Muutke küpsiste eelistusi

Best Scores: Solution to the Catastrophe-Bound Environment [Kõva köide]

  • Formaat: Hardback, 130 pages, kõrgus x laius: 230x155 mm, kaal: 408 g
  • Ilmumisaeg: 01-Jun-2017
  • Kirjastus: Nova Science Publishers Inc
  • ISBN-10: 1536109150
  • ISBN-13: 9781536109153
Teised raamatud teemal:
  • Formaat: Hardback, 130 pages, kõrgus x laius: 230x155 mm, kaal: 408 g
  • Ilmumisaeg: 01-Jun-2017
  • Kirjastus: Nova Science Publishers Inc
  • ISBN-10: 1536109150
  • ISBN-13: 9781536109153
Teised raamatud teemal:
Foreword ix
Preface xi
List of Figures
xiii
List of Tables
xv
Chapter 1 Introduction
1(4)
Chapter 2 Environmental Problems, Major Initiatives and Clean Technology
5(30)
1 Pollution Problems
5(6)
1.1 Climate Change
6(2)
1.2 Acid Rain
8(1)
1.3 Water Pollution
9(1)
1.4 Waste Disposal Problem
10(1)
2 Depletion of Natural Resources
11(4)
2.1 Deforestation
11(1)
2.2 Ozone Layer Depletion
12(1)
2.3 Global Fossil Fuel Consumption Surges
13(1)
2.4 Loss of Biodiversity
14(1)
2.5 Melting Glaciers
14(1)
2.6 Mineral Resources Depletion
15(1)
3 Major Environmental Control Initiatives
15(11)
3.1 International Environmental Agreements
16(6)
3.2 Montreal Protocol
22(2)
3.3 Other IEAs
24(2)
4 Environmentally Clean Technology
26(6)
4.1 Development of Clean Technology
26(3)
4.2 Brief Review on Clean Technology Studies
29(3)
5
Chapter Notes
32(3)
Chapter 3 Analytical Framework and Non-Cooperative Equilibrium
35(24)
1 Economy and Technology
36(5)
2 Impacts and Accumulation Dynamics of Pollutants
41(2)
3 Government Objectives
43(2)
4 Non-Cooperative Equilibrium
45(9)
5
Chapter Notes
54(1)
6 Appendix: Notational Definition and Proof of Theorem 4.1
55(4)
Part 1 Notational Definition
55(1)
Part 2 Proof of Theorem 4.1
56(3)
Chapter 4 BEST SCORES Cooperation: Theory and Solution Mechanism
59(30)
1 Theoretical Underpinnings of BEST SCORES Cooperation
60(3)
2 Group Optimal Cooperation
63(6)
2.1 Gains from Cooperative Development
63(2)
2.2 Cooperative Optimization
65(4)
3 Best Technology Pattern under Cooperation
69(9)
3.1 Group Optimal Cooperative Strategies
70(6)
3.2 Optimal Cooperative Trajectory
76(1)
3.3 Individual Rationality in Cooperation
77(1)
4 Subgame Consistent Collaborative Solution
78(7)
4.1 The Condition of Subgame Consistency
79(1)
4.2 Subgame Consistent Payoff Distribution Procedure
80(3)
4.3 Economic Viability and Transfer Payments
83(2)
5 Institutional Mechanism Design for BEST SCORES Cooperation
85(2)
6
Chapter Notes
87(2)
Chapter 5 An OR Model of BEST SCORES Cooperation
89(30)
1 Hierarchical Structure of Operations Research Scheme
89(3)
2 Operational Framework Construction
92(10)
2.1 Economy and Technology
92(6)
2.2 Impacts and Accumulation Dynamics of Pollutants
98(2)
2.3 Government Objectives
100(2)
3 Non-cooperative Outcome
102(2)
4 Cooperative Solutions
104(9)
4.1 Gains in Cooperative Clean Technology Development
104(1)
4.2 Gains from Abatement Cooperation and Pollution Dynamics
105(1)
4.3 Optimization under Different Technology Patterns
106(3)
4.4 Optimal Cooperative Solution
109(4)
5 Courses of Actions
113(4)
5.7 Subgame Consistent Payoff Distribution
113(1)
5.2 Imputation Distribution Mechanism
114(2)
5.3 Transfer Payments
116(1)
6
Chapter Notes
117(2)
Chapter 6 Stochastic and Heuristic Models of BEST SCORES Cooperation
119(38)
1 Stochastic BEST SCORES Cooperation Model
119(3)
2 Non-Cooperative Outcome
122(3)
3 Cooperative Clean Technology Development and Environmental Control
125(13)
3.1 Gains in Cooperation
125(1)
3.2 Cooperative Optimization under Uncertainty
126(12)
4 Subgame Consistent Collaboration under Uncertainty
138(5)
4.1 Optimality Principle
138(1)
4.2 Imputation Distribution Mechanism
139(4)
5 BEST SCORES Cooperation: A Heuristic Approach
143(13)
5.1 Information and Plausible Estimates
143(3)
5.2 A Heuristic Model of BEST SCORES Cooperation
146(4)
5.3 A Numerical Illustration
150(6)
6
Chapter Notes
156(1)
7 Appendix: Proof of Theorem 2.1
156(1)
Technical Appendices for
Chapter 5
157(1)
Appendix A Proof of Proposition 3.1 157(10)
Appendix B Proof of Proposition 4.1 167(6)
References 173(12)
Author Contact Information 185(2)
Index 187