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Behavioral Economics 3rd edition [Kõva köide]

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  • Formaat: Hardback, 556 pages, kõrgus x laius: 234x156 mm, kaal: 952 g, 131 Tables, black and white; 206 Line drawings, black and white; 206 Illustrations, black and white
  • Sari: Routledge Advanced Texts in Economics and Finance
  • Ilmumisaeg: 23-Jan-2018
  • Kirjastus: Routledge
  • ISBN-10: 113809711X
  • ISBN-13: 9781138097117
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Behavioral Economics 3rd editionSuurem pilt
  • Formaat: Hardback, 556 pages, kõrgus x laius: 234x156 mm, kaal: 952 g, 131 Tables, black and white; 206 Line drawings, black and white; 206 Illustrations, black and white
  • Sari: Routledge Advanced Texts in Economics and Finance
  • Ilmumisaeg: 23-Jan-2018
  • Kirjastus: Routledge
  • ISBN-10: 113809711X
  • ISBN-13: 9781138097117
Teised raamatud teemal:
Püsilink: https://www.kriso.ee/db/9781138097117.html
Märksõnad:
Over the last few decades behavioral economics has revolutionized the discipline. It has done so by putting the human back into economics, by recognizing that people sometimes make mistakes, care about others and are generally not as cold and calculating as economists have traditionally assumed. The results have been exciting and fascinating, and have fundamentally changed the way we look at economic behavior.

This textbook introduces all the key results and insights of behavioral economics to a student audience. Ideas such as mental accounting, prospect theory, present bias, inequality aversion and learning are explained in detail. These ideas are also applied in diverse settings such as auctions, stock market crashes, charitable donations and health care, to show why behavioral economics is crucial to understanding the world around us. Consideration is also given to what makes people happy, and how we can potentially nudge people to be happier.

This new edition contains expanded and updated coverage of contract theory, bargaining in the family, time and risk, and stochastic reference points, among other topics, to ensure that readers are kept up to speed with this fast-paced field. The companion website is also updated with a range of new questions and worked examples. This book remains the ideal introduction to behavioral economics for advanced undergraduate and graduate students.
List of figures
xvi
List of tables
xxiv
List of research methods boxes
xxviii
Preface xxx
Part I Introduction
1(28)
1 An introduction to behavioral economics
3(26)
1.1 The history and controversies of behavioral economics
4(14)
1.1.1 Behavioral economics is reborn
6(3)
1.1.2 Behavioral economics and policy
9(2)
1.1.3 The different faces of behavioral economics
11(2)
1.1.4 Debate and controversy
13(3)
1.1.5 Too far or not far enough
16(2)
1.2 Some background on behavioral economics methods
18(6)
1.2.1 Some background on experiments
18(4)
1.2.2 Some background on theory
22(2)
1.3 How to use this book
24(2)
1.3.1
Chapter previews
25(1)
1.3.2 Behavioral finance
26(1)
1.4 Further reading
26(1)
1.5 Online material
27(1)
1.6 Review questions
27(2)
Part II Economic behavior
29(342)
2 Simple heuristics for complex choices
31(66)
2.1 Utility and search
31(14)
2.1.1 How to search
33(5)
2.1.2 Choice arbitrariness
38(7)
2.2 Mental accounting and framing
45(12)
2.2.1 Reference-dependent utility
46(1)
2.2.2 The endowment effect
47(2)
2.2.3 Willingness to pay or accept
49(2)
2.2.4 Transaction utility
51(1)
2.2.5 Narrow framing
52(3)
2.2.6 Hedonic editing
55(1)
2.2.7 Choice bracketing
55(2)
2.3 The role of emotions
57(9)
2.3.1 Aversion to lying
58(1)
2.3.2 Deception
59(4)
2.3.3 Honesty and framing
63(3)
2.4 Summary
66(1)
2.5 Demand, supply and markets
67(8)
2.5.1 Double-auction markets in the lab
69(3)
2.5.2 Posted offer markets and market power
72(1)
2.5.3 The law of one price
73(2)
2.6 Labor supply and reference dependence
75(6)
2.6.1 A Target Income and Target Wage
76(1)
2.6.2 Taxicab drivers
77(2)
2.6.3 Female labor supply
79(2)
2.7 The housing market
81(3)
2.7.1 Reluctance to sell
82(1)
2.7.2 What are buyers willing to pay?
83(1)
2.8 The behavioral life cycle hypothesis
84(7)
2.8.1 Fungibility and mental accounting
86(5)
2.9 Saving for the future
91(4)
2.9.1 Let's diversify
92(1)
2.9.2 Let's not diversify
93(2)
2.10 Further reading
95(1)
2.11 Online material
96(1)
2.12 Review questions
96(1)
3 Choice with risk
97(65)
3.1 Expected utility
97(11)
3.1.1 The Allais paradox
102(1)
3.1.2 Risk aversion
103(3)
3.1.3 Risk-loving for losses
106(1)
3.1.4 When expected utility will work
107(1)
3.2 Independent and fanning out
108(7)
3.2.1 Disappointment
110(2)
3.2.2 Rank-dependent expected utility
112(3)
3.3 Reference dependence and prospect theory
115(11)
3.3.1 Reference-dependent utility
118(1)
3.3.2 The reference point and expectations
119(3)
3.3.3 Combined gambles
122(1)
3.3.4 Stochastic reference point
123(3)
3.4 Preference reversals
126(9)
3.4.1 Procedural invariance
130(1)
3.4.2 Regret theory
131(2)
3.4.3 Prospect theory and preference reversals
133(2)
3.4.4 Why preference reversals matter
135(1)
3.5 Summary
135(1)
3.6 Financial trading
136(8)
3.6.1 The equity premium puzzle
136(3)
3.6.2 The disposition effect
139(3)
3.6.3 The ostrich effect
142(2)
3.7 Insurance
144(2)
3.8 Tax evasion
146(9)
3.8.1 Standard model of tax evasion
148(2)
3.8.2 Behavioral theories of tax evasion
150(2)
3.8.3 Taxes and reference points
152(1)
3.8.4 Tax evasion in the laboratory
152(3)
3.9 Legal settlements
155(5)
3.9.1 Fourfold pattern of risk attitudes
156(2)
3.9.2 Frivolous litigation
158(2)
3.10 Further reading
160(1)
3.11 Online materials
160(1)
3.12 Review questions
160(2)
4 Choosing when to act
162(44)
4.1 Exponential discounting
162(8)
4.1.1 The discount factor
164(4)
4.1.2 The utility of sequences
168(2)
4.2 Hyperbolic discounting
170(9)
4.2.1 Quasi-hyperbolic discounting
172(2)
4.2.2 The consequences of time inconsistency
174(2)
4.2.3 Temptation and self-control
176(3)
4.3 Loss aversion and sequences
179(5)
4.3.1 Reference dependence
179(3)
4.3.2 Preferences for sequences
182(2)
4.4 Time and risk
184(5)
4.5 Summary
189(1)
4.6 Borrowing and saving
190(3)
4.6.1 Saving equals growth or growth equals saving?
191(1)
4.6.2 Why save when you have debts?
192(1)
4.7 Exploiting time inconsistency
193(5)
4.7.1 Time inconsistency and consumer behavior
193(1)
4.7.2 Firm pricing
194(3)
4.7.3 Choosing the correct calling plan
197(1)
4.8 Environmental economics
198(5)
4.8.1 Inter-generational discount factor
199(2)
4.8.2 Reducing CO2 emissions
201(2)
4.9 Further reading
203(1)
4.10 Online materials
204(1)
4.11 Review questions
204(2)
5 Learning from new information
206(44)
5.1 Bayesian updating and choice with uncertainty
206(6)
5.1.1 Models of choice with uncertainty
208(2)
5.1.2 The Ellsberg paradox
210(2)
5.2 Two cognitive biases
212(10)
5.2.1 Confirmatory bias
212(2)
5.2.2 A Model of Confirmatory Bias
214(2)
5.2.3 Law of small numbers
216(2)
5.2.4 A Model of the Law of Small Numbers
218(2)
5.2.5 Generating random sequences
220(1)
5.2.6 Do biases matter?
221(1)
5.3 Learning from others
222(9)
5.3.1 To conform or not
222(1)
5.3.2 Cascade experiments
223(3)
5.3.3 What happened to conformity?
226(2)
5.3.4 Signaling games
228(3)
5.4 Summary
231(1)
5.5 Health care
231(5)
5.5.1 Patients
231(3)
5.5.2 Practitioners
234(2)
5.6 Bubble and bust
236(9)
5.6.1 Bubbles in the lab
236(4)
5.6.2 Experience and bubbles
240(4)
5.6.3 Explaining bubbles
244(1)
5.7 Voting in elections
245(2)
5.8 Further reading
247(1)
5.9 Online materials
248(1)
5.10 Review questions
248(2)
6 Interacting with others
250(71)
6.1 The beauty contest
250(6)
6.1.1 Strategy and Nash equilibrium
251(2)
6.1.2 Choice in a beauty contest
253(2)
6.1.3 Learning in a beauty contest
255(1)
6.2 Playing for the first time
256(17)
6.2.1 Level-k thinking
256(2)
6.2.2 Sophisticated beliefs
258(2)
6.2.3 Focal points
260(5)
6.2.4 Equilibrium refinement
265(4)
6.2.5 Nash equilibrium with mistakes
269(4)
6.3 Learning from experience
6.3.1 Reinforcement learning
273(1)
6.3.2 Belief-based learning
274(4)
6.3.3 Experience-weighted learning
278(1)
6.3.4 Learning and prediction
279(4)
6.4 Teams make decisions
283(7)
6.4.1 Teams and the beauty contest
285(3)
6.4.2 The sophistication of teams
288(1)
6.4.3 Are teams smarter?
289(1)
6.5 Summary
290(1)
6.6 Auctions
290(6)
6.6.1 Revenue equivalence
291(2)
6.6.2 Winner's curse
293(3)
6.7 Learning to coordinate
296(13)
6.7.1 Weakest link games
297(6)
6.7.2 Threshold public good games
303(2)
6.7.3 Coordinating on networks
305(4)
6.8 Monetary policy by committee
309(1)
6.9 Industrial organization
310(9)
6.9.1 Limit pricing
311(3)
6.9.2 Market entry
314(2)
6.9.3 Quantity leadership
316(3)
6.10 Further reading
319(1)
6.11 Online materials
319(1)
6.12 Review questions
319(2)
7 Social preferences
321(50)
7.1 The experimental evidence for social preferences
321(17)
7.1.1 The nice side of social preferences
322(5)
7.1.2 The nasty side of social preferences
327(3)
7.1.3 Reciprocity
330(4)
7.1.4 Fairness and competition
334(1)
7.1.5 The terminology of reciprocity
335(1)
7.1.6 Social preferences and teams
335(3)
7.2 Inequality aversion
338(8)
7.2.1 Inequality aversion with incomplete information
338(3)
7.2.2 Inequality aversion with complete information
341(4)
7.2.3 An evaluation of inequality aversion models
345(1)
7.3 Intentions and social norms
346(7)
7.3.1 A Model of Fairness Based on Intentions
347(2)
7.3.2 What is fair?
349(4)
7.4 Summary
353(1)
7.5 Giving to charity
354(4)
7.5.1 Crowding out
354(2)
7.5.2 Who is watching?
356(2)
7.5.3 Why do people give?
358(1)
7.6 Price and wage rigidity
358(7)
7.6.1 Amodelof worker reciprocity
360(2)
7.6.2 Wage stickiness in the lab
362(1)
7.6.3 How long to forget a wage change?
363(1)
7.6.4 Firm pricing
363(2)
7.7 Contract theory
365(4)
7.7.1 Contracts for loss-averse workers
366(2)
7.7.2 Exploitation of an overconfident worker
368(1)
7.8 Further reading
369(1)
7.9 Online materials
369(1)
7.10 Review questions
369(2)
Part III Origins of behavior
371(92)
8 Evolution and culture
373(42)
8.1 Evolution and economic behavior
373(12)
8.1.1 Looking for food and finding a utility function
374(2)
8.1.2 Choosing when to have children
376(1)
8.1.3 Aggregate risk
377(3)
8.1.4 Competing with others
380(5)
8.2 Culture and multi-level selection
385(11)
8.2.1 Cross-cultural comparisons
385(4)
8.2.2 Group selection
389(3)
8.2.3 Gene-culture coevolution
392(1)
8.2.4 Reciprocity in children and chimpanzees
393(3)
8.3 Summary
396(1)
8.4 The gender gap
397(6)
8.4.1 Attitudes to risk
398(1)
8.4.2 Attitudes to competition
399(2)
8.4.3 Social preferences
401(1)
8.4.4 Why are men and women different?
402(1)
8.5 The economics of family
403(4)
8.6 Development economics
407(6)
8.6.1 The education production function
407(3)
8.6.2 Microfinance
410(3)
8.7 Further reading
413(1)
8.8 Online materials
413(1)
8.9 Review questions
414(1)
9 Neuroeconomics
415(48)
9.1 An introduction to the brain
415(9)
9.1.1 An economist's map of the brain
418(3)
9.1.2 Brain processes
421(1)
9.1.3 Executive control systems
422(2)
9.2 Valuing rewards and learning
424(9)
9.2.1 Reward evaluation
424(3)
9.2.2 Learning about rewards
427(3)
9.2.3 Risk and uncertainty
430(2)
9.2.4 Different types of reward
432(1)
9.3 Making decisions
433(17)
9.3.1 Choice and strategy
434(3)
9.3.2 Framing effects
437(1)
9.3.3 Strategic behavior
438(2)
9.3.4 Fairness and norms
440(3)
9.3.5 Punishment and inequality aversion
443(2)
9.3.6 Present bias and a brain in conflict
445(4)
9.3.7 Multiple-self models
449(1)
9.4 Summary
450(1)
9.5 Addiction
451(9)
9.5.1 A Model of Rational Addiction
452(2)
9.5.2 Biases and addiction
454(3)
9.5.3 Cues and addiction
457(2)
9.5.4 Addiction and neuroscience
459(1)
9.6 Further reading
460(1)
9.7 Online materials
461(1)
9.8 Review questions
461(2)
Part IV Welfare and policy
463(67)
10 Happiness and utility
465(39)
10.1 What makes us happy?
465(8)
10.1.1 Happiness is relative
468(3)
10.1.2 Adaption and habituation
471(2)
10.2 Do we know what makes us happy?
473(7)
10.2.1 Remembered utility
474(3)
10.2.2 Projection bias
477(3)
10.3 Choice and commitment
480(6)
10.3.1 Does present bias matter?
481(2)
10.3.2 Pre-commitment
483(1)
10.3.3 Do people like having choice?
484(2)
10.4 Summary
486(1)
10.5 Health and happiness
487(5)
10.5.1 Measuring the value of treatment
487(3)
10.5.2 Improving the remembered utility of treatment
490(2)
10.6 Saving and retirement
492(3)
10.6.1 Projection bias in saving
492(2)
10.6.2 Investor autonomy
494(1)
10.7 Welfare trade-offs
495(6)
10.7.1 The inflation-unemployment trade-off
495(2)
10.7.2 Taxsaliency
497(4)
10.8 Further reading
501(1)
10.9 Online materials
502(1)
10.10 Review questions
502(2)
11 Policy and behavior
504(26)
11.1 Designing good institutions
504(13)
11.1.1 The tragedy of the commons
505(3)
11.1.2 Matching markets
508(4)
11.1.3 Spectrum auctions
512(4)
11.1.4 Behavioral economics and institution design
516(1)
11.2 Nudge and behavior change
517(11)
11.2.1 Savings accounts
518(1)
11.2.2 A Default to Save
519(2)
11.2.3 Nudge
521(3)
11.2.4 Nudge and behavior change
524(1)
11.2.5 Consumer protection, health and the environment
525(3)
11.3 Summary
528(1)
11.4 Further reading
528(1)
11.5 Online materials
529(1)
11.6 Review questions
529(1)
Bibliography 530(20)
Index 550
Edward Cartwright is a Reader in Economics at the University of Kent, Canterbury, UK.