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Bargaining and the Theory of Cooperative Games: John Nash and Beyond [Kõva köide]

Edited by
  • Formaat: Hardback, 784 pages, kõrgus x laius: 244x169 mm
  • Sari: Elgar Mini Series
  • Ilmumisaeg: 29-Oct-2010
  • Kirjastus: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
  • ISBN-10: 1848441673
  • ISBN-13: 9781848441675
Teised raamatud teemal:
  • Formaat: Hardback, 784 pages, kõrgus x laius: 244x169 mm
  • Sari: Elgar Mini Series
  • Ilmumisaeg: 29-Oct-2010
  • Kirjastus: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
  • ISBN-10: 1848441673
  • ISBN-13: 9781848441675
Teised raamatud teemal:
In John Nash's 1950 seminal paper "The Bargaining Problem" (published in Econometrica) he introduced what has become known as "axiomatic theory of bargaining" and later suggested that "each bargaining problem could be analyzed as a non-cooperative game," according to editor William Thomson (economics, U. of Rochester) in his introduction. The essay goes on to say that "Nash's model has been one of the most successful paradigms of game theory" and discusses the paper in depth. Nash's paper leads off this collection, followed by 50 selected articles and excerpts printed in facsimile (none of the others are discussed). They are arranged in six thematic sections: basic papers, understanding the role of the disagreement point, variable population agents, enriching the model, strategic considerations, and experiments. The articles were previously published in such journals as Games and Economic Behavior, Mathematical Social Sciences, and Journal of Economic Theory. There is no index. Annotation ©2011 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)
Acknowledgements xi
Introduction William Thomson xv
PART I BASIC PAPERS
A Independence
1 `The Bargaining Problem', Econometrica, 18 (2), April, 155-62
5(8)
John F. Nash Jr.
2 `Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem', Mathematics of Operations Research, 2, (1), February, 64-5
13(2)
Alvin E. Roth
3 `Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem', Journal of Economic Theory, 16(2), December, 247-51
15(5)
Alvin E. Roth
4 `Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Revealed Group Preferences', Econometrica, 59, (6), November, 1787-801
20(15)
Hans Peters
Peter Wakker
5 `Generalized Ginis and Cooperative Bargaining Solutions', Econometrica, 62 (5), September, 1161-78
35(18)
Charles Blackorby
Walter Bossert
David Donaldson
6 Efe A. Ok (1998), `Inequality Averse Collective Choice', Journal of Mathematical Economics, 30, 301-21
53(24)
B Monotonicity
7 `Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem', Econometrica, 43 (3), May, 513-18
77(6)
Ehud Kalai
Meir Smorodinsky
8 `An Impossibility Result Concerning n-Person Bargaining Games', International Journal of Game Theory, 8 (3), 129-32
83(4)
A.E. Roth
9 `Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons', Econometrica, 45 (7), October, 1623-30
87(8)
Ehud Kalai
10 `Individual Monotonicity and Lexicographic Maxmin Solution', Econometrica, 51 (2), March, 389-401; `Erratum', Econometrica, 51 (5), September, 1603
95(14)
Haruo Imai
11 `Monotonicity and Independence Axioms', International Journal of Game Theory, 9 (1), 37-49
109(13)
W. Thomson
R.B. Myerson
12 `A Class of Solutions for Group Decision Problems', Management Science, 19 (8), April, 936-46
122(11)
P.L. Yu
13 `The Equal-Loss Principle for Bargaining Problems', Economics Letters, 26, 103-6
133(6)
Youngsub Chun
C Axioms Pertaining to Operations Performed on Feasible Sets
14 `Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility', Econometrica, 45 (7), October, 1631-7
139(7)
Roger B. Myerson
15 `The Super-Additive Solution for the Nash Bargaining Game', International Journal of Game Theory, 10 (3/4), 163-93
146(31)
M.A. Perles
M. Maschler
16 `Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems', Econometrica, 49 (4), July, 883-97
177(15)
Roger B. Myerson
17 `Multiple-Issue Bargaining and Axiomatic Solutions', International Journal of Game Theory, 26, (4), 501-24
192(24)
Clara Ponsati
Joel Watson
18 `Simultaneity of Issues and Additivity in Bargaining', Econometrica, 54 (1), January 153-69
216(19)
Hans Peters
D Ordinal Invariance
19 `Utility Comparison and the Theory of Games', in G. Th. Guilbaud (ed.), La Decision, Paris: Editions du CNRS, 251-63
235(13)
Lloyd S. Shapley
20 `Ordinal Interpersonal Comparisons in Bargaining', Econometrica, 51 (1), January, 219-21
248(3)
Lars Tyge Nielsen
21 `A Note on Ordinally Equivalent Pareto Surfaces', Journal of Mathematical Economics, 34, 27-38
251(12)
Yves Sprumont
22 `An Ordinal Solution to Bargaining Problems with Many Players', Games and Economic Behavior, 46, 129-42
263(16)
Zvi Safra
Dov Samet
E Non-convex Problems
23 `The Bargaining Problem Without Convexity: Extending the Egalitarian and Kalai-Smorodinsky Solutions', Economics Letters, 36, 365-9
279(5)
John P. Conley
Simon Wilkie
24 `The Nash Bargaining Theory with Non-Convex Problems', Econometrica, 65 (3), May, 681-5
284(9)
Lin Zhou
PART II UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF THE DISAGREEMENT POINT
A Monotonocity
25 `Monotonicity of Bargaining Solutions with Respect to the Disagreement Point', Journal of Economic Theory, 42 (1), 50-58
293(12)
William Thomson
B Axioms Pertaining to Operations Performed on Disagreement Points
26 `Characterizing the Nash and Raiffa Bargaining Solutions by Disagreement Point Axioms', Mathematics of Operations Research, 16 (3), August, 447-61
305(15)
Hans Peters
Eric van Damme
27 `Bargaining with Uncertain Disagreement Points', Econometrica, 58 (4), July, 951-9
320(13)
Youngsub Chun
William Thomson
PART III VARIABLE POPULATION OF AGENTS
A Population Monotonicity
28 `The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population', Mathematics of Operations Research, 8 (3), August, 319-26
333(8)
William Thomson
29 `Problems of Fair Division and the Egalitarian Solution', Journal of Economic Theory, 31 (2), December, 211-26
341(16)
William Thomson
30 `Guarantee Structures for Problems of Fair Division', Mathematical Social Sciences, 4, 205-18
357(16)
William Thomson
Terje Lensberg
B Consistency and Its Converse
31 `Stability and Collective Rationality', Econometrica, 55 (4), July, 935-61
373(27)
Terje Lensberg
32 `Stability and the Nash Solution', Journal of Economic Theory, 45 (2), 330-41
400(12)
Terje Lensberg
33 `The Converse Consistency Principle in Bargaining', Games and Economic Behavior, 40, 25-43
412(23)
Youngsub Chun
PART IV ENRICHING THE MODEL
A Adding Information About Underlying Set of Physical Alternatives
34 `Risk Aversion and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem', in O. Moeschlin and D. Pallaschke (eds), Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 65-71
435(7)
Richard E. Kihlstrom
Alvin E. Roth
David Schmeidler
35 `Risk Aversion and Nash's Solution for Bargaining Games with Risky Outcomes', Econometrica, 50 (3), May, 639-47
442(9)
Alvin E. Roth
Uriel G. Rothblum
36 `Risk Aversion in the Nash Bargaining Problem with Risky Outcomes and Risky Disagreement Points', Econometrica, 58 (4), July, 961-5
451(5)
Zvi Safra
Lin Zhou
Itzhak Zilcha
37 `Axiomatic Bargaining Theory on Economic Environments', Journal of Economic Theory, 45 (1), 1-31
456(31)
John E. Roemer
38 `On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and its Extension to Non-Expected Utility Preferences', Econometrica, 60 (5), September, 1171-86
487(16)
Ariel Rubinstein
Zvi Safra
William Thomson
39 `Bargaining Solutions without the Expected Utility Hypothesis', Games and Economic Behavior, 5 (2), April, 288-306
503(19)
Zvi Safra
Itzhak Zilcha
40 `A Cardinal Characterization of the Rubinstein-Safra-Thomson Axiomatic Bargaining Theory', Econometrica, 63 (5), September, 1241-9
522(11)
Simon Grant
Atsushi Kajii
B Adding Claims
41 `Bargaining Problems with Claims', Mathematical Social Sciences, 24, 19-33
533(15)
Youngsub Chun
William Thomson
42 `An Alternative Solution to Bargaining Problems with Claims', Mathematical Social Sciences, 25, 205-20
548(19)
Walter Bossert
C Adding Preferences Over Solutions
43 `Preferences Over Solutions to the Bargaining Problem', Econometrica, 65 (1), January, 1-18
567(22)
Kim C. Border
Uzi Segal
PART V STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS
A Analyzing Bargaining Problems as Strategic Games
44 `Two-Person Cooperative Games', Econometrica, 21 (1), January, 128-40
589(13)
John Nash
45 `The Nash Bargaining Solution is Optimal', Journal of Economic Theory, 38 (1), 78-100
602(23)
Eric van Damme
46 `Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model', Econometrica, 50 (1), January, 97-109
625(16)
Ariel Rubinstein
B Manipulation
47 `Distortion of Preferences and the Nash Theory of Bargaining', Economics Letters, 3, 203-6
641(4)
Vincent P. Crawford
Hal R. Varian
48 `Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem', Econometrica, 49 (3), May, 597-619
645(26)
Joel Sobel
C Implementation
49 `Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution', Journal of Economic Theory, 33 (1), June, 32-45
671(14)
H. Moulin
50 `Subgame-Perfect Implementation of Bargaining Solutions', Games and Economic Behavior, 41, 292-308
685(20)
Eiichi Miyagawa
PART VI EXPERIMENTS
51 `On Dividing Justly', Social Choice and Welfare, 1 (1), 1-24
705
M.E. Yaari
M. Bar-Hillel
Edited by William Thomson, Elmer B. Milliman Professor of Economics, University of Rochester, US