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Belief-based Stability in Coalition Formation with Uncertainty: An Intelligent Agents' Perspective 2013 ed. [Kõva köide]

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  • Formaat: Hardback, 183 pages, kõrgus x laius: 235x155 mm, 27 Illustrations, black and white; XIX, 183 p. 27 illus., 1 Hardback
  • Ilmumisaeg: 25-Sep-2013
  • Kirjastus: Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. K
  • ISBN-10: 3642382142
  • ISBN-13: 9783642382147
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Belief-based Stability in Coalition Formation with Uncertainty: An Intelligent Agents' Perspective 2013 ed.Suurem pilt
  • Formaat: Hardback, 183 pages, kõrgus x laius: 235x155 mm, 27 Illustrations, black and white; XIX, 183 p. 27 illus., 1 Hardback
  • Ilmumisaeg: 25-Sep-2013
  • Kirjastus: Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. K
  • ISBN-10: 3642382142
  • ISBN-13: 9783642382147
Teised raamatud teemal:
Püsilink: https://www.kriso.ee/db/9783642382147.html
Märksõnad:
Belief-based Stability in Coalition Formation with Uncertainty An Intelligent Agents’ Perspective discusses coalition stability. It extends the classic stability concept of the non-transferable utility core by proposing new belief-based stability criteria under uncertainty, and illustrates how the new concept can be used to analyze the stability of a new type of belief-based coalition formation game. The book is intended for graduate students, engineers, and researchers in the field of artificial intelligence and computer science.Chi-kong Chan is a laboratory manager and a visiting lecturer at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University, China; Ho-fung Leung is a Professor and the Chairman of Department of Computer Science and Engineering, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, China.

This book extends the classic stability concept of the non-transferable utility core, proposing new belief-based stability criteria under uncertainty and showing use of the concept to analyze the stability of a new type of belief-based coalition forming game.
Chapter 1 Multi-agent Cooperation and Stability
1(12)
1.1 Semi-competitive Multi-agent Systems
1(5)
1.1.1 Characteristics of Multi-agent Systems
1(3)
1.1.2 Two Basic Solution Concepts of Coalition Formations
4(2)
1.2 Coalition Formation and Game Theory
6(3)
1.2.1 Transferable Utility Games
7(1)
1.2.2 Non-transferable Utility Games
8(1)
1.3 Problem with the Common Knowledge Assumption
9(4)
References
11(2)
Chapter 2 Non-transferable Utility Games and Coalition Formation Mechanisms
13(16)
2.1 Non-transferable Utility Cooperative Games
14(4)
2.2 Transferable Utility Cooperative Games
18(4)
2.3 Coalition Formation Mechanisms
22(2)
2.4 Belief and Uncertainties
24(5)
References
25(4)
Chapter 3 Two Classes of Stability --- Strong Core and Weak Core
29(44)
3.1 Coalition Formation and Stability
30(5)
3.2 An Example
35(6)
3.3 NTU Games with Internal Uncertainty
41(5)
3.4 Opinions and Preferences of Agents
46(8)
3.5 The Strong Core and the Weak Core
54(10)
3.6 Effect of Refinedness of Agent Opinions
64(5)
3.7 Application Areas
69(1)
3.8 Summary
70(3)
References
71(2)
Chapter 4 The b-Core: Belief-based Coalition Stability
73(42)
4.1 Games Without Common Knowledge
74(3)
4.2 Belief-based Coalitional Games
77(9)
4.3 NTU Games with Private Beliefs
86(14)
4.4 The Core, the b-Core and Belief Accuracy
100(10)
4.5 Discussion
110(2)
4.6 On Dynamic Beliefs
112(1)
4.7 Summary
113(2)
References
114(1)
Chapter 5 Example Application of the b-Core: Buyer Coalition Problem with Beliefs
115(32)
5.1 Buyer Coalition Problems
116(5)
5.1.1 Are the Utility Really Transferable?
118(1)
5.1.2 How About Stability?
119(1)
5.1.3 Private Information in Buyer Coalition
119(1)
5.1.4 Existing Approaches
120(1)
5.1.5 A New Approach
120(1)
5.2 Background of Buyer Coalition Problem
121(11)
5.2.1 Unit Price Schedule and Agent Preference
121(3)
5.2.2 Agent Beliefs
124(1)
5.2.3 NTU Buyer Coalition Games
125(4)
5.2.4 Properties of the b-Core in NTU-Buyer Games
129(3)
5.2.5 On Mechanism Design
132(1)
5.3 A Distributed Mechanism
132(7)
5.3.1 Distributed Non-transferable Utility Coalition Formation Mechanism
133(4)
5.3.2 An Example of the Mechanism
137(2)
5.4 Experiment
139(4)
5.4.1 Performance of the Mechanism
139(3)
5.4.2 Evidence of Incentive Compatibility
142(1)
5.5 Summary
143(4)
References
144(3)
Chapter 6 The Complete Picture: sb-Core and wb-Core
147(24)
6.1 Uncertain Opinion and Private Beliefs
148(2)
6.2 An Illustrating Example
150(5)
6.3 NTU-BU Games
155(10)
6.3.1 Preferences and Beliefs in NTU-BU Games
157(2)
6.3.2 NTU-BU Games Stability
159(6)
6.4 Properties
165(5)
6.4.1 Relationships of the Four Criteria
165(1)
6.4.2 Effect of Refinedness
166(2)
6.4.3 Effect of Accuracy
168(2)
6.5 Summary
170(1)
References
170(1)
Chapter 7 Conclusion
171(6)
7.1 New Solution Concepts for Belief-based NTU Games
171(3)
7.2 The Future
174(3)
References
175(2)
Book References 177(4)
Index 181