public employees, and a nationalized political climate that rewards ideological grandstanding over basic competence, America's state governments have become fiscal basket cases. Confident that they'll be bailed out by the federal government at the first sign of economic distress, elected officials in state after state are choosing budget gimmickry over spending discipline, reaping political dividends all the while. But what happens when the bailout doesn't materialize, or isn't quite as generous as expected? Drawing on the history of federal responses to state fiscal disasters from the 1790s to the Covid pandemic, David Schleicher's In a Bad State offers a brilliant and engaging exposition of exactly why these fiscal reckonings have proven so painful in the past, and why the inevitable next one will be no exception. * Reihan Salam, Manhattan Institute * David Schleicher, the leading lawyer on state and city governments, has written an extraordinary book that describes with incredible clarity the complexity of the fiscal decisions that lie ahead for cities and states. It is well worth reading. * Richard Ravitch, Former Lt. Governor of New York and Chairman of the Metropolitan Transit Authority * David Schleicher, one of the most brilliant and far-ranging political thinkers of his generation, here takes on a very specific question: How federal governments should respond when state and local governments default. Schleicher's timely insight is that overspending is inextricable from the question of growth, and In a Bad State's deft history channels all the ways in which federalism has complicated and shaped the efforts to build a bigger and more modern country. The pragmatic question with which this gem-like policy book begins opens into a literary one: Of how existing legal and policy regimes might be bent in order to account for the future. * Benjamin Wallace-Wells, The New Yorker * Highly recommended for public finance professionals, scholars, attorneys, elected officials, and legislative staff. * Choice *

Acknowledgments xi
PART I WHY IS IT SO HARD TO GET OUT OF A BAD STATE? AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM OF STATE AND LOCAL FISCAL CRISES
Introduction: Why Is It So Hard to Get Out of a Bad State?
3(14)
PART II WHEN WE'VE BEEN IN A BAD STATE: THE THEORY AND HISTORY OF FEDERAL RESPONSES TO STATE AND LOCAL FISCAL CRISES
1 What Has Already Been Said about Federal Responses to State and Local Budget Crises? What Has Been Left Out?
17(16)
1.1 STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL MORAL HAZARD OR THE PROBLEM OF "SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS"
17(5)
1.2 STATE FISCAL CRISES AND MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION
22(2)
1.3 STATE BUDGET CRISES, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND DEVELOPMENT
24(3)
1.4 AVOID MORAL HAZARD, ALLEVIATE RECESSIONS, AND/OR BUILD INFRASTRUCTURE: PICK TWO, BUT NOT THREE
27(3)
1.5 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 1: THREE METHODOLOGICAL NOTES
30(3)
2 State Debt Crises through the 1840s
33(8)
2.1 Hamilton, The Assumption Of State Debts, And Moral Hazard
34(2)
2.2 The State Debt Crises Of The 1830S And 1840s
36(5)
3 The Dual Debt Crises of the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century
41(19)
3.1 The Railroad Bond Crises
42(14)
3.1.1 Railroad Bonds in the Courts
45(7)
3.1.2 Railroad Bonds and Local Government Law
52(2)
3.1.3 Americas Urban Civic Infrastructure: "The Achievements of Government... Rivaled the Feats of the Old Testament God"
54(2)
3.2 THE OTHER DEBT CRISIS OF THE 1870S: SOUTHERN STATE POST-RECONSTRUCTION REPUDIATION AND THE "ODIOUS DEBT" DOCTRINE
56(3)
3.3 Conclusion
59(1)
4 State and Local Debt Crises in the 20th Century
60(17)
4.1 State And Local Fiscal Crises During The Great Depression
61(7)
4.1.1 The Creation of
Chapter 9 Municipal Bankruptcy
62(3)
4.1.2 When a State Goes Broke: Arkansas in the 1930s
65(3)
4.2 When Big Cities Go Broke
68(9)
4.2.1 New York City: Ford to City, Drop Dea ... Well, Wait a Minute
70(4)
4.2.2 Bailouts without Moral Hazard: The Case of Washington, DC
74(3)
5 The Great Recession and State and Local Fiscal Crises
77(26)
5.1 The American Recovery And Reinvestment Act
78(1)
5.2 Build America Bonds
79(2)
5.3 The End Of Stimulus And The Rise Of The Pension Crisis
81(6)
5.4 Municipal Bankruptcy In The Great Recession And The Puerto Rico Crisis
87(11)
5.4.1
Chapter 9: A Quick Primer
87(2)
5.4.2
Chapter 9 in the Great Recession
89(9)
5.5 Puerto Rico And Promesa
98(4)
5.6 Conclusion
102(1)
6 COVID-19, the CARES Act, the MLF, and the ARP
103(18)
6.1 Who Cares About States And Cities?
107(2)
6.2 The Municipal Liquidity Facility
109(3)
6.3 The December 2020 Stimulus And The Arp
112(5)
6.4 Conclusion: The Second Draft Of History
117(4)
PART III TOOLS FOR GETTING OUT OF A BAD STATE
7 An Introduction to the Principles for Responding to State and Local Fiscal Crises
121(5)
8 Building Better Bailouts
126(26)
8.1 Traditional Considerations When Building Bailouts
126(4)
8.1.1 General or Specific?
127(1)
8.1.2 Conditional or Unconditional?
127(2)
8.1.3 Loans or Grants?
129(1)
8.2 Building Better Bailouts: Advancing Prudence, Mixing, And Spreading In Bailout Design
130(7)
8.2.1 Conditions on General State and Local Crisis Aid
130(3)
8.2.2 Conditions on Aid to Specific Jurisdictions in Fiscal Crisis
133(4)
9 Building Better Defaults
137(2)
9.1 Building better defaults: reforms to chapter 9
139(7)
9.1.1 Insolvency
139(2)
9.1.2 Preferences
141(2)
9.1.3 Financial Engineering
143(2)
9.1.4
Chapter 9 and Overlapping Local Governments
145(1)
9.2 Building Bigger Defaults: State Governments And
Chapter 9
146(3)
9.3 Appendix To
Chapter 9: The Constitutional Status Of "Big Macs"
149(3)
10 Building Better Forms of State and Local Austerity
152(5)
10.1 Separating State And Local Tax Bases
152(2)
10.2 Pension Reform
154(3)
11 Resilience, or Building a Better Federal System
157(10)
11.1 Encouraging Inter-Regional Mobility
158(1)
11.2 The Tentative Case For Keeping The Municipal Bond Interest Tax Exemption
159(4)
11.3 The Efficiency Of Infrastructure Spending
163(1)
11.4 Nationalizing Parts Of The Welfare State
164(3)
PART IV THE CONCLUSION, OR WHY STATES ARE OFTEN BAD
12 Why States Are Often Bad
167(6)
Notes 173(56)
Index 229
David Schleicher is a Professor of Law at Yale Law School. He is an expert in local government law, federalism, land use, state and local finance, and urban development. His work has been published widely in academic journals, including the Yale Law Journal and the University of Chicago Law Review, as well as in popular outlets like The New York Times, The Atlantic, and Slate. He has been called "the most important thinker we have on the subject of local government" and "ingenious" by National Review, one of the "most interesting writers on land use" by Washington Monthly, "interesting" by The Nation, "clever" by The Economist, "neat" by Slate, and "great but old fashioned" by Vox. He is also the co-host of the podcast, "Digging a Hole: The Legal Theory Podcast."